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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Federal Statutes and Regulation
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW -WATERSHED PROTECTION AND FLOOD PRE-
VENTION ACT - UNDER SECTION 5, A MULTIDAM PROJECT MAY BE
TREATED AS A SINGLE UNIT FOR PURPOSES OF COMPUTING A COST/-
BENEFIT RATIO.
Concerned Residents v. Grant (1976)
As a result of frequent flooding in the Brodhead Creek area of the
Pocono Mountains in northeastern Pennsylvania, local government officials
sought federal assistance' under the Watershed Protection and Flood
Prevention Act (Watershed Act)2 to build four floodwater detention dams.
3
After the project application was approved,4 a work plan 5 describing the
project was prepared by the local officials and the Soil Conservation Service
of the Department of Agriculture (SCS) and submitted to the appropriate
congressional committees for approval.6 Although the approval was
received,7 delays ensued that necessitated the preparation of a supplemental
work plan.8 As required under the Watershed Act, both the original and
1. The county commissioners of Monroe and Pike counties applied for federal aid
in 1958. Concerned Residents v. Grant, 537 F.2d 29, 31 (3d Cir. 1976).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1009 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Section 4 sets forth the
conditions which must be met in order to obtain federal assistance under the
Watershed Act. See id. § 1004.
3. 537 F.2d at 31. A flood in August 1955, which claimed nine lives and caused
severe property damage, prompted local officials to attempt to remedy the situation.
Id. at 31 n.1.
4. The governor of Pennsylvania approved the application for the project,
pursuant to section 3 of the Watershed Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1003 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
537 F.2d at 31 n.1.
5. The Watershed Act does not expressly provide that a work plan must be
prepared. However, the frequent references to a "plan" seemingly indicate that one is
envisioned as a component of programs instituted under the Watershed Act. See 16
U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1003, 1005 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The work .plan prepared in the
instant case enumerated the duties to be performed by the parties involved in the
multidam construction. Concerned Residents v. Grant, 388 F. Supp. 394, 410 (M.D. Pa.
1975).
6. 537 F.2d at 31. The work plan was submitted to the Agriculture Committees of
both houses of Congress in 1961 pursuant to section 2 of the Watershed Act, which
requires that, when the amount of federal funding requested for a project is estimated
to exceed $250,000, approval by the "appropriate Committees of the Senate and House
of Representatives" be obtained. 16 U.S.C. § 1002 (Supp. V 1975). The estimated cost of
the proposed project in the instant case was $2 million. 537 F.2d at 31.
7. 537 F.2d at 31.
8. Section 4 of the Watershed Act requires local officials to obtain any easements
needed for the project. See 16 U.S.C. § 1004(1) (Supp. V 1975). Because the local
officials experienced difficulty in obtaining the necessary easements, construction
was delayed for approximately nine years. 537 F.2d at 31-32.
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supplemental work plans included a cost/benefit analysis9 which asserted
that the benefits of the multidam project, when evaluated as a whole,
exceeded its costs.' 0 As construction of two of the dams was nearing
completion,"I the plan for the remaining dam, Pa-466, met the opposition of
local residents, who claimed that its construction would decrease their
property values and interfere with their enjoyment of the area. 2 Seeking
.declaratory and injunctive relief,' 3 the residents instituted a class action,' 4
alleging that the SCS decision to award a contract to construct dam Pa-466
violated the Watershed Act' 5 since the benefits of that dam, when separately
evaluated, did not exceed its costs.' 6 The United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania held that, under the Watershed Act, each
dam in a multidam project must be individually cost justified; and, because
the benefits of dam Pa-466 did not exceed its costs when separately
evaluated, an injunction was issued to restrain its construction. 17 On appeal
by the SCS, i s the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed,' 9 holding that, under the Watershed Act, a multidam project may
9. 537 F.2d at 31-32. Section 5 of the Watershed Act provides that a cost/benefit
ratio must be determined for any flood control project for which federal assistance is
sought: "At such time as the Secretary [of Agriculture] and the interested local
organizations have agreed on a plan for works of improvement, and the Secretary has
determined that the benefits exceed the costs. . . , the local organization may secure
* . . services . . . in connection with such works of improvement ...... 16 U.S.C.
§ 1005(1) (1970) (emphasis added). For a discussion of how a cost/benefit ratio is
computed, see text accompanying note 24 infra.
10. 537 F.2d at 31-32. The ratio of benefits to costs in the original work plan was
1.2 to 1, while the supplemental work plan contained an updated ratio of 1.8 to 1. Id.
11. Id. The original work plan had provided for the construction of four dams. See
text accompanying note 3 supra. However, the conveyance of the necessary easements
was conditioned upon deletion of one of the proposed dams from the project. 537 F.2d
at 31-32; see note 8 supra.
12. Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 4.
13. 388 F. Supp. at 396-97. Plaintiffs sought to have construction of dam Pa-466
enjoined, and they further requested that the actions of the SCS be declared violative
of section 5 of the Watershed Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1005(1) (1970), and of section 102 of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). 388 F. Supp.
at 396-96; see note 29 and accompanying text infra.
14. 388 F. Supp. at 400. Members of the class were local residents "who both use
and enjoy [the area's] environmental resources, including its extraordinary fishing,
wildlife and scenic beauty." Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 2. The residents
alleged that the dam would destroy the recreational aspects of the area "without
commensurate benefit in terms of flood protection." Id.; see note 48 and accompany-
ing text infra.
15. 388 F. Supp. at 396.
16. Brief for Appellees at 10, 24-25.
17. 388 F. Supp. at 399. The district court also held: 1) that the SCS had violated
section 102 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) (1970), by its failure to file an
environmental impact statement (see note 29 and accompanying text infra); 2) that
judicial review of the SCS's actions under the Watershed Act was available; and 3)
that the discount rate of 3.25% used by the SCS to convert future dollars into present
values was unlawfully low (see note 24 and accompanying text & note 34 infra). 388 F.
Supp. at 398-99.
18. The substantive appeal dealt solely with the issue concerning the Watershed
Act, since the SCS did not appeal the district court's determination that it had
violated section 102 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). 537 F.2d at 31.
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be treated as a single unit for purposes of computing a cost/benefit ratio.
Concerned Residents v. Grant, 537 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1976).
In response to a growing need to both preserve the nation's resources
20
and protect against loss of life and damage to property,21 the Watershed Act
was enacted in 1954 to provide federal assistance for communities seeking to
institute works of improvement in the area of flood control.22 In order to
obtain financial assistance under the Watershed Act, section 5 requires that
the benefits of the proposed project exceed its costs. 23 Determination of a
cost/benefit ratio involves a complex four step process: 1) defining the
benefits and costs of the particular project; 2) assigning monetary values to
each benefit and costs; 3) discounting these monetary values to present
20. Prior to the passage of the Watershed Act, President Eisenhower summarized
the federal government's role in the area of resource preservation in an address to
Congress:
The Federal Government has a responsibility to manage wisely ... public
lands and forests .... Important values exist in these lands for forest and
mineral products, grazing, fish and wildlife, and for recreation. Moreover, it is
imperative to the welfare of thousands of communities and millions of acres of
irrigated land that such lands be managed to protect the water supply and water
quality which comes from them. In the utilization of these lands, the people are
entitled to expect that their timber, minerals, streams and water supply, wildlife,
and recreational values should be safeguarded, improved, and made available not
only for this but for future generations. At the same time, public lands should be
made available for their best use under conditions that promote stability for
communities and individuals and encourage full development of the resources
involved.
President's Message to Congress Relative to a Program Designed to Conserve and
Improve the Nation's Natural Resources, H.R. Doc. No. 221, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1954), reprinted in (1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2901-02.
21. The preamble of the Watershed Act provides:
Erosion, floodwater, and sediment damages in the watersheds of the rivers
and streams of the United States, causing loss of life and damage to property,
constitute a menace to the national welfare; and it is the sense of Congress that
the Federal Government should cooperate with States and their political
subdivisions, soil or water conservation districts, flood prevention or control
districts, and other local public agencies for the purpose of preventing such
damages, of furthering the conservation, development, utilization, and disposal of
water, and the conservation and utilization of land and thereby of preserving,
protecting, and improving the Nation's land and water resources and the quality
of the environment.
16 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added)
22. A letter from E.T. Benson, former Secretary of Agriculture, to Clifford R.
Hope, then Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, described the purpose
of the house bill, that was subsequently enacted into law as the Watershed Act: "The
dominant purpose of watershed plans provided for by the bill would be flood
prevention and water management .... The bill provides for cooperative effort by
States and local agencies and the Federal Government in a unified manner for...
the management of water within small watersheds." Letter from E.T. Benson to
Clifford R. Hope (Aug. 5, 1953), reprinted in S. REP. No. 1620, 83 Cong., 2d Seas. 7
(1954).
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dollar figures; and 4) converting present value figures into a ratio. 24 Where a
large project is composed of several smaller projects, calculation of the
overall cost/benefit ratio may be further complicated if each subproject must
be separately evaluated to determine whether its benefits exceed its costs.
The Watershed Act is silent as to whether component parts of a large
flood control project may be treated as single units in determining the
cost/benefit ratio. Section 2 does provide, however, that "[a] number of...
subwatersheds, when they are component parts of a larger watershed, may
be planned together when the local sponsoring organizations so desire. '25
While no cases decided under the Watershed Act have clarified this
provision, several cases decided under the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA)26 have addressed a similar issue.27 In keeping with its
purpose of ensuring that environmental factors receive due consideration in
the planning of federal programs, 28 NEPA requires that any federal agency
seeking to implement a plan that may substantially effect the environment
submit an environmental impact statement setting forth the advantages
24. Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Courts: Judicial Review Under NEPA, 9
GA. L. REV. 417, 420-21 (1975). For further discussion of the cost/benefit analysis, see
Comment, Judicial Review of Cost-Benefit Analysis Under NEPA, 53 NEB. L. REV.
540, 545-47 (1974).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1002 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
27. See note 30 & 31 and accompanying text infra.
28. Section 101 of NEPA provides in part:
(a) The Congress ... declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal
Government . .. to use all practicable means and measures . . . to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and
future generations of Americans.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation
may-
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically
and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage ...
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources ....
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a), (b)(2), (3), (4), (6) (1970) (emphasis added). In addition, section
102(2)(B) states: "the Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible ... all agencies of the Federal Government shall ... identify and develop
methods and procedures ... which will insure that presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in
decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations." Id. § 4332(2)(B).
4
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and disadvantages of the proposed project as it relates to the environment. 29
In examining cases brought for violations of NEPA, courts generally have
held that, where a project is composed of several subprojects, an environ-
mental impact statement should be filed for the project as a whole, 30 because
separate evaluations of project subparts often do not reveal the cumulative
detrimental effects which the entire project may have upon the environ-
ment.31 On the other hand, where a separate evaluation of each subproject
would reveal more extensive environmental damage than is shown by a
comprehensive statement, NEPA's policies seemingly require separate
impact statements, for each segment, in order that there be full discovery of,
and weight accorded to, the actual environmental costs of the project.32
29. Id. § 4332(2)(C). Section 102(2)(C) states that all federal agencies shall
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable committments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id.
30. See, e.g., Swain v. Brinegar, 9 ENvia. REP. (BNA) 1086, 89 (7th Cir. July 20,
1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Appalachian
Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105, 115 (D.N.H. 1975); Chelsea Neighbor-
hood Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 389 F. Supp. 1171, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120, 124 (E.D. Va. 1972). See also Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2730-31 (1976); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,
313 U.S. 508, 527-28 (1941).
31. As one court reasoned: "One more factory polluting air and water ... may
represent the straw that breaks the back of the environmental camel. Hence the
absolute, as well as comparative, effects of a major federal action must be
considered." Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 831 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973) (in deciding whether agency action significantly affects the
environment, the agency should examine its project in relation to existing
environmental conditions).
The concept of the division of a project into subparts for evaluation of its
environmental impact is termed "segmentation". See Appalachian Mountain Club v.
Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105, 114-15 (D.N.H. 1975). The rationale against segmenting
projects for environmental impact evaluation is founded upon the principle that, in
considering the advantages or disadvantages of a particular project, isolated glimpses
of particular results may not give a comprehensive objective view of the situation. Cf.
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Barker Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 435 (1905). The Third
Circuit's opinion in Concerned Residents is perhaps subject to criticism for the lack of
reference to the term "segmentation" and the NEPA cases which discuss it, although
it is possible that the issue was simply never discussed by the parties.
32. The author is aware of no reported situations prior to the present one where
separate evaluations of the segments of a project proved to reveal a greater amount of
environmental detriment than did the evaluation of the project as a whole. See note 45
infra. However, where separate evaluations may prove to be more revealing than one
cumulative impact statement, it is reasonable to expect a court to find segmentation to
be proper, in accordance with NEPA's mandate to federal agencies that they properly
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Before addressing the merits of the action, the Third Circuit extensively
considered the questions of standing33 and judicial review. 34 Finding neither
of these issues preclusive, the court confronted the merits of the case,
emphasizing initially that nothing in the Watershed Act itself requires that
33. 537 F.2d at 33. Although the parties had stipulated to standing, the court
requested during oral argument that both parties submit supplemental briefs on the
issue. Id. at 33 n.7. The Third Circuit initially observed that section 10(a) of the
Administrative'Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), was applicable. 537 F.2d at
33 n.7. Section 10(a) provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). The court noted
that Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp has interpreted section 10(a) of the
APA to mean that an individual has standing to sue under a particular statute if he
alleges: 1) that he has sustained or will sustain some actual. or threatened injury; and
2) that the injury is one within the "zone of interests" to be protected by the particular
statute. 537 F.2d at 33, citing Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152-53 (1970). The court determined that the plaintiffs' allegation in the instant case
that the dam would decrease their property values and "impair [their] enjoyment of
the area's recreational and aesthetic resources" clearly satisfied the first requirement
of injury. 537 F.2d at 33. The Third Circuit then observed that the second standing
requirement did not limit the focus solely to the cost/benefit aspect of the Watershed
Act, but rather upon the purposes of the Watershed Act as a whole: to "benefit the
residents of areas afflicted by flood dangers." Id. at 33, citing Davis v. Romney, 490
F.2d 1360, 1365 (3d Cir. 1974).
34. The court began its discussion of judicial review by noting the applicability of
section 10(e) of the APA, which provides that "[tihe reviewing court shall ... hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). Section 10 of the
APA provides for judicial review "except to the extent that (1) statutes preclude
judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." Id.
§ 701. The court pointed out that, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
an action reviewing the Secretary of Transportation's approval of a highway through
a park, the Supreme Court interpreted the latter exception very narrowly saying:
[Tihe Secretary's decision here does not fall within the exception for action"committed to agency discretion." This is a very narrow exception .... The
legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is
applicable in those rare instances where "statutes are drawn in such broad terms
that in a given case there is no law to apply."
401 U.S. at 410 (footnotes and citations omitted); see Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159,
174-75 (1970); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. ,Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157
(1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 142 (1967); Sierra Club v.
Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974); Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517 (N.D.
Ala. 1973).
The Concerned Residents court then stated that, since the SCS had asserted
that the instant case fell within one of the exceptions to the general rule of
availability of judicial review under section 10 of the APA, the SCS had the burden of
proving that the legislature intended that projects instituted under the Watershed Act
be free from judicial review. 537 F.2d at 34. The court rejected the SCS's contention
that the requirement under the Watershed Act of congressional committee approval of
large projects implicitly showed that the legislature intended to preclude judicial
review under the Watershed Act. Id. In the court's view, the purpose of the
requirement was not to preclude judicial review, but rather to improve budget control.
Id. In support of its interpretation, the court stated that, had the legislative purpose of
committee approval been to prevent judicial interference, the Congress would have
required that the agency submit to the committees a written economic analysis. Id.
The court noted that its view was further supported by the fact that the approval
requirement applied only to large projects. Id.; see Letter from Rowland Hughes to
6
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each dam in a multidam project have its own favorable cost/benefit ratio.35
The court observed that section 5 of the Watershed Act requires only that the
"benefits of every 'plan' exceed the costs associated with implementing the
plan, not that every segment of the plan be cost justified when viewed in
isolation. '"'3 Furthermore, the court noted that section 2 of the Watershed
Act permits the component parts of a single watershed to be planned
together.3
7
Perhaps the most important factor in the court's eventual holding,
however, was its interpretation of the SCS's own project evaluation
manuals: the Watershed Protection Handbook (Handbook)3 8 and the
Economics Guide for Water Protection and Flood Prevention (Guide). 9 In
response to the plaintiffs' argument that the Guide called for the
maximization of net benefits,40 and thus required that each of the dams
Clifford R. Hope (Aug. 31, 1953), reprinted in S. REP. No. 1620, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9
(1954), which lends further credence to the Third Circuit's interpretation.
As a result, the court determined that the SCS had not met its burden and
that judicial review was therefore proper. 537 F.2d at 34.
It was also held that the SCS's choice of discount rates under section 80 of the
Water Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-17 (Supp. V 1975), was
subject to judicial review. 537 F.2d at 35. Section 80 permits the use of the 3.25%
discount rate used by the SCS in the instant case only if "the appropriate non-Federal
interests have, prior to December 31, 1969, given satisfactory assurances to pay the
required non-Federal share of project costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-17(b) (Supp. V 1975).
In holding that the administrative discretion embodied in the Watershed Act was "not
wholly without judicially discernible limits," 537 F.2d at 35, the court rejected the
SCS's contention that "the Secretary's discretion ... is so great that the
determination of whether any 'assurances' are 'satisfactory' has been 'committed to
agency discretion by law' and hence is unreviewable." Id., quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-
17(b) (Supp. V 1975), and 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
35. 537 F.2d at 36.
36. Id.
37. Id., citing 16 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For the relevant portion
of section 2 see text accompanying note 25 supra.
38. SOIL CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, WATERSHED
PROTECTION HANDBOOK (1957) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. The court examined
the following project evaluation procedure delineated in the Handbook:
"1. Reach agreement with sponsoring local organization on a minimum level
of protection to solve the flood problems of the entire watershed community."
"2. For each hydrologic unit having an essentially separate flood plain,
develop the least costly system . . .of protection ... "
"3. Evaluate the benefits that will accrue to each system."
537 F.2d at 36, quoting HANDBOOK, supra at § 105-0222.
:39. SOIL CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP't OF AGRICULTURE, EcONOMIcs GUIDE
FOR WATER PROTECTION AND FLOOD PREVENTION (1964) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE].
The court reviewed the following provision: "'In project formulation consideration
needs to be given to the interrelationship of structures. Such an interrelationship
exists where a group of structures protect a common flood plain. Here the most
economical system for attaining the agreed upon level of protection may be evaluated
as a unit.'" 537 F.2d at 36-37 quoting GUIDE, supra at § II'-D.
40. 537 F.2d at 37. The principle of maximization of net benefits was described in
the Guide in the following manner: "From an economic viewpoint, the optimum scale
of project developement is the point at which net benefits are at a maximum. Net
benefits are maximized when the benefits added by the last increment of scale or
scope of project development are equal to the cost of adding that increment." GUIDE,
supra note 39, at § II-C.
[Vol. 22
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have a favorable cost/benefit ratio when evaluated separately," the Third
Circuit pointed out that such an interpretation was inconsistent with other
parts of the Guide permitting "single evaluations of groups of measures."42
Moreover, the court reasoned that, since the SCS, the author of the Guide
and Handbook, used the manuals on a regular basis,4 3 its interpretations of
their provisions should be respected unless unreasonable. 44 For these
reasons, the Third Circuit concluded that each dam in a multidam project
need not have a favorable cost/benefit ratio;45 rather, the instant multidam
project could be treated as a single unit in determining whether its benefits
exceeded its costs.
46
Although the pertinent sections of the Watershed Act and its Guide and
Handbook were scrutinized carefully, the scope of the Third Circuit's
analysis is somewhat disappointing from an environmental standpoint in
41. 537 F.2d at 37. Plaintiffs reasoned that, if a single dam in a multidam project
failed to have a favorable cost/benefit ratio, the ratio of the project as a whole would
become less favorable, thereby violating the principle of the maximization of net
benefits. Id.
42. Id. For the text of the relevant portions of the Guide and Handbook, see notes
38-40 supra. The court further stated that
under plaintiffs' interpretation, SCS might be required to reduce the desired level
of protection whenever it became apparent that reaching the desired level would
involve construction of a cost-inefficient dam. But nothing in the Guide suggests
that the principle of maximizing net benefits invariably takes precedent over the
goal of attaining agreed upon levels of protection.
537 F.2d at 37-38.
The court also observed that the SCS would permit an exception to the
principle of maximizing net benefits "where the dams are interrelated in the sense
that they protect a common flood plain," and that the Guide itself specifically "permit
[ted] an exception to the maximization principle where intangible benefits, incapable
of monetary evaluation, [were] associated with the project." Id. at 38, citing GUID-,
supra note 39, at § I-C-2.
43. 537 F.2d at 38.
44. Id. The Third Circuit stated: "'An agency's explication of its regulations if
reasonable . . is controlling despite the existence of other interpretations that may
seem even more reasonable.'" Id., quoting Lucas Coal Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine
Operations, 522 F,2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1975). However, the court added that the Guide
and Handbook did not have the effect of law as they were "merely internal operating
procedures, rather than regulations officially promulgated." 537 F.2d at 38.
45. Id. at 38-39. It is interesting to note at this point the unusual posture of the
parties in Concerned Residents. Often, the overall environmental effect of a project is
detrimental, and it is the agency which seeks to cost-justify its programs on a
segment-by-segment basis while the residents prefer to have the project viewed as a
whole. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Appalachian
Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 1975); Chelsea Neighborhood
Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 389 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Thompson v.
Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972). This typical posture arises from the agency's
desire to minimize the appearance of the detrimental effects of those projects which
have met the opposition of local residents, who want to emphasize these harmful
aspects. However, in Concerned Residents, because the overall environmental effect of
the multidam project was beneficial, the agency preferred to cost-justify the project in
its entirety, particularly in light of the fact that if each dam was separately cost
justified, dam Pa-466 probably could not be constructed. See note 49 and
accompanying text infra.
46. 537 F.2d at 38. Referring to section 10(e) of the APA, the court stated that the
SCS's decision to treat the dams as a unit was not so arbitrary and capricious that the
reviewing court would be compelled to set aside the determination. Id., citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1970). For the text of this subsection see note 34 supra.
7591976"1977]
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that there was no attempt by the court to coordinate its decision with the
policies of resource preservation around which the Watershed Act and
NEPA revolve.47 A discussion of such policies would have been particularly
appropriate in the instant case, in light of the fact that construction of the
dam in question was likely to destroy a substantial portion of the ecology of
Buck Hill Creek. In the district court's opinion of the Concerned Residents
case, it was recognized that dam Pa-466, if built, would likely have a
detrimental effect upon this extremely popular trout-fishing stream by
increasing the water temperature to intolerable levels for trout, by
preventing migration, and by altering flow patterns, which would drasti-
cally affect fish habits.
4
1
A decision that the Watershed Act requires separate cost/benefit ratios
for each dam would have prevented construction of dam Pa-466 and the
injury to the environment which the dam might have caused, since the
benefits of that particular dam did not exceed its costs. 49 However, the Third
Circuit's decision to permit the multidam project to be treated as a single
unit for purposes of determining the cost/benefit ratio is likely to result in
the construction of the dam in question, with its potentially harmful
attendant environmental effects, because the benefits of the project, when
viewed in its entirety, did in fact exceed the project's costs.50 The purposes
behind the Watershed Act are clearly contrary to such a result.51 The Act's
declaration of policy clearly states that "preserving, protecting, and
improving the Nation's land and water resources and the quality of the
environment" is the goal of its flood control programs. 52 Moreover, in
referring to the Watershed Act, President Eisenhower indicated that flood
prevention plans were to be submitted to Congress "only if the Secretary is
satisfied that such works constitute needed and harmonious elements in the
comprehensive development . . . involved."' ' Both of these statements
suggest that a policy of environmental preservation and harmony should
underlie all projects brought under the Watershed Act. Since the court's
47. See notes 20-22 & 28-32 and accompanying text supra.
48. 388 F. Supp. at 406. The district court explained that the dam, if built, could
cause the temperature of the water to rise to at least 71 degrees. Id. at 404. Since trout
cannot withstand temperatures above 70 to 72 degrees, this anticipated rise in
temperature would either destroy the trout immediately or cause them to crowd into
areas of tolerable temperatures, which could also result in their elimination. Id. at
404-05. The district court further noted that the dam would interfere with the major
spawning area by causing silting (a redepositing of tiny, loose, sedimentary particles),
which would cut off the oxygen supply to fish eggs deposited in the spawning area. Id.
at 405.
49. The cost/benefit ratio of the dam would satisfy section 5 of the Watershed Act
only if, on remand, the district court reversed its prior decision that the assurances
received from the local officials to pay the non-federal costs were unsatisfactory, and
therefore that the proper discount rate had been utilized. See note 17 supra. However,
even if the 3.25% discount rate is permitted, the cost/benefit ratio of dam Pa-466
would still only be 1.05 to 1, which is marginal at best. See 388 F. Supp. at 399.
50. 537 F.2d at 32; See note 10 supra.
51. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 1975). For the text of this section, see note 21 supra.
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decision in the instant case might produce a result contrary to the policy of
resource preservation upon which the Watershed Act is founded, a
discussion of this policy and an explanation of its relation to the facts of the
instant case would have substantially reinforced the court's conclusion.
Furthermore, a second and closely related deficiency in the scope of the
Third Circuit's analysis lies in the lack of any discussion of NEPA, 4 its
policies, and its application to the Concerned Residents case. NEPA
attempts to ensure that agencies sponsoring federal programs consider the
environmental impact of their proposed projects so that the resources of the
nation may be best preserved. 51 The applicability of this federal policy of
environmental consideration to projects being funded under the Watershed
Act would seem apparent upon examination of NEPA's statutory language.
Section 102(1) of NEPA provides that "[tihe Congress authorizes and directs
that, to the fullest extent possible, the policies, regulations, and public laws
of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance
with the policies set forth in this chapter."5 6 Furthermore, it has been held
that NEPA's application is not to be limited solely to the requirement of the
filing of an environmental impact statement,57 and that violations of NEPA
may be found even in situations where an impact statement is not
required.-' It would seem, therefore, that NEPA's intended scope is too broad
and pervasive to have been entirely overlooked 59 by the Third Circuit in
Concerned Residents, and perhaps some consideration of the environmental
impact of its decision concerning the multidam project should have been
undertaken by the court.
It should be emphasized that a consideration of environmental factors,
as is apparently required under both the Watershed Act and NEPA, would
not necessarily have compelled the court to reach a different conclusion,
54. See notes 26-31 and accompanying text supra.
55. See notes 28 & 29 and accompanying text supra.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). In addition, section
105 provides that "[t]he policies and goals set forth in this chapter are supplementary
to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies." Id. § 4335.
57. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 834-35 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973) (mandate of section 102(D) of NEPA to develop alternatives to proposed
action may apply even to actions which do not significantly effect the environment).
58. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1975)
(section 102(2)(D) of NEPA, which requires the sponsoring agency to develop
alternatives to the proposed action, is applicable even in the absence of the filing of
an environmental impact statement).
59. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), was one of the first cases to consider the
broad ramifications of NEPA. In referring to the policy behind NEPA, the Calvert
court indicated that NEPA "makes environmental protection a part of the mandate of
every federal agency and department." Id. at 1112. The Calvert court further
recognized that "[tihe sweep of NEPA is extraordinarily broad, compelling
consideration of any and all types of environmental impact of federal action." Id. at
1122; see Environmental Defense Fund v. Army Corps of Engrs., 470 F.2d 289, 294
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Army
Corps of Engrs., 348 F. Supp. 916, 927 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir.
1974); Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120, 124 (E.D. Va. 1972); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 367 (E.D.N.C. 1972). See also Sierra
Club v. Federal Power Comm'n, 407 U.S. 926, 927-28 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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since it could have been decided that the SCS interpretations of the
Watershed Act, the Guide, and the Handbook were overridingly reasonab-
le."" It also should be noted that the environmental impact of the dam in
question will be considered at some point before its construction, since the
district court has ordered the SCS to file an environmental impact
statement.!" Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the court did not consider
these legislative mandates, since the decision to permit the multidam project
to be cost justified as a whole, without examining the impact of such a
decision upon the environment may implicitly encourage other courts to
similarly overlook environmental considerations. It would seem that if
federal environmental priorities are ever to be implemented, their connection
with many aspects of statutory interpretation must be fully recognized.
Susan Kassell
MEDICAID - ABORTION - THE MEDICAID ACT REQUIRES A PARTICIPATING
STATE TO FUND NONTHERAPEUTIC ABORTIONS IF THE STATE ALSO USES
MEDICAID FUNDS TO FINANCE FULL TERM DELIVERIES AND
THERAPEUTIC ABORTIONS.
Doe v. Beal (1975)
Plaintiffs were eleven unmarried indigent women,' participating in the
Pennsylvania Medical Assistance Program 2 (PMAP), whose pregnancies
60. See note 44 supra. NEPA does not expressly prohibit federal programs which
are harmful to the environment. See Citizens Organized to Defend Environment, Inc.
v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520, 541 (S.D. Ohio 1972). Rather, NEPA merely requires that
the environmental effects of decisions concerning federally funded projects be
considered. See 42 U.S.C. §§4331, 4332 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); notes 28-29 and
accompanying text supra.
61. 388 F. Supp. at 399; see note 17 supra.
1. The Medicaid statute requires that participating states provide aid to the
"categorically needy," 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1970), including those receiving Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), id. §§ 601-610, and allows the state to
provide aid to other "medically needy" persons, id. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)-(C), as defined by
the state. In Pennsylvania, this includes those receiving Public Assistance, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 62, §§ 401-435 (Purdon 1952).
The Medicaid statute requires that five services be provided to the
categorically needy:l) inpatient hospital services, 2) outpatient hospital services, 3)
laboratory and X-ray services, 4) nursing facility, diagnosis of children, and family
planning services, and 5) physician's services, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1970).
Further, the state must provide 7 of 16 types of listed services for the "medically
needy." Id.§ 1396d(a)(1)-(16).
Of the 11 plaintiffs, 6 were "categorically needy" and 5 were "medically
needy." However, Pennsylvania does not discriminate between its categorically and
medically needy in providing services. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 619 n.16 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976).
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ranged from six to seventeen weeks. 3 They unsuccessfully attempted to
obtain elective, as opposed to therapeutic, abortions 4 from Magee-Womens
Hospital in Pittsburgh. The hospital refused solely because such abortions
would not be reimbursable under the regulations of the defendant
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (Department), which adminis-
ters the PMAP.5
In a suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania filed against the Department and several of its officers,
plaintiffs attacked the Department's regulations on both statutory and
constitutional grounds, contending that they were inconsistent with title
XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid Act)6 and violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7 A three-judge panel found
that although the regulations were consistent with the statute,8 they
nonetheless acted to deprive plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws.9
Therefore the panel entered the requested declaratory judgment.' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,"' sitting en banc,'2
invalidated the regulations on statutory grounds, and therefore did not
3. Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 177 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
4. "Elective," as used here, describes abortions that are reimbursable under the
regulations established by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare. See note 5
infra. "Therapeutic" describes abortions reimbursable under the regulations.
5. 523 F.2d at 613-14. The Department's regulations provided that abortions
could be performed under the PMAP only when the following conditions are satisfied:
1. There is documented medical evidence that continuance of the pregnancy
may threaten the health or life of the mother;
2. There is documented medical evidence that the infant may be born with
incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency; or
3. There is documented medical evidence that the continuance of a
pregnancy resulting from a legally established statutory or forcible rape or incest,
may constitute a threat to the mental or physical health of the patient;
4. Two other physicians chosen because of their recognized professional
competency have examined the patient and concurred in writing; and
5. The procedure is performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.
Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 175 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
The plaintiffs advanced the following rationales for their decisions to seek
abortions: "because a birth at my age would be a severe burden on my life as well as
my family;" "I already have four children and another child would further burden our
financial plight and cause severe stress on me;" "I am still in high school and do not
wish to have a baby at this time;" "because my two children and myself are already
in financial difficulty and a birth at this time would be a severe burden on my
emotional state;" and "because of the burden and interruption to my personal life that
birth would cause." 376 F. Supp. at 178. A detailed statement of the facts may be
found in the district court's opinion. Id. at 175-78.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (1970).
7. 523 F.2d at 614. In addition to a declaratory judgment, plaintiffs sought class
action status and injunctive relief. Both were denied by the district court, and the
denials were not appealed. Id. at 613 nn.1 & 2.
8. 376 F. Supp. at 182-86.
9. Id. at 186-92; see note 22 infra.
10. 523 F.2d at 613.
11. Judge Van Dusen wrote the court's opinion. Dissenting opinions were filed by
Judges Kalodner and Adams. 523 F.2d at 624,635. Judge Gibbons joined in all but one
section of Judge Kalodner's dissent. Id. at 635.
12. Between the three-judge district court's order and the Third Circuit's en banc
opinion, the case was argued before a Third Circuit panel; its opinion and judgment
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reach the constitutional question. The Third Circuit modified the district
court's order and remanded, 13 holding that the Medicaid Act requires any
state which finances full term delivery and therapeutic abortions to finance
nontherapeutic abortions through the end of the second trimester of
pregnancy. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
3220 (1976).' 4
The Medicaid Act,15 like much national social welfare legislation,
utilizes a carrot-and-stick approach to achieve its aims: states are
encouraged to appropriate money for medical services by the offer of federal
matching funds,16 This approach to social welfare policy has prompted the
states to do whatever is necessary to receive matching funds,"7 while
utilizing the money received from Washington to implement their own policy
goals as much as possible.18
The Supreme Court abortion decisions, Roe v. Wade19 and Doe v.
Bolton,20 which sharply restricted the authority of the states to regulate
abortions, 21 generated the instant statutory controversy regarding the
degree of control which a state may exercise, within the Medicaid Act, over
the maternal health care servies that it funds. Pregnant Medicaid Act
eligibles in several states have successfully attacked state regulations
were filed on December 10, 1974. On January 31, 1975, the court vacated the panel's
judgment and ordered reargument en banc for May 8, 1975. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d at
613. The panel's opinion, presumably withdrawn, was not reported.
13. Using their power under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970) to modify a supplemental
order of a district court, the Third Circuit merely altered the reasons for giving
declaratory judgment for the plaintiffs - citing statutory rather than constitutional
grounds. This obviated the need to reconvene a three-judge panel. 523 F.2d at 624.
14. Doe v. Beal was argued before the Supreme Court on October 6, 1976 and
January 11, 1977. [1976-1977] U.S. SUPREME COURT BULLETIN (CCH) 8017, 8102.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (1970).
16. See id. § 1396b.
17. See, eg., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 451 (Purdon 1952). While state participation
in any of the categorical grant programs is nominally voluntary, the effect of federal
matching funds, is that no state can afford not to participate. All 50 states participate
in the AFDC program. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 472-73 (1970). All states
except Arizona participate in Medicaid. Comment, Abortion on Demand in a Post-
Wade Context: Must the State Pay the Bills?, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 921, 932-33 n.80
(1973).
18. For examples of "deviant" state policies which have been challenged as
inconsistent with the Social Security Act, see Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975);
Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975); New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413
U.S. 405 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404
U.S. 282 (1971); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
21. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court held that a Texas criminal
abortion statute, which prohibited abortions except when necessary to save the
mother's life, was an unconstitutional denial of due process of law under the
fourteenth amendment. In an unusually specific holding, the Court stated that during
the first trimester of pregnancy, the states could not in any way regulate the decision
of a woman regarding abortion; during the second trimester, the states could pass
regulations reasonably related to the protection of maternal health; only in the third
trimester of pregnancy, when the state had a compelling interest in protecting the life
of a viable human being, could a state prohibit an abortion outright. Id. at 163-65.
However, the Chief Justice stated: "Plainly the Court today rejects any claim that the
[Vol. 22
13
Lamb: Federal Statutes and Regulation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
denying funds for nontherapeutic abortions on the ground that they deny
equal protection.2 2 However, prior to the instant case, only two courts had
adjudicated the controversy on statutory grounds, reaching opposite
conclusions.
23
In Roe v. Norton,24 the Commissioner of Welfare of the State of
Connecticut interpreted the Medicaid Act to prohibit reimbursement for
nontherapeutic abortions 25 and adopted a regulation to that effect. 26 The
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that the act
not only did not require, but did not permit such a regulation. 27 Although
agreeing with the defendant-Commissioner that the statute limited federal
reimbursement "to meet the costs of necessary medical and remedial care
and services," 28 the court found elective abortions to be such a service within
the meaning of the act.29 The court stated that even though the plaintiffs'
Constitution requires abortion on demand." Id. at 208 (concurring in both Doe v.
Dolton and Roe v. Wade).
In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court struck down a Georgia
abortion statute under which abortion was a crime unless, among other requirements,
it was performed by a licensed physician in whose judgment the abortion was
necessary because the pregnancy would 1) endanger the woman's life or health, or 2)
produce a child with a serious birth defect, or 3) unless the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest. Id. at 183-84. These are almost identical to three of the requirements
for a therapeutic abortion in the PMAP regulations in controversy. See note 4 supra.
In Bolton, the Court affirmed the holding of the district court that these three
restrictions on the physician's judgment were unconstitutional invasions of the
mother's privacy and liberty, although technically the issue was not before them. 410
U.S. at 186-87. However, the Court also agreed with the district court in upholding the
state's right to require that all abortions be approved by a physician as necessary for
his patients' physical or mental health, based upon his best clinical judgment, taking
all factors into consideration. Id. at 191-92.
The Georgia statute, like the PMAP regulations, also required the assent of
two other physicians and performance of the operation in an accredited hospital. Id.
at 184. The Court held that these two requirements would violate the due process
clause in every instance. Id. at 194-200.
22. The theory of the equal protection attack on the regulations is, briefly, that
since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a woman has a fundamental right to an
abortion and, as there is no compelling state interest in distinguishing between the
funding of therapeutic and nontherapeutic abortions, such classification is unconsti-
tutional. See Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 186-91 (W.D. Pa. 1974). The
following cases have so held: Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973);
Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated
and remanded, 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
23. In the present case, the district court fully discussed the statutory question
before invalidating the regulations on constitutional grounds. It found no inconsist-
ency between the PMAP regulations and the Medicaid Act. See 376 F. Supp. at 182-
86.
24. 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974).
25. Id. at 727.
26. Connecticut Welfare Dep't, Public Assistance Program Manual, vol. 3, ch. III,
§ 275 (1973).
27. 380 F. Supp. at 729. The regulation was deemed inconsistent with the
following provision of the Medicaid Act: "For the purposes of this subchapter, the
term 'medical assistance' means ... medical care, or any other type of remedial care
recognized under State law, furnished by licensed practitioners within the scope of
their practice. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(aX6) (1970).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10XC)(i) (1970).
29. 380 F. Supp. at 729.
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doctors had certified that the abortions were not necessary for the mothers'
health, 30 the question of "whether that circumstance exclude[d] these
abortions ... [was one] of law, not of medicine. ' 31 Observing that
pregnancy is a medical condition that necessitates medical treatment, the
court found it best to leave the choice of treatment to the discretion of
patient and doctor, so long as the treatment chosen was an accepted and not
excessively costly medical procedure.
32
In sharp contrast to Norton was the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Roe
v. Ferguson,33 the only appellate case to uphold nontherapeutic abortion
regulations on statutory grounds.34 In Roe v. Ferguson, plaintiffs, including
pregnant indigents, doctors, and clinics, challenged the validity of an Ohio
statute,3" and the regulations thereunder, which prohibited the use of state
funds for any abortion that was not necessary to preserve the life or health
of the mother. The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on
the theory that the Medicaid Act prohibited participating states from
distinguishing elective abortion expenses from all other medical expenses.
36
In reversing, the Sixth Circuit noted that the Medicaid Act had been enacted
prior to the Supreme Court abortion decisions, and then commented:
There is no indication that Congress intended to require the furnishing
of abortion services not required for the preservation of the health of the
woman at a time when the performance of such abortions was illegal in
most jurisdictions. In view of the disfavor shown towards abortions in
other legislation, we are reluctant to infer that Congress intended to
include required coverage for such controversial services without even
mentioning the subject. 37
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 729-30. Here the court seemed to be paraphrasing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(a)(6) (1970), but did not cite that section.
33. 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975).
34. In his dissent in Doe v. Beal, Judge Kalodner cited Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112
(10th Cir. 1974), as a second example, but the learned judge appears to have been
mistaken. There the court stated:
[11n light of the applicable statutes' complete silence on the abortion question, we
prefer to dispose of the present appeal on constitutional grounds, rather than by
any strained effort to show that the policy in question is, in effect, though not in
so many words, prohibited by either federal or state statute.
Id. at 1115.
35. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §5101.55c (Page 1974).
36. 515 F.2d at 279. Specifically, the district court, relying upon 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1970), argued that the five services listed in that section (see note 1
supra), which were mandatory under 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(13)(B), (C)(i) (1970), included
abortion services. 515 F.2d at 279.
37. 515 F.2d at 283. In support of this statement, the Sixth Circuit noted that
abortion was specifically excluded as a means of family planning under the Family
Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 300a(6) (1970).
515 F.2d at 283. Likewise, in establishing the Legal Services Corporation System,
Congress provided that no funds could be used to assist those seeking to procure a
nontherapeutic abortion. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8) (Supp. V 1975).
Similarly, the district court in the instant case, after reviewing the five
mandatory services thought crucial in the district court opinion of Roe v. Ferguson
(see notes 1 & 36 supra), noted that abortion services were not specifically provided for
in the Medicaid Act. 376 F. Supp. at 184. The court viewed the Medicaid Act as a
[Vol. 22
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In Doe v. Beal, however, the Third Circuit rejected the Sixth Circuit's
emphasis upon congressional intent, stating: "It is impossible to believe that
in enacting Title XIX [Medicaid Act] Congress intended to freeze the medical
services available to recipients at those which were legal in 1965. ''38 Rather,
the Third Circuit adopted a line of reasoning parallel to that employed by
the Norton court,39 concluding that the statutory mandate that funds be
provided only for necessary treatment 40 allows a state latitude to determine
what conditions necessitate treatment, but reserves the choice of treatment
for a medical condition to the physician and the patient.41 The court then
analyzed Pennsylvania's obligations under the Act as follows: 1) the proper
treatment of a medical condition must be left to the judgment of the
attending physician under the act;42 2) since Pennsylvania funds full term
delivery and therapeutic abortions for Medicaid eligibles, the state has
determined that pregnancy is a condition necessitating medical treatment;
43
3) there is no justification for differentiating elective abortions from other
treatments of the condition of pregnancy;44 therefore, 4) a state which
finances full term delivery and therapeutic abortions under its Medicaid
program cannot decline to fund elective abortions during the first two
trimesters of pregnancy 45 if an eligible woman and her physician so
"scheme of cooperative federalism" under which Congress gave the states great
latitude in administering their programs; the statutory language could be said neither
to require nor to prohibit the state funding of elective abortions. Id. at 184-86. In
reaching this conclusion, the district court relied heavily upon New York State Dep't
of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), and quoted the latter opinion
extensively. See 376 F. Supp. at 184-85.
38. 523 F.2d at 622-23.
39. See text accompanying notes 24-32 supra.
40. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i), 1396a(a)(30) (1970). The defendants in
Norton had also relied upon that provision of the Medicare Act adopted at the same
time as Medicaid, which disallowed reimbursement for any expenses incurred "which
are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury
S. ...." 42 U.S.C. at § 1395y(a)(1) (1970). 380 F. Supp. at 729. The Norton court admitted
that legislative history supported a common interpretation for both acts, as "it is not
likely that Congress intended to provide broader benefits to the indigent than to those
who were purchasing coverage under Medicare."Id.
41. 523 F.2d at 618, 620. As other examples of the limits upon state discretion in
the Medicaid Act, the court cited the mandatbry nature of services (see note 1 supra)
and certain equality of distribution requirements, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10) (1970). 523
F.2d at 617.
42. 523 F.2d at 620. In support of this, the court relied upon Roe v. Wade and 42
U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(6) (1970), for the proposition that the statute mandated the funding
of all physician services licensed by the state, which, since Wade and Bolton, included
abortion services. A similar conclusion was reached in Comment, Abortion on
Demand in a Post-Wade Context: Must the State Pay the Bills?, 41 FORDHAM L. REV.
921, 934 (1973).
43. 523 F.2d at 621.
44. Id. at 621-22. All parties to the controversy admitted that elective abortions
are usually cheaper than either therapeutic abortions or full term deliveries coupled
with prenatal and postnatal care, and that elective abortions, at least in the first
trimester of pregnancy, are the safest method of treatment for the mother. Thus,
neither economy nor maternal health could be advanced as a justification for
Pennsylvania's regulations.
45. Id. at 622. The court cited Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton as controlling, with
the caveat that, consistent with those opinions, Pennsylvania could require
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decide.4 6 Thus, finding the regulations of the Department prohibiting
reimbursement for elective abortions invalid as inconsistent with the
Medicaid Act, the Third Circuit instructed the district court to issue a
declaratory judgment to that effect.
47
It is respectfully submitted that the majority erred on this issue.48 The
language of the Medicaid Act can hardly justify the court's holding that a
participating state which funds therapeutic abortions and full term
deliveries is required to fund elective abortions. The word "abortion" does
not appear in the statute. While all parties to the case admitted that the
statute mandated only "necessary treatment," 49 the Third Circuit defined
"necessary treatment" to mean any treatment prescribed by a physician for
a condition designated as requiring medical care. A more logical interpreta-
tion of "necessary treatment" would have excluded plaintiffs' elective
abortions.50 By definition, a nontherapeutic abortion is not performed in
reimbursed abortions to be performed in a hospital during the second trimester since,
in that trimester, the medical risk to the mother from abortion is significant. Id. at 622
n.25.
46. Id. at 622.
47. Id. at 623-24. By so interpreting the Medicaid statute, the Third Circuit placed
Doe v. Beal within the King v. Smith, as opposed to the Dandridge v. Williams, line of
cases which have determined the degree of state latitude permissible under the Social
Security Act.
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), had struck down the Alabama "substitute
father" rule prohibiting AFDC payments to otherwise eligible families where the
mother cohabited with an able-bodied man. The Court discerned that when Congress
had provided for payments to children without a "parent" in the AFDC legislation, 42
U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970), it must have meant children without someone who had a legal
duty to support them. Thus, "parent" would not have included an Alabama
"substitute father." The Court, therefore, held that the Alabama rule improperly
denied benefits to persons declared eligible by Congress. 392 U.S. at 333.
In the King line, see Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975) (modified
"substitute father" rule); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 398 (1972) (father serving in
armed forces held to be "continually absent" from home); Townsend v. Swank, 404
U.S. 282 (1971) (aid must be given to needy 18-20 year olds in college); Lewis v. Martin,
397 U.S. 552 (1970) (yet another unsuccessfully modified "substitute father" rule).
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the state of Maryland had
imposed a maximum limit of $250 on the AFDC funds which a family unit could
receive in a month. Plaintiffs, all with families whose computed standard of need
would have otherwise exceeded the maximum payment, contended that younger
children in eligible large, needy families were being wholly denied mandatory
benefits. However, the Court, characterizing the scheme as a per capita diminution of
the family grant, upheld the power of the states to so decrease the level of benefits
paid to the eligibles "[s]o long as some aid is provided to all eligible families and all
eligible children, the statute itself is not violated." Id. at 481. In the Dandridge line,
see Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, (1975); New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino,
413 U.S. 405 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
48. For an opposite view, in agreement with the majority, see Comment, supra
note 42, at 937-38. The majority's view has recently been repudiated by the Supreme
Court.
49. See note 40 supra.
50. No doubt plaintiffs in our case would characterize their desired abortions as
"necessary," in the sense that childbirth would be a financial hardship or personal
inconvenience to them (see note 3 supra), but this should be distinguished from
"necessary" in the medical sense. For a discussion of the requirement that treatment
be medically necessary, see note 40 supra.
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response to the mother's ill health.51 On the other hand, medical assistance
is unquestionably necessary in performing either a therapeutic abortion or
full term delivery to protect the health of the mother, and in the latter case,
the child.
Rather than straining to find an implied bar to the Department's
regulations in the language of the statute, the majority should have
interpreted the statute in light of administrative and congressional intent.
As pointed out by Judge Kalodner in his dissent, the majority's interpreta-
tion of the Medicaid Act ignored the opinions of both the Solicitor General 52
and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,5 3 who viewed the
statute as neither prohibiting nor requiring participating states to fund
elective abortions. The court thereby violated "the settled rule that
construction of a statute by an agency charged with its administration
should be accorded great deference, absent compelling indications that it is
clearly wrong."' 4 Similarly, the court's assertion that Congress could not
have intended to freeze medical services at those legal in 1965 does not prove
that Congress would have required the states to fund elective abortions in
their Medicaid programs if they had then been legal. In fact, since Roe v.
Wade, Congress has evidenced nothing but hostility toward the use of
national funds for nontherapeutic abortions.
55
The Third Circuit should have adopted the lower court's reasoning that,
since the statute does not specifically prohibit, require, or otherwise mention
abortions, the funding of elective abortions for Medicaid eligibles should be
a matter of state discretion.5 6 Had it adopted this position, the court would
have been forced to determine the constitutionality of the PMAP regulations
51. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1435 (4th ed. 1976). Within the
definition of the word "therapeutic," an opposite result can logically be argued, but
only if one defines pregnancy as a "disease." See id.
52. 523 F.2d at 625, 629 (Kalodner, J., dissenting), citing the Memorandum
Amicus Curiae of- the Solicitor General filed in Nassau County Medical Center v.
Klein, 412 U.S. 95 (1973) (vacated and remanded in light of Roe v. Wade).
53. 523 F.2d at 625, citing 1 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 14,511.
54. 523 F.2d at 630 (Kalodner J., dissenting). The dissent cited the following cases
in support of its view: Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 559 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397, 415 (1970); Federal Hous. Administration v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84,90
(1958); Bernstein v. Ribicoff, 299 F.2d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 1962).
55. See note 30 supra. In fact, subsequent to the Third Circuit's decision in Doe v.
Beal, Congress passed a bill prohibiting the use of federal funds for nontherapeutic
abortions. However, the statute was declared unconstitutional by a district court judge
in Buckley v. McCrae, Nos. 76-C-1804 and 76-C-1805 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1976). The
Supreme Court on November 8, 1976, denied an application for a stay of the order
enjoining the enforcement of the statute pending appeal. [1976-1977] U.S. SUPREME
COURT BULLETIN (CCH)B-188.
56. In fact, that Congress intended to provide the states at least some latitude in
selecting which kinds of services it would provide is evidenced by the Medicaid Act
itself, which allows a state to choose any 7 of 16 types of medical services to be
provided for medically needy eligibles. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13XC)(ii), 1396d(1)-(16)
(1970).
It is in this respect that the majority's reliance on King v. Smith (see note 47
supra) is misplaced. The principle of law derived from King and its progeny is that the
state cannot wholly deny benefits to individuals who are eligible for assistance under
congressional standards. In this case the indigent plaintiffs have not been denied all
Medicaid benefits, they have only been denied reimbursement for elective abortions.
1976-19771
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under the equal protection clause.5 7 Although invalidating state action on
statutory grounds is preferable to deciding a constitutional issue unnecessar-
ily,58 it is not always possible. A remedy may well have been appropriate in
the instant case, but if so, the Third Circuit's strained interpretation of the
Medicaid Act was not the proper vehicle for achieving it.
J. Kurt Straub
ANTITRUST LAW - PRICE FIXING AND PRODUCT RESTRICTIONS IN
AGREEMENT BETWEEN LICENSOR AND LICENSEE HELD NOT VIOLATIVE
OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT.
Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co. (1976)
From 1964 to 1969, Hempfield Stores, Inc. (Hempfield), pursuant to an
agreement with S.S. Kresge Co. (Kresge), operated two food stores adjacent
to and in the same building with Kresge department stores operated under
the trade name "K-Mart."1 The salient terms of the licensing agreement,
which permitted Hempfield to use the name "K-Mart Foods" at each store,
required Hempfield, inter alia, to: 1) charge the same prices as Kresge for
items sold by both of them, the price to be set by Kresge absent mutual
agreement; 2) offer merchandise at a price competitive with the same or
similar merchandise offered in the trading area; and 3) restrict the sale of
The essence of Dandridge v. Williams, controls in this case. Once the state makes
funds available to all its Medicaid eligibles, it is within the state's power to determine
the level of benefits and types of services granted. 397 U.S. at 481.
57. See note 22 supra. Judge Kalodner's dissent also discussed the constitutional
issue. 523 F.2d at 631-35.
58. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), the Court reversed the dismissal of a
suit in which the New York regulations under the AFDC provisions of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§601-660 (Supp. V 1975), were challenged. The Court
remanded, requiring the district court to consider the statutory challenge before
reaching the constitutional issue. 415 U.S. at 550.
The Supreme Court indicated that the same priority of consideration should
be applied in the Medicare setting. Doe v. Westby, 420 U.S. 968 (1975), vacating and
remanding 383 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974). The lower court had reached a
constitutional challenge to South Dakota's limits on payments for abortions under
Medicaid without considering the consistency of the regulations with the Medicaid
Act itself. The Court instructed the district court to reconsider in light of Hagans v.
Lavine.
1. Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1186, 1187 (3d Cir. 1976). The K-Mart trade
name was used by Kresge in its attempt to develop an image as a discount
merchandiser offering quality merchandise at competitive prices. Id. at 1186. Kresge
operated a number of stores under this name. Id.
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non-food merchandise to specified categories of goods.2 These license terms
were enforced by Kresge by supplying Hempfield with "Identical Pricing
Books" to be used in pricing "like items" (merchandise sold by both of them)
and by policing the Hempfield stores for violations.3 Kresge licensed the K-
Mart name to Hempfield believing that the high sales volume necessary to
make the K-Mart discount business profitable could best be achieved by
drawing upon the potential buying power of frequent grocery store
customers. 4 Although under the agreement the Hempfield grocery stores
were held out to the public as part of the K-Mart enterprise, they were
actually independent operations.
5
In 1969, Hempfield's leases were terminated and it filed a petition in
bankruptcy soon thereafter.6 Plaintiff, Hempfield's trustee in bankruptcy,
then brought a treble-damage action against Kresge in 1971 in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 7 alleging that
the restrictions imposed upon Hempfield in the licensing agreement
constituted per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 Plaintiff
2. Id. at 1186-87. The agreement also provided that Hempfield could not enter
into any fair trade agreement nor issue trading stamps without express approval by
Kresge. Furthermore, Hempfield was required to use specified equipment provided by
Kresge. Id. at 1187. The trial court's rulings against Hempfield on these restrictions
were not appealed. Id. at 1187 n.10.
3. Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 394 F. Supp. 817, 826, 827 (W.D. Pa. 1975). The
district court noted that as a result of the policing policy, Hempfield was directed on
several occasions to remove unauthorized merchandise or to discontinue its sale when
the stock on hand was exhausted. Id. at 826.
4. 544 F.2d at 1186. Kresge chose to license Hempfield rather than operate a
grocery business itself because it had no food merchandising experience and lacked
distribution sources. Id.
5. Id. at 1187. The independent nature of the business was evidenced by the
following: 1) Hempfield was not permitted to use any Kresge trade name, including K-
Mart, on any of its merchandise; 2) Hempfield was not permitted to use the K-Mart
name on its checks, business stationery, or pricing labels; 3) Hempfield was not
restricted by Kresge with respect to supply sources; and 4) neither Hempfield nor
Kresge purchased any goods or services from the other. Id.
6. Id.
7. 394 F. Supp. at 823.
8. Section 1 provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
serveral states, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal." Id. 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970). Although the prohibition of section 1 is literally absolute, the Supreme Court of
the United States construed this section early in the Act's history as precluding only
those arrangements that unreasonably restrain competition. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). In Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231 (1918), the Court articulated the so-called "rule of reason":
[Tihe legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a
test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
20
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alleged that the price restrictions resulted in an illegal horizontal9 price-
fixing arrangement, and that the product restrictions interfered with
Hempfield's right to exercise its independent business judgment,10 thus
"'[contributing] to Hempfield's business failure.' "" Upon Kresge's motion
for summary judgment, the district court held that subject matter
jurisdiction was lacking in that the restrictions complained of neither
occurred in nor substantially affected interstate commerce.' 2 The court did,
however, proceed to discuss the case on its merits in "the interests of judicial
economy," and found that the restrictions imposed by Kresge upon Hempfield
were not violative of section 1 under either the per se or rule of reason
standard.13 The court then granted Kresge's motion for summary judg-
ment.14 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
after finding that subject matter jurisdiction did exist,'5 affirmed the grant
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to
be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
Complementing the "rule of reason" is the per se rule, explained in Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), as follows: "[Tlhere are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
the business excuse for their use." Id. at 5. See generally Von Kalinowski, The Per Se
Doctrine - An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 569 (1964).
9. A horizontal restraint is one established by entities at the same functional
level of the economic system, such as a group of supermarket owners agreeing to limit
the geographic area in which each will operate. See United States v. Topco Assocs.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972). A vertical restraint is one which originates at one level of the
economic distribution system and is imposed on businesses at another level, as in a
manufacturer's refusal to allow his vendees to sell his products to specified customers
or outside certain areas. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372
(1967).
10. 394 F. Supp. at 826; see notes 24-29 and accompanying text infra.
11. 394 F. Supp. at 826.
12. Id. at 833-42. The court applied the "come to rest doctrine" to find that the
groceries sold by Hempfield were not in the flow of interstate commerce. It said that
even though many of the items were obtained from sources outside of Pennsylvania,
the sales to the public were not in the flow of interstate commerce because once the
items reached the stores' shelves they "came to rest"; at this point they were so
diverted from interstate commerce that subsequent sales to customers were purely
local transactions. Id. at 836. For cases discussing the "come to rest doctrine," see
Cliff Food Stores v. Kroger, 417 F.2d 203, 2.10 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Food &
Grocery Bureau, 43 F. Supp. 974, 977 (S.D. Cal. 1942). The district court concluded that
interstate commerce was not affected by the Kresge-Hempfield agreement because 1)
Hempfield did not allege that the price and product restrictions restricted its sources
of supply or the prices it paid for the supplies; 2) the restrictions did not deprive
suppliers of their freedom to sell to Hempfield in a competitive market; 3) the
restrictions did not drive Hempfield out of business as a retailer of its suppliers'
merchandise. 394 F. Supp. at 833-42. For a discussion of the "affecting commerce"
problem, see United States v. Starlite Drive-In, 204 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1953).
13. 394 F. Supp. at 843.
14. Id. at 849.
15. 544 F.2d at 1188-90. The Third Circuit, relying upon the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738
(1976), held that the jurisdictional requirement was met in light of Hempfield's
$400,000 in out-of-state purchases and the fact that the challenged pricing restriction
was used by Kresge on a nationwide basis in its K-Mart Food Store agreements. 544
F.2d at 1189-90.
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of summary judgment on the ground that the restrictions did not violate
section 1 under either the per se or rule of reason test. Evans v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976).
The particular business arrangement in Kresge1' apparently had not
been presented for judicial analysis of its legality under the antitrust laws
prior to this case. However, the types of conduct involved in the
arrangement that allegedly violated section 1 - horizontal price fixing and
interference with independent business judgment - have a well-established
history of interpretive case law.
As a subject of special solicitude under the antitrust laws, price fixing
has been the focus of some of the Supreme Court's most unequivocal
language. In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,' 7 the Court was
confronted with an agreement to fix and maintain uniform prices by
manufacturers who controlled eighty-two percent of the domestic sanitary
pottery business.'8 In finding the agreement illegal, the Court stated: "[I]t
has ... often been decided and always assumed that uniform price fixing
by those controlling in any substantial manner a trade or business in
interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Law, despite the
reasonableness of the prices agreed upon."'19 Even when prices have been
fixed indirectly,20 the Court has firmly declared the dogma: "Whatever
economic justification particular price fixing agreements may be thought to
have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are
all banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous
system of the economy."2' The Court has emphasized that no showing of
competitive abuses or evils which such agreements are allegedly designed to
eliminate or alleviate may serve as a defense. 22 Thus, price fixing has long
been considered per se an unreasonable restraint of the trade.
23
The per se rule has also been applied by the Supreme Court in numerous
antitrust cases where the independent business judgment of a vendor has
been impinged upon by others. For example, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons,24 a drug manufacturer's imposition of minimum resale
prices upon his vendees was condemned as a per se violation of section 1
because, inter alia, it restricted the dealers' freedom of trade.25 Forty years
16. For a discussion of the pertinent provisions of the Kresge-Hempfield
agreement, see notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra.
17. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
18. Id. at 394.
19. Id. at 398; see Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 238
(1899) (question of reasonableness of contractual agreement to fix prices not open to
the courts at common law and same rule should apply under the Sherman Act).
20. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 216 (1940)
(individuals and major oil companies acted to stabilize gasoline prices by agreements
to remove excess or "distress" gasoline from the market).
21. Id. at 226 n.59 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 218.
23. See note 8 supra. As stated previously, an agreement which is not found to be
per se illegal must be examined under the rule of reason test. For an explanation of
this test, see note 9 supra.
24. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
25. Id. at 403-07.
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later, in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,26 the Court
applied the per se standard to strike down an agreement among competing
liquor distributors that fixed maximum resale prices, noting that "agree-
ment[s] among competitors to fix maximum resale prices ... no less than
those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby
restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.
'27
Furthermore, in United States v. General Motors Corp.,25 collaborative
action directed at certain General Motors franchisees by the manufacturer
and other General Motors dealers was declared per se illegal because it
deprived the franchisees of their freedom to sell automobiles through
discount houses.29 The freedom of independent business entities to make
their competitive decisions unhampered by external pressure is thus a basic
principle of antitrust policy.
The Third Circuit in Kresge was therefore confronted with a business
agreement and practice which appeared, at least on the surface, to present a
classical per se violation of section 1 - horizontal price fixing coupled with
other restrictions upon Hempfield's exercise of its independent business
judgment. After disposing of the jurisdictional issue,30 the court noted that
before an arrangement in a particular case may be subject to the per se rule:
1) the business relationship between the parties must be "one with which the
courts have had 'considerable experience,' "31 and 2) the restrictions
embodied in the relationship must be "'naked restraints of trade with no
purpose except [the] stifling of competition.' "32 After commenting that the
district court had found the relationship in the instant case to be akin to a
franchise, 33 the present court characterized the relationship as more like a
26. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
27. Id. at 213; see Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959),
where a group boycott was subjected to per se treatment as it prevented the affected
merchants from selling according to their own judgment. Broadway-Hale, a chain
department store, operated one of its stores next door to an appliance store operated
by Klor's. Id. at 208. So located, the two stores were competitors for retail appliance
sales. Id. Broadway-Hale used its "monopolistic" buying power to induce 10 national
appliance manufacturers and their distributors not to deal with Klor's or to sell to it
only on highly unfavorable, discriminatory terms. Id. at 209. The effect was "to [take]
from Klor's its freedom to buy appliances in an open competitive market and [drive] it
out of business as a dealer in the manufacturers' products. It [also] deprive[d] the
manufacturers and distributors of their freedom to sell to Klor's. Id. at 213.
28. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
29. Id. at 144. General Motors, aided by the policing efforts of local dealers,
targeted dealers who were. selling through discount houses and pressured them to
abandon the practice. Id. at 135-38. Not only did this interfere with the targeted
dealers' freedom of trade, it also eliminated the discount houses from access to the
market for Chevrolets. Id. at 145. The Supreme Court held the action per se illegal. Id.
30. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
31. 544 F.2d at 1191, quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608
(1972).
32. Id.
33. 544 F.2d at 1191. Provisions in the licensing agreement that led the district
court to its "franchise" conclusion included: 1) payments to Kresge by Hempfield of a
percentage of gross sales in excess of a given figure as license fees; 2) common
advertising, directed by Kresge, with the cost shared by Hempfield; and 3)
discontinuance by Hempfield of its use of the K-Mart or any related trade name upon
termination of the agreement. 394 F. Supp. at 844.
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"concession" 34 but emphasized that precise labeling was unnecessary since
the relevant inquiry was simply "whether there has been sufficient judicial
examination of, and experience with, the hybrid business arrangement at
issue here. ' 35 Finding that the antitrust statutes had apparently never been
invoked to challenge a business relationship similar to the Kresge-
Hempfield arrangement, 36 the court indicated a "'need to know more than
we do about the actual impact of these arrangements on competition to
decide whether they have such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack
* . . any redeeming virtue" and therefore should be classified as per se
violations of the Sherman Act.' 37
In addition to its inability to find prior judicial consideration of, and
thus the requisite "considerable experience" with, the Kresge arrangement
to declare it per se illegal, the court was unable to find that the restrictions
involved met the second portion of the test-that they were "naked restraints
of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition. '38 This result was
reached because a prerequisite of a horizontal restraint of trade is an
agreement between competitors, and the court found that Kresge and
Hempfield were not competitors.39 The Third Circuit stated that although
the parties arguably appeared to be competitors because certain non-food
items could be purchased from either Kresge or Hempfield, the fact that such
goods were presented to the public under a common K-Mart marquee made it
as though these items were simply available at two different locations in a
single vendor's (Kresge's) establishment. 40 Furthermore, the court found
that the restrictive terms in the arrangement served a legitimate business
purpose: By stimulating the business and efficiency of both the discount
house and the grocery store, the restrictions, rather than stifling competi-
tion, enabled the total operation to function as an effective competitor to
34. 544 F.2d at 1192. The Third Circuit reasoned that Hempfield, by using the
name K-Mart Foods on its marquee and thus appearing as K-Mart to the public, was
in effect operating within the K-Mart complex as a "concession." Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1191. The court was also unable to find any nonjudicial legal discussion
of the relationship created by the agreement. Id.
37. Id. at 1192, quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963),
quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
38. 544 F.2d at 1192; see notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text supra.
39. 544 F.2d at 1192. The court quoted from United States v. Columbia Pictures
Corp., 169 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1961): "[B]efore we may say that ... agreements
[imposing such restraints] are inherently unlawful, we must find that the agreements
were made between competitors, actual or potential, dealing in competing products in
a relevant market." Id. at 893.
The court also noted that while some vertical restraints, such as resale price
maintenance, are per se illegal, neither party to the instant action argued that the
restrictions here involved were vertical in nature. 544 F.2d at 1192 n.25.
40. 544 F.2d at 1193. The court noted that the uncontradicted affidavit of one of
the Hempfield incorporators showed that the parties did not intend to compete with
one another, and that the absence of competition was essential to their business
arrangement. Moreover, the district court had found that Kresge and Hempfield were
not competitors because only between two and five percent of Hempfield's
merchandise was also sold by the K-Mart department stores. Id.
1976-1977]
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other department store and food discounters. 4' The court therefore regarded
per se treatment as inappropriate.
42
Although plaintiffs attack on the licensing agreement restrictions W~as
based solely upon an argument of per se illegality,13 the Third Circuit also
discussed the restrictions' validity under the rule of reason. Applying tliat
test as formulated by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States,4 the court concluded that the restraints, imposed as they were to
enhance the business and efficiency of both parties and allow them to stand
as a unified competitor in the discount and food markets,45 were such as
"'merely regulate and perhaps thereby promote competition [rather than]
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.'-46 The Third Circuit
therefore affirmed the district court's granting of Kresge's motion for
summary judgment.
47
The Third Circuit's refusal to apply the per se standard to the Kresge-
Hempfield arrangement appears at least superficially sound when consi-
dered in the context of cases involving restrictive covenants in shopping
center leases and trademark licensing. 4 However, the factual differences
between these cases and Kresge may dilute their precedential force. In
Savon Gas Stations v. Shell Oil Co.,49 a covenant in a shopping center lease
providing that the lessor would not permit the use of other property in the
shopping center for a competitive service station was found to be a
reasonable ancillary restraint of trade, and thus not violative of section 1.50
Since the covenant clearly barred the lessor itself from operating a
competing business in the shopping center, it is arguable that the agreement
eliminating competition between Kresge, as lessor, and Hempfield, as lessee,
was also a reasonable ancillary restraint. However, in Savon, the Fourth
Circuit was careful to note that no price-fixing agreement and no direct
interference with the plaintiffs business was involved; the restrictive
covenant resulted only in the lessor's refusal to allow an adjacent service
station (plaintiff) direct access to the shopping center, thereby denying it the
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1194.
44. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). For an explanation of this test, see note 8 supra.
45. See text accompanying note 41'supra.
46. 544 F.2d at 1194, 1196, quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918). Since the burden of proof to establish a section 1 violation is upon the
plaintiff, and since the plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence to support a finding of a
violation under the rule of reason standard, the court, upon the record presented, could
not have found such a violation. See 544 F.2d at 1193-96. The court quoted at length
from the uncontradicted affidavit of one of the founders of Hempfield's predecessor,
who had negotiated the Kresge license. He stated, inter alia: "I agreed to [the price
restrictions] because [they] essentially accomplished one purpose of two separate
operations under one name, and the identical pricing would avoid customer confusion
and damage to the low-price discount image that we were both trying to accomplish."
Id. at 1195.
47. 544 F.2d at 1196.
48. See notes 49-51 & 58-60 and accompanying text infra.
49. 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963).
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use of the shopping center property as part of its place of business. 5' In Kresge
both price fixing and direct interference with Hempfield's business were
present.52 Moreover, unlike Savon, wherein the lessor voluntarily restricted its
own behavior, the lessor in Kresge restricted the behavior of its lessee,
Hempfield, an independent business entity. 3
Although K-Mart is a trade name and not a trademark, the rules
governing its use are generally similar to those governing the use of
trademarks.54 Just as the owner of a tradmark has the right to impose
reasonable restraints on its licensees calculated to protect the reputation of
its product, 55 Kresge, as a trade name licensor to' Hempfield, enjoyed the
same rights with respect to the K-Mart name. In fact, protection of the "low
price 'K-Mart' discounting image"56 was part of the asserted justification for
the restraints imposed upon Hempfield.57 In Susser v. Caruel Corp.,5 8 the
Second Circuit upheld a section 1 challenge of a clause in a franchising
contract requiring the franchisee-retailers to sell only the franchisor's
products or those approved by the franchisor. The case is a useful vehicle for
analyzing the result reached in Kresge, notwithstanding the fact that a
franchise was involved in Carvel whereas the Kresge-Hempfield relation-
ship was characterized by the Third Circuit as a concession. 59 Looking
beyond the labels, both Hempfield and the Carvel franchisees were
permitted to use their licensor's trade name or trademark on their stores.
6 0
However, the Carvel franchisees were allowed to use the Carvel name in
their advertising displays and on the products they sold,61 while Hempfield
had no such rights with respect to the K-Mart name.62 The antitrust
significance of this distinction lies in the fact that, even inside a Carvel
store, one would identify the products sold with the Carvel name, but once
past the K-Mart marquees a customer could perceive the independent nature
51. 309 F.2d at 310.
52. See notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text supra.
53. For evidence of Hempfield's independence, see notes 2 & 5 and accompanying
text supra.
54. See Stover v. Farmers' Educ. & Coop. Union, 250 F.2d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 976 (1958). In general, a trademark is applicable to a vendible
commodity to which it is affixed, whereas a trade name is applicable to a business
and its goodwill. American Steel Foundries v. Robinson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926).
55. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 517 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965). However, a trademark can not be legally
used as a vehicle to impose restrictions that would otherwise violate section 1. Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951). In fact, the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970), imposes sanctions for the use of a trademark "to violate
the antitrust laws of the United States." Id. § 1115(b)(7).
56. 544 F.2d at 1193.
57. Id.
58. 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
59. See note 34 and accompanying text supra. The Second Circuit stated: "The
antitrust laws certainly do not require that a licensor of a trademark permit his
licensees to associate with the trademark other products unrelated to those
customarily sold under the mark." 332 F.2d at 517. The franchisees in Carvel sold the
franchisor's soft ice cream product. Id. at 508-09.
60. Carvel, Id. at 517; Kresge, 544 F.2d at 1186-87.
61. 332 F.2d at 517.
62. See note 5 supra.
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of the Kresge and Hempfield operations. 63 This attenuates the force of the
argument that restrictions upon Hempfield were necessary to protect the
"low price 'K-Mart' discounting image."
64
It is also significant that price fixing, present in Kresge, was absent in
Carrel at the time of trial and appeal, but the trial judge had found that
price-fixing provisions in earlier. Carvel franchise agreements were per se
violations of section 1.65 In language which, if applicable to the tightly
controlled Carvel franchise system, is a fortiori applicable to the simple
Kresge-Hempfield licensor-licensee relationship, the trial court stated: "The
cases outlawing price fixing have been so sweeping that there would appear
to be no room for saying that ... price fixing may be justified as ancillary
to a valid business operation.
'66
Indeed, the Third Circuit's Kresge decision accords little weight to one of
the most oft-repeated dictates of the Supreme Court in the antitrust field -
that an agreement to fix prices is per se an unreasonable restraint of trade.
6 7
As the Supreme Court has stated: "It is not for the courts to determine
whether in particular settings price-fixing serves an honorable or worthy
end."' 6  The Third Circuit's refusal to apply the per se standard, at least to
the price fixing provision in the Kresge-Hempfield agreement, is thus open
to serious question. The court's justification for its position, that Kresge and
Hempfield were not competitors and therefore no horizontal price fixing
arrangement could be established, 69 is tenuous in at least two respects. First,
Kresge and Hempfield were noncompetitors not because the market cast
them in this relationship, but because they agreed not to compete.70 Second,
the very fact that they had to agree to this arrangement demonstrates that
they were at least potential competitors; and as the court itself recognized,
even agreement between potential competitors can establish a per se
violation of section 1.71
Although the Third Circuit characterized the Kresge-Hempfield
arrangement as a "joint venture" by noting that the parties "acted as
'partners' in establishing and operating under joint merchandising and
pricing policies" thereby competing as a unit against others in the market,
72
such a determination should not vindicate otherwise illegal restraints of
63. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
64. 544 F.2d at 1193; see text accompanying notes 56 & 57 supra.
65. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). No appeal was
taken from this finding by the trial court. 332 F.2d at 509.
66. 206 F. Supp. at 649 (emphasis added). The court noted that "[ilt has been
established beyond any possibility of dispute that agreements fixing prices are illegal
per se under Section 1 ofthe Sherman Act." Id. at 648, citing Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911), and United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392 (1927).
67. See notes 21 & 22 and accompanying text supra.
68. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950).
69. See notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
70. 544 F.2d at 1187, 1193.
71. Id. at 1192; see note 39 supra. The court's conclusion that a horizontal
limitation was not present'resulted from a finding that Kresge and Hempfield were
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trade. As the Supreme Court stated in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States:73 "[Wie find [no] support in reason or authority for the proposition
that agreements between legally separate persons' and companies to
suppress competition among themselves and others -can be justified by
labeling the project a "joint venture." Perhaps every agreement and
combination to restrain trade could be so labeled. ' 74 Even if some members
of the public were induced to believe that K-Mart and Hempfield were a
single entity, Kresge and Hempfield were legally separate companies,7 5 and
therefore within the purview of the Timken language;
The Third Circuit's exoneration of the product restrictions in the Kresge-
Hempfield agreement, 76 while not as direct an affront to Supreme Court
holdings as its exoneration of the price-fixing arrangement, is nonetheless
dubious in light of the cases that have developed and reiterated one of the
underpinnings of antitrust policy - the freedom of independent business
entities to make independent decisions with respect to the conduct of their
operations. 77 Although Kresge, as a trade name licensor, had the right to
impose reasonable restraints upon Hempfield, 78 the visible independence of
the two businesses behind the K-Mart marquees raises the question whether
any restrictions were reasonably necessary to protect the "low price 'K-Mart'
discounting image." 79 Moreover, whether the restraints other than price
fixing should have been declared valid even under the rule of reason is
questionable, since the Kresge-Hempfield relationship was not as tightly
woven as that between the franchisor and franchisees in Carvel,0 and a
horizontal relationship was involved in Kresge as contrasted with a vertical
one in Carvel.51 Since the plaintiff bore the burden of establishing that the
arrangement constituted a section 1 violation, 2 and since it advanced
arguments only in support of a finding of per se illegality, 83 the court's
conclusion that no section 1 violation was proven on the record - "that the
challenged restraints 'merely regulates [sic] and perhaps thereby promote
73. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
74. Id. at 598. In Timken the Court found a per se violation of section 1 where the
dominant American producer of roller bearings used its trademark licensing
agreements to divide the international market amongst itself and British and French
producers. Id. at 597-99.
75. For the manifestations of this independence of one, another at the retail sales
level, see note 5 supra.
76. For a discussion of the terms of this agreement, see note 2 and accompanying
text supra.
77. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's views on this issue, see notes 24-29
and accompanying text supra.
78. See note 55 and accompanying text supira.
79. 544 F.2d at 1193; see notes 5 & 59-64 and accompanying text supra.
80. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text supra.
81. For an explanation of horizontal and vertical restraints, see note 9 supra. The
apparent inappropriateness of the Third Circuit's refusal to characterize the
relationship between Kresge and Hempfield as horizontal because of the absence of
actual competition between them is discussed at notes 69-71 and accompanying text
supra.
82. 544 F.2d at 1193; see note 46 supra.
83. 544 F.2d at 1194.
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competition,' ",84 - is unassailable so long as one ignores the fact that
Kresge and Hempfield were potential competitors who laid to rest any
chance of actual competition between them through agreement. 5
The Third Circuit appears to have opened the door for competitors,
actual or potential, situated in close geographic proximity to one another, to
effectively eliminate competition between themselves by the simple
expedient of operating under a common name and holding themselves out to
the public as noncompetitors. Even price fixing, long thought to be illegal
per se,8 6 will have an opportunity to thrive under the guise of agreements
between noncompetitors who have consciously decided and agreed not to
compete with one another. Since the Supreme Court's absolute proscription
of price fixing admits no such exception, 7 the Kresge decision may be
viewed as an unwarranted relaxation of the judiciary's vigilance in the
price-fixing area.
Reginald A. Krasney
CONSUMER LAW - TRUTH IN LENDING ACT - DISCLOSURE OF
ACCELERATION CLAUSE IN INSTALLMENT CONTRACT NOT REQUIRED
WHEN STATE LAW PROVIDES FOR THE REBATE OF UNEARNED INTEREST.
Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc. (1975)
In order to finance the purchase of a used automobile, plaintiffs William
and Joan Johnson entered into a retail installment contract with
McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc. (McCrackin-Sturman).1 A copy of the
contract and a disclosure statement were delivered to plaintiffs at the time of
sale.2 Although the contract contained a provision granting McCrackin-
Sturman the right to accelerate payment in the event of plaintiffs' default,
3
84. Id. at 1196, quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918).
85. See notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 17-23, 67 & 68 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 17-23, 67 & 68 and accompanying text supra.
1. Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257, 260 (3d Cir. 1975).
Under the retail installment contract, plaintiffs were required to pay in 30 monthly
installments the purchase price of the vehicle less a downpayment, plus finance and
other charges. Id.
2. Id. at 260-61. Under the Truth in Lending Act, the creditor, McCrackin-
Sturman, was required to disclose certain credit information to the plaintiff-
consumers. See Truth in Lending Act, § 128(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (1970); Regulation
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b) (1976). Basically, such disclosures must be made on a separate
statement and presented in a clear and conspicuous manner. Truth in Lending Act,
§ 121(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (1970); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1976).
3. 527 F.2d at 261. The acceleration clause was located in a contractual provision
labeled "Default." In this same provision the creditor was given rights in addition to
acceleration, including the right to repossess and resell the automobile and the right
to obtain from the borrower reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses incurred by
the creditor in effecting such repossession and resale. Id.
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this right was not set forth in the disclosure statement.4 Plaintiffs made
none of the required payments, and the automobile was ultimately
repossessed by Ford Motor Credit Company, the assignee of the contract.5
Alleging that the failure to include the acceleration provision in the
disclosure statement constituted a violation of section 128(a)(9) of the Truth
in Lending Act (Act)6 and section 226.8(b)(4) of Regulation Z7 promulgated
thereunder, plaintiffs instituted an action against McCrackin-Sturman and
Ford Motor Credit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania.8 The district court subsequently granted plaintiffs
the requested relief.9 On appeal,' 0 the United States Court of Appeals for the
4. Id. The disclosure statement did contain a provision delineating the charges
that would be assessed against plaintiffs in the event of late payment of an
installment. Id. In addition, it set forth the method for computing the portion of the
finance charge that would be rebated if plaintiffs prepaid their obligation. Id.
5. Id. Under the contract, the seller retained the right to repossess the
automobile in the event of default. Id.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(9) (1970). Section 128(a)(9) provides in pertinent part: "In
connection with each consumer credit sale not under an open end credit plan, the
creditor shall disclose each of the following items which is applicable: ". . . [t]he
default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of late payments." Id.
The sale in Johnson was not made pursuant to an open end credit plan and
therefore fell within section 128(a)(9) of the Act. For the statutory definition of "an
open end credit plan," see id. § 1602(i). Basically, open end credit is credit of an
ongoing nature, under which there is no fixed date by which the obligation must be
fully paid. Examples include credit extended via credit cards and revolving charge
accounts. On the other hand, consumer credit not under an open end credit plan is
credit extended for a specific length of time, with payments of equal amounts due at
set intervals. This type of credit is exemplified by a typical bank loan or a retail
installment contract such as that in Johnson. Galie, The Acceleration Clause as a
Truth in Lending Disclosure: The End of a Dilemma?, 93 BANKING L.J. 317, 319
(1976).
7. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1976). Section 226.8(b)(4) provides in pertinent part: "In
any transaction subject to this section, the following items, as applicable, shall be
disclosed: . . .(4) the amount, or method of computing the amount, of any default,
delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of late payments." Id.
8. Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 153 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
Jurisdiction was based upon section 130(e) of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
1640(e) (1970). 381 F. Supp. at 154.
9. Id. at 154. All parties originally moved in the district court for summary
judgment. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against McCrackin-Sturman was
granted, but its motion against Ford Motor Credit was denied without prejudice. Id. at
156. Both McCrackin-Sturman's and Ford Motor Credit's motions for summary
judgment were denied. Id. The district court concluded that acceleration of the loan
was a charge within the meaning of section 128(a)(9) of the Act and section 226.8(b)(4)
of Regulation Z. Id. Relying upon Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp.
955 (N.D. Ill. 1972), the court held that a creditor's right to accelerate payment was
precisely the "type of disclosure the Truth in Lending Act was intended to require."
381 F. Supp. at 155-56. In addition, the court rejected the defendants' contention that
since the acceleration clause was not automatically imposed, it did not have to be
disclosed under section 226.8(b)(4) of Regulation Z. Id. For an analysis of the district
court opinion, see WAYNE L. REV. 1153 (1975). See generally Federal Reserve Board
Staff Opinion Letter No. 591, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
30,834 (Apr. 10, 1972); Federal Reserve Board Staff Opinion Letter No. 290, [1969-
1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,528 (Mar. 19, 1970); Federal
Reserve Board Staff Opinion Letter, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) 30,404 (June 23, 1969).
10. Since the district court certified only the grant of summary judgment against
McCrackin-Sturman as final, the appeals from the other district court rulings were
dismissed by the Third Circuit for lack of an appealable order. 527 F.2d at 262.
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Third Circuit" reversed, holding that since a state statutory provision 12
requires creditors to rebate the unearned portion of the finance charge, a
failure to disclose a right of acceleration does not violate section 128(a)(9) of
the Act or section 226.8(b)(4) of Regulation Z. Johnson v. McCrackin-
Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975).
In 1969, Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act in order to ensure
for consumers a meaningful disclosure of credit costs, which then could be
readily compared to facilitate the informed use of credit.13 In order to
effectuate this purpose, the Federal Reserve Board (Board), pursuant to
congressional authority.,14 promulgated Regulation Z,'5 which, together with
the Act, requires the creditor to make certain disclosures to the consumer in
most credit transactions.
6
Prior to the instant case, numerous district courts had confronted the
question of whether an acceleration clause is required to be disclosed. Since
the Truth in Lending Act and its supplemental regulations require the
11. The case was heard by Judges Van Dusen, Maris, and Hunter. Judge Hunter
wrote the opinion of the court.
12. See note 33 infra."
13. Truth in Lending Act, § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970); see Mourning v. Family
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 364-65 (1973); Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet,
Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1974). The Act was later amended to include an
additional purpose: "to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit
billing and credit card practices." 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1976) (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 1601 (1970)). For a discussion of the amendments to the Act, see Comment,
Consumer Protection: Amendments To Truth in Lending Act, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 567
(1975).
14. Section 105 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 1604 (1970), gives the Board authority to
prescribe regulations which, in the judgment of the Board, are necessary to execute
the purpose of the Act. In Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc. 411 U.S. 356
(1973), the United States Supreme Court recognized the power granted the Board by
section 105 of the Act, stating:
To accomplish its desired objective, Congress determined to lay the structure of
the Act broadly and to entrust its construction to an agency with the necessary
experience and resources to monitor its operation. Section 105 delegated to the
Federal Reserve Board broad authority to promulgate regulations necessary to
render the Act effective.
Id. at 365; accord, Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir.
1974).
15. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.14 (1976). In addition to promulgating Regulation Z, the
Board, under the authority delegated to it by Congress, has issued and continues to
issue formal interpretations of Regulation Z's provisions. Id. §§ 226.101-.1002.
Furthermore, from time to time members of the Board issue Federal Reserve Board
staff opinion letters to explain particular provisions of the Act and Regulation Z.
Thus, in addition to case law, there are four sources of authority available to the
courts and the creditor in determining what must be disclosed under the Act: 1) the
Act itself, 2) Regulation Z, 3) the Board's formal interpretations of Regulation Z, and
4) the Federal Reserve Board staff opinion letters. For a discussion of the relative
weight to be accorded the latter three sources, see St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii,
[19761 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,434, at 87,861-62 (D. Hawaii Apr. 12, 1976).
Although none of these three sources are absolutely binding upon a court, they are
nonetheless entitled to great weight in construing the Act. See Philbeck v. Timmers
Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1974); Frank v. Reserve Consumer Discount
Co., 398 F. Supp. 703, 704-05 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Jones v. East Hills Ford Sales, Inc., 398
F. Supp. 402, 403-04 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
16. See Truth in Lending Act, §§ 121(a), 127, 128, 129, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631(a), 1637,
1638, 1639 (1970); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.7, 226.8 (1976).
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disclosure of "default, delinquency, or similar charges,"'1 7 most of these
courts have focused upon whether an acceleration: clause constituted a
"charge" within the meaning of this phrase. The results have been
inconsistent, however, since some courts have interpreted "charges" to mean
any pecuniary burden or expense,' 8 while others have limited the term's
scope to include only monetary sums imposed in addition to the immediate
payment obligation.' 9 Alternatively, some courts have focused almost
entirely upon whether the purpose of the Act requires disclosure of an
17. See notes 6 & 7 supra.
18. See Meyers v. Clearfield Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 722, 726-27 (E.D. La.
1974), rev'd, 539 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1976); Barksdale v. Peoples Financial Corp., [1976]
5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,738, at 88,341 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 5, 1974) (recommenda-
tions of special master), reod sub noma., McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 543 F.2d 568
(5th Cir. 1976); Pollock v. Avco Financial Servs., [1976] 5 CONS.- CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
98,766, at 88,396 (N.D. Ga. July 1, 1974) (recommendations of special master); Garza
v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F., Supp. 955, 959 (N.D. Ill. 1972); cf. Hall v.
Sheraton Galleries, [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,737 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 21,
1974) (recommendations of special master) (disclosure of acceleration clauses
necessary in open end as well as closed end credit transactions)..
The leading case employing this rationale is Garza. The court in Garza noted
that the word "charge" was defined by Black's Law Dictionary as an "obligation" or"claim" (see BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 294 (4th ed. 1968)), and that the term had been
judicially defined in a pre-Truth in Lending Act case as a pecuniary burden or
expense. 347 F. Supp. at 959, citing Sunderland v. Day, 12 Ill. 2d 50, 52, 145 N.E.2d 39,
40 (1957). Considering these definitions and the purpose of the Act, the Garza court
concluded that the acceleration of the balance of the debt was a charge that should be
disclosed under section 128(a)(9) of the Act and section 226.8(b)(4) of Regulation Z. 347
F. Supp. at 959. This rationale was also adopted by the district court in Johnson. See
note 9 supra.
The Myers court also interpreted the term "charge" broadly by holding that it
could mean "any pecuniary burden, expense, or obligation." 384 F. Supp. at 727.
19. See Allen v. City Dodge, Inc., Civ. No. 74-427A (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 1975)
(recommendations of special master) (opinion digested in [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) 98,428); McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 395 F. Supp. 422, 427-28 (N.D. Ga.
(1975), rev'd, 543 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1976); Brooks v. Stone Mountain Ford, Inc., Civ.
No. 74-231A (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 1975) (recommendations of special master) (opinion
digested in [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,554); McKinney v. Greenbriar
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., Civ. No. 74-1509A (N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 1975) (opinion digested in
[1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,552); Barrett v. Vernie Jones Ford, Inc., 395 F.
Supp. 904, 908 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev'd sub nor., McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 543
F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1976); Barksdale v. Peoples Financial Corp., 393 F. Supp. 112, 114-
15 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev'd sub noma., McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 543 F.2d 568 (5th
Cir. 1976); Grant v. Imperial Motors, Civ. No. 3146 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 1974) (opinion.
digested in [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,620), rev'd, 539 F.2d 506 (5th.Cir.
1976); Hamlet v. Beneficial Fin. Co., Civ. No. 74-821A (N.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 1974)
(recommendations of special master) (opinion digested in [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) 95,646); Pugh v. American Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., Civ. No. 14,109 (D.
Conn. Apr. 10, 1974) (opinion digested in [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,827);
Washington Motor Sales v. Ferreira, 131 N.J. Super. 328, 333-34, 329 A.2d 599, 603
(1974).
When applying this interpretation to an acceleration clause, the courts have
had to determine whether the creditor was required to rebate any unearned interest or.
finance charge upon acceleration. 'n those cases where the creditor had the right to
accelerate the unearned finance charge, the "courts have held that this unearned
interest constituted an- additional charge and that the acceleration clause should have
been disclosed. See Allen v. City Dodge, Inc., supra; McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank,
supra at 427-28;. Barrett v. Vernie Jones Ford, Inc., supra at 908; Pugh v. American
Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., Supra. See also Galie, supra note 6. On the other hand,
in those cases where the creditor was required to rebate the unearned portion of the/
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acceleration clause, but again conflicting decisions have resulted. 20 Because
of these inconsistencies in the decisional law, 21 both the consumer and the
creditor have been unable to ascertain their rights and responsibilities under
the Act.
22
Against this conflicting and inconsistent background, the Third Circuit
became the first federal appellate court to deal with the issue. 23 Observing
that prior to the enactment of the Act the terms "default charges" and
"delinquency charges" had "well established meanings in the commercial
credit field and in other consumer credit legislation, ' 24 the Third Circuit
finance charge upon acceleration, the courts have concluded that there was no
"charge" in addition to that which was already due and, hence, no need to disclose the
acceleration clause as a "default, delinquency, or similar charge." See Brooks v. Stone
Mountain Ford, Inc., supra; McKinney v. Greenbriar Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., supra;
Barksdale v. Peoples Financial Corp., supra at 114-15; Grant v. Imperial Motors,
supra; Hamlet v. Beneficial Fin. Co., supra.
20. E.g., Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9, 16 (D. Ore. 1975) (creditor
must disclose any right of acceleration in order to comply with the "meaningful
disclosure" standard of the Act); see Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp.
955, 959 (N.D. Ill. 1972). But see Houston v. Atlanta Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No.
74-119A (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 1974) (recommendations of special master) (opinion
digested in [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,687); cf. Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l.
Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973)
(broad purpose of Act does not overrule specific language of section 129).
21. To further complicate the situation, one court has rejected the rationales of the
other courts, suggesting still another approach for resolving the acceleration clause
problem. See Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,568
(N.D. Ga. July 1, 1975) (recommendations of special master). In Morris, the court dealt
with section 226.6(g) of Regulation Z which provides: "If information disclosed in
accordance with this part is subsequently rendered inaccurate as the result of any act,
occurrence, or agreement subsequent to the delivery of the required disclosures, the
inaccuracy resulting therefrom does not constitute a violation of this part." 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.6(g) (1976). This provision also appears in section 124 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1634
(1970). The footnote to section 226.6(g) provides in pertinent part: "Such acts,
occurrences, or agreements include the failure of the customer to perform his
obligations under the contract and such actions by the creditor as may be proper to
protect his interests in such circumstances." 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(g) n.6 (1976). In light of
section 226.6(g) and its explanatory footnote, the court held that where the inaccuracy
in the disclosed percentage rate results from the subsequent occurrence of default, and
the creditor then exercises his right to accelerate, there is no violation of the Act or of
Regulation Z, even though the acceleration includes unearned interest. [1976] 5 CONS.
CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,568, at 88,074.
22. For an analysis of the judicial inconsistency on this and other issues under
the Act and the effects upon consumers and creditors, see Paer, Truth in Lending:
Protection for the Consumer or for the Creditor?, 24 EMORY L.J. 357, 359-68, 377-78
(1975); Rumsey, Truth in Lending: Congress Reacts to the Creditor's Dilemma, 24
EMORY L.J. 379, 380-91 (1975).
. 23. Emphasizing that it was not confronted with the question of whether the Act
or Regulation Z requires disclosure of an acceleration clause under which the creditor
is not required to rebate the unearned finance charge, the Third Circuit restricted its
holding accordingly. 527 F.2d at 260 n.3.
Subsequent to the Third Circuit's decision, the Fifth Circuit has also
considered the question presented here. See note 46 infra.
24. 527 F.2d at 266. The court analyzed two sources in particular to determine the
"well established meanings" of the terms. The court first noted that the Consumer
Credit Guide defines "delinquency charges" as follows:
"[T]he compensation a creditor receives on a precomputed contract for the
debtor's delay in making timely installment payments ....
Because a precomputed contract is the only one prepared on the assumption
that the debtor will make all payments when due, the creditor is left without any
[Vol. 22
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criticized the reasoning of the district court in Johnson because it focused
only upon the word "charges" and because it emphasized that word's
dictionary meaning rather than its well-established meaning in the
commercial credit field. 25 The Third Circuit pointed out that the terms
"default charges" and "delinquency charges" generally refer to specific
monetary penalties which the borrower is required to pay because of his
failure to meet the payment schedule. 26 Applying these definitions to the
phrase "default, delinquency, and similar charges," the court concluded that
section 128(a)(9) required disclosure only of those specific monetary
amounts, over and above the amounts already due under the loan, that are
imposed because of the untimely payment of one or more installments.
27
Thus, the Third Circuit found that a right of acceleration under which the
creditor must rebate the unearned portion of the finance charge is not within
the disclosure requirement required of section 128(a)(9) since the rebate
income for a period where payment is delayed. In lieu of accelerating the maturity
of the entire obligation, the creditor may make an appropriate charge just for the
delay on the particular installment."
Id., quoting [1976] 1 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 4230, 4231 (1971) (emphasis
supplied by the court). The other source was the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act which defines "default charges" as follows:
"A default charge may be collected on any installment payment or payments
which are not paid on or before the due date of such payments. Such default
charge shall not exceed the rate of two percent (2%) per month on the amount of
the payment or payments in arrears .... Such default charge shall not be
collected on any payment in default because of any acceleration provision in the
contract."
527 F.2d at 266, quoting Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, § 21(a), PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 621(A) (Purdon 1965) (emphasis supplied by the court). See also
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, § 2.203 [1976] 1 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 5063
(delinquency charge is a charge on an installment not paid in full within a specified
period of time after its scheduled due date).
25. 527 F.2d at 265. The Third Circuit specifically noted that the district court
ignored the well-established principle of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis. Id.
at 265 & n.14, citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). This
principle is fully defined in 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 4908 (3d ed. 1943):
In case the legislative intent is not clear, the meaning of doubtful words may
be determined by reference to their association with other associated words and
phrases. Thus, when two or more words are grouped together, and ordinarily have
a similar meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the general word will be
limited and qualified by the special word. But this is so, only if the result is
consistent with the legislative intent, for the maxim noscitur a sociis is a mere
guide to legislative intent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The court also indicated its belief that Congress intended to ascribe to the
terms "default charges" and "delinquency charges" their ordinary meanings in the
consumer credit industry. 527 F.2d at 265-66, citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,
417 U.S. 182, 201-02 (1974) (where Congress uses technical terms, it is proper to
explain them by reference to the field to which they are appropriate). The court
recognized that neither the Act nor its legislative history defines the phrase "default,
delinquency, or similar charge." 527 F.2d at 265. However, the-court also recognized
that "the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended to enact
remedies that reflected commercial realities." Id., citing Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072, 1078-79 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir.
1973); S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1967).
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prevents the creditor from collecting any additional charge. 2 Moreover,
since the shortening of the repayment period does not, in itself, constitute a
"tangible pecuniary sum assessed because of. . . default, '29 the fact that it
may further burden the borrower or even cause him an additional expense
was held to be an insufficient reason to include the acceleration clause
within the Act's disclosure requirements.
30
The plaintiffs additionally argued that the Act had been violated
because the contract itself did not provide for a rebate of the unearned
interest.3' The Third Circuit, however, relying upon the principle that
statutory provisions of the state in which the contract is executed become a
part of the contract,32 rejected this argument and held that because the
28. Id. The court noted that when a creditor is required to rebate the unearned
interest upon acceleration, the result is a shortening of the period within which the
principal must be repaid, not the assessment of an additional charge. Id., citing
Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,568 (N.D. Ga. July
1, 1975) (recommendations of special master). The court further asserted that the
credit consumer incurs no cost other than that disclosed on the face of the loan
contract. The creditor is Simply given the right to pursue his remedies against the
defaulting debtor immediately, rather than having to wait for the contract term to
expire 527 F.2d at 266, citing McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, [1976] 5 CONS. CRED.
GUIDE (CCH) 98,683, at 88,263 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1974) (recommendations of special
master), rev'd, 543 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1976).
29. 527 F.2d at 267.
30. Id. The court believed its conclusion was further supported by both the
language of section 226.8(b)(4) of Regulation Z (see note 7 supra) and by Federal
Reserve Board Staff Opinion Letter No. 851, [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
131,173 (Oct. 22, 1974), which provides in pertinent part:
If under the acceleration provision, a rebate is made by the creditor in
accordance with the disclosure of the rebate provisions of § 226.8(b)(7), we believe
that there is no additional "charge" for late payments made by the customer and
therefore no need to disclose under the provisions of § 226.8(b)(4). On the other
.hand, if upon acceleration of the unpaid remainder of the total of payments, the
creditor does not rebate unearned finance charges in accordance with the rebate
provisions disclosed in § 226.8(b)(7), any amounts retained beyond those which
would have been rebated under the disclosed rebate provisions represent a
"charge" which should be disclosed under § 226.8(b)(4).
Id. The court, recognizing that the interpretation was that of the Federal Reserve
Board staff and not that of the Board itself, noted that "[s]taff opinions are to be
considered the opinion of the Board until it rules to the contrary." 527 F.2d at 267
n.23, citing Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1974) (staff
opinion letters, though not binding, are entitled to great weight), and Federal Reserve
Board Staff Opinion Letter No. 444, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CoNs. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) 30,640 (Mar. 1, 1974). It is interesting to note, as did the Johnson court, that
the Staff Opinion Letter was issued subsequent to the district court opinion in the
instant case. 527 F.2d at 267.
In light of the staff opinion letter and its own interpretation of the phrase
"default, delinquency, and similar charges," the court refused to adopt. plaintiffs'
argument that the purpose of the Act required disclosure of the creditor's right of
acceleration where unearned interest charges must be rebated. Id. at 269. The court
noted that "no matter now [sic] desirable" general disclosure of acceleration clauses
might be, its discussion was necessarily limited to whether the specific provisions of
the Act or Regulation Z required such disclosure. Id.
31. 527 F.2d at 268.
32. Id., citing Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 550 (1866), In
Von Hoffman, the Supreme Court stated a general rule that "the laws whiish'subsist
-at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be ierformed,
enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in
35
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Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act requires the rebate of the
unearned finance charge,33 the failure of the defendants specifically to
provide for a rebate in the contract did not warrant a finding that the Act
had been violated.
34
The pivotal question confronted by the Johnson court was the
interpretation to be given the phrase "default, delinquency, or similar
charges." Although the court's ultimate interpretation may be sound and
convincing, it nonetheless may have shortchanged the meaning of the
phrase by concentrating primarily upon the terms "default charge" and
"delinquency charge," and by thereafter narrowly defining a "similar
charge" as one which necessarily involves an additional monetary sum.35 A
liberal interpretation 3 by the court of the term "similar" could have resulted
in providing the consumer with meaningful disclosure while at the same
time doing no damage to the well-established meanings of "default charge"
its terms." 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 550; accord, Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal
Res. Bank, 262 U.S. 649, 660 (1923); N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d
1210, 1215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973); Gardner & North Roofing &
Siding Corp. v. Board of Governors, 464 F.2d 838, 841-42 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
33. Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, § 22(B), PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
69, § 622(B) (Purdon 1965). Section 22(B) provides in pertinent part: "Whenever all the
time balance is liquidated prior to maturity by prepayment, refinancing, or
termination by surrender or repossession and resale of the motor vehicle, the holder of
the installment sale contract shall rebate to the buyer immediately the unearned
portion of the finance charge." Id.
34. 527 F.2d at 268-69. The court also concluded that the method of rebate of the
unearned finance charge was properly disclosed pursuant to section 226.8(b)(7) of
Regulation Z. Id. at 268-69 & n.28. Section 226.8(b)(7) provides in pertinent part:
In any transaction subject to this section, the following items, as applicable,
shall be disclosed.
(7) Identification of the method of computing any unearned portion of the
finance charge in the event of prepayment in full . . . and a statement of the
amount or method of computation of any charge that may be deducted from the
amount of any rebate of such unearned finance charge that will be credited to an
obligation or refunded to the customer ....
12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7) (1976). Since the court considered acceleration to be essentially
a prepayment and since the method for rebate upon acceleration was identical to that
of voluntary prepayment, the court determined that it was unnecessary to include a
separate provision indicating the method of rebate in the event of acceleration. 527
F.2d at 269 n.28. In other words, the disclosure of the method of rebate upon
prepayment was sufficient. See Federal Reserve Board Staff Opinion Letter No. 851,
[1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,173 (Oct. 22, 1974). But see Morris v. First
Nat'l Bank, [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,568, at 88,072 (N.D. Ga. July 1,
1975) (recommendations of special master) (there is a difference between "prepayment
in full," as used in section 226.8(b)(7), and acceleration); Houston v. Atlanta Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 74-119A (N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 1975) (recommendations of special
master) (opinion digested in [1976] 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,553) (section
226.8(b)(7) does not require disclosure of rebate method in event of acceleration);
Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955, 959 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (section
226.8(b)(7)'s "prepayment in full" language applied only to voluntary prepayment,
and does not encompass involuntary prepayment under an acceleration clause).
35. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra.
36. A strict interpretation refuses to extend the import of words used in a statute
so as to include cases or acts which the words do not clearly describe. On the other
hand, a liberal interpretation construes the words in an effort to accomplish the
purpose or intention of the act. See 3 J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, § 5504.
1976-1977]
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and "delinquency charge. '37 Instead of focusing upon the common element
in those terms as being an assessment of an additional monetary sum, the
court, in its statutory analysis, could have determined that a "similar
charge," like a "default charge" and a "delinquency charge," is simply one
that invokes a penalty for failure to make timely payments. 38 Viewed in this
light, the acceleration clause would have to be disclosed under the Act, since
such a clause requires the debtor who has failed to make timely payments to
pay the entire sum owed, which is more than he would otherwise have to pay
at that time. Such a liberal interpretation would comply with the
requirement of meaningful disclosure as well as the more specific language
of section 128(a)(9) of the Act and section 226.8(b)(4) of Regulation Z.
39
Notwithstanding the need for liberal construction in the Truth in
Lending area, 40 it is submitted that ultimately the Johnson court's
conclusion may prove to be the better one. If the Act is continually
interpreted in a loose and liberal fashion and more disclosures are required,
the function of the disclosure statement, if not the purpose of the Act itself,
will be totally frustrated. In other words, the result will be a disclosure
statement almost as long and confusing as the contract itself.
41
Another aspect of the court's decision worthy of attention concerns the
Third Circuit's rejection of the argument that disclosure should be required
when the contract itself makes no mention of the fact that the unearned
interest must be rebated under state law. 42 Previously, a few federal district
courts had been receptive to such an argument, reasoning that a creditor
who asserts a right to collect unearned interest by not expressly providing
for a rebate should bear the burden of properly disclosing its existence or be
subjected to damages for violating the Act. The fact that the lender would be
unable to enforce that right under state law was deemed irrelevant by these
37. Certainly, no statutory interpretation should do violence to any of the words
being defined. See 2 J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, § 4706; 3 id. § 5504. However, a
statute should be construed with reference to its manifest intention, and if the
language is susceptible of two meanings, one which will execute the purpose of the
statute and the other which will defeat it, the language should be given the former
construction. See 2 id. § 4704. See also N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d
1210, 1214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973) (Act's terms must be construed in
liberal fashion if underlying congressional purpose is to be effectuated).
38. For the definitions of "default charge" and "delinquency charge" relied upon
by the Johnson court, see note 24 supra.
39. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. It is important to note that this
interpretation does not rely solely upon the purpose of the Act, which was the basis of
the court's decision in Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9, 16 (D. Ore. 1975).
In Woods, the court did not rest its conclusion upon a specific section of the Act or
Regulation Z. Rather, it held that the "meaningful disclosure" standard of the Act
alone requires disclosure of an accelerating clause. Id. Unlike the Woods analysis, the
proposed interpretation attempts to define the language of section 128(a)(9) of the Act
and section 226.8(b)(4) of Regulation Z in light of the intention of the Act.
40. See N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
41. This problem may have already presented itself. See Hearings on the
Consumer Protection Efforts of the Three Major Bank Regulatory Agencies Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Currency, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 119-20 (1976)
(Statement of Jonathan Landers).
42. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
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courts. 3 Although not discussed by the Johnson court, the main difficulty
with this rationale is that it appears to be supported primarily, if not
entirely, by the "policy" of the Truth in Lending Act." The Third Circuit
was obviously not impressed with this policy argument since it disposed of it
simply by asserting a "general rule" that the laws "of the state in which the
contract is executed or performed become part o the contract." 45
In light of Johnson and the fact that the Truth in Lending Act does not
mention acceleration clauses, the arguments which the district courts prior
to Johnson have accepted in concluding that disclosure is required, though
imaginative, must be deemed tenuous at best. Indeed, these arguments may
have been dealt their death blow by a recent Fifth Circuit opinion which
supports the conclusion if not the reasoning of the Third Circuit in
Johnson.
46
43. See McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 395 F. Supp. 422, 427-28 (N.D. Ga. 1975),
rev'd, 543 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1976); Barrett v. Vernie Jones Ford, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 904,
908-09 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev'd sub nom., McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 543 F.2d 568
(5th Cir. 1976).
One commentator has suggested several reasons for holding that an
acceleration clause, which does not itself provide for a rebate of the unearned finance
charge, should be disclosed even if state law requires such a rebate. Galie, supra note
6, at 331-34. One reason is that such a required disclosure would encourage creditors
to draft their agreements in conformity with state law. Id. at 331-32. Creditors would
have a choice of including in the acceleration clause a provision stating that any
unearned interest will be rebated upon acceleration (which state law requires
anyway), or disclosing that they assert a right to collect the unearned interest (which
state law prohibits). By choosing the latter course, creditors would aid in the detection
of violations of state law. Id. at 332. A second reason is that since borrowers may not
know that the collection of the unearned finance charge is prohibited by state law,
they may pay it if it is not disclosed. Id. Hence, by putting creditors to the choice
described above, the possibility of unwary borrowers being deceived into paying the
unearned finance charges upon acceleration will be reduced. Id. at 332-33. A third
reason offered by the commentator is that Congress never intended that the Act's
disclosure requirements be nullified or modified by state law. Id. at 333-34.
44. In McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 395 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev'd, 543
F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1976), the district court stated:
[T]he effectuation of the Congressional purpose as set out in 15 U.S.C. § 1601
requires disclosure of all charges which the lender asserts a right to collect at the
time credit is extended whether or not it is finally determined that he can utilize
the enforcement mechanisms of the state courts to collect the charge.
395 F. Supp. at 428.
45. 527 F.2d at 268. Even recognizing the applicability of this "general rule," it
may be that a court, when faced with this issue, will undertake to explore the relevant
state law and not feel itself bound by any conclusions reached in Johnson. This
indeed was the situation in Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. La.
1976) (supplemental opinion), which held that the nondisclosure of an acceleration
clause violated section 226.8(b)(4) of Regulation Z. In Burley, the court analyzed the
Louisiana law which required that there be a rebate upon acceleration. The court
found that the rebate under the state law was conditioned upon the creditor bringing
suit to collect the obligation, whereas the Pennsylvania law involved in Johnson did
not require the creditor to file suit in order to collect the unpaid principal. Id. at 780-
81. Thus, the creditor in Burley had the power to collect as yet unearned interest, even
though it did not have the right to do so. Id. at 781. The Burley court also concluded
that the disclosure of an acceleration clause lies within the expressed congressional
purpose of the Act. Id. at 792.
46. Martin v. Commercial Sec. Co., 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976). In Martin, the
Fifth Circuit accepted the Johnson court's conclusion that section 128(a)(9) of the Act
requires "disclosure only of those specific monetary sums imposed upon the debtor
because of the late payment of an installment." Id. at 528. Unlike the Third Circuit,
1976-1977l
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It is nevertheless both interesting and noteworthy that in the absence of
appellate court guidance, so many federal district courts, purportedly relying
on the "policy" of the Truth in Lending Act, have required disclosure of
acceleration clauses even when state law required the rebate of unearned
interest charges. It does not take a great deal of insight to imply from these
opinions that the courts had, if nothing else, been persuaded that the
consumer would benefit greatly from a disclosure of the acceleration clause.
It was therefore not necessarily such a large step for these courts to conclude
that such disclosure should be within the scope of the Truth in Lending Act
if it was not already. 47 Given this assumption, it seems likely that unless
Congress enacts amending legislation in this area, the decisions of the Third
and Fifth Circuits may serve only to force consumer litigants and the courts
so disposed to find other sections in the Act through which to imply a
requirement that acceleration clauses be disclosed.
Stuart J. Agins
however, the Fifth Circuit refused to place reliance upon the Federal Reserve Board
Staff Opinion Letter. See note 30 supra. The Fifth Circuit believed that the staff's
conclusion that acceleration is basically a prepayment of the contract obligation was
without foundation for "[iun the installment credit context prepayment and
acceleration appear to be conceptually antithetical." 539 F.2d at 529. Hence, the
Martin court, refusing to find section 226.8(b)(7) of Regulation Z applicable to
acceleration, rejected the borrower's argument that the creditor's asserted right to
collect any unearned interest upon acceleration is a charge required to be disclosed
under section 128(a)(9), holding that "in the absence of a regulation requiring it,
failure to disclose an acceleration clause and the lender's rebate policy with respect
thereto in an installment credit transaction does not give rise to a claim for statutory
damages." Id. This holding has been adopted by the Fifth Circuit in other recent
opinions. See McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 543 F.2d 568, 569-70 (5th Cir. 1976);
Grant v. Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1976); Meyers v. Clearfield Dodge
Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 1976).
It is important to note that the Fifth Circuit in Martin appeared to be
impressed with the fact that there was no mention of acceleration clauses in the Act,
Regulation Z, or the Federal Reserve Board's formal interpretations, even though such
clauses were often seen in installment contracts. 539 F.2d at 524.
47. The Johnson court, on the other hand, was unwilling to take that step. It
stated:
It may indeed be true, as plaintiffs argue, that some borrowers do not know that a
creditor can require the entire debt to be due upon default, or that other
consequences may flow from default. However, no matter now [sic] desirable we
might think it to underscore a creditor's right to accelerate payment upon default,
the question to which we are, of course, limited is whether the specific provisions
of the Truth in Lending Act or Regulation Z require inclusion of this significant
right in the disclosure statement.
527 F.2d at 269 (footnote omitted).
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT - INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION POSSESSES STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY TO DENY RENT TO RAIL CARRIER FOR USE OF ITS LINES
DURING A DIRECTED SERVICE.
Lehigh & New England Railway v. ICC (1976)
The Lehigh and New England Railway Company (L & NE), a.railroad
carrier located solely in Pennsylvania, experienced three consecutive years
of deficit .operations as. of December 1974.1 Faced with a projection of
continued losses in 1975, L & NE issued an embargo, effective January 24,
.1975, encompassing all traffic moving to, from, and over. its lines. 2 In
order to prevent the implementation of L& NE's proposed embargo, 3 the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), pursuant to section 1(16)(b) of the.
.Interstate. Commerce Act (ICA),4 issued Service Orders 1207 and 1208 on
1. Lehigh & N.E. Ry. v. ICC, 540 F.2d 71., 76 (3d Cir. 1976). L & NE experienced a
substantial decline in net income in 1972, and it was operating at an annual deficit in
excess of $100,000 in 1973 and 1974. Id. This financial difficulty was attributed to a
decrease in coal and cement traffic over its lines. Id..
2. -Id. The decision to issue an embargo was prompted by an operating loss
projection totalling nearly $400,000 -for the first six months of 1975. Id.
3. The potential disruption of rail service that this type of embargo could cause
was forecasted by the Interstate Commerce. Commission (ICC) in a report to the
United States Committee on Commerce on a proposed amendment to section 1(16) of
the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), 49 U.S.C. § 1(16) (1970). S. REP. No. 302, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 302]. The ICC stated: "Tihe
nation's railroads operate as an integrated system, notwithstanding the fact that the
system consists of many individual enterprises... . . If one operation terminates
because of some crisis, the effect will ripple throughout the entire system." Id.
4. 49 U.S.C. ,§ 1(16)(b) (Supp. V 1975). Section 1(16)(b) provides in relevant part:
(b) Whenever any carrier by railroad is unable to transport the traffic offered
it because-
(1) its cash position makes its continuing operation impossible;
(2) it has been ordered to discontinue any service by a court; or
(3) it' has abandoned service without obtaining a certificate from the
Commission pursuant to this section;
the Commission may ... make such just and reasonable directions with respect
to the handling, routing, and movement of the traffic available to such carrier
and its distribution over such carrier's lines, as in the opinion of the Commission
will best promote the service in the interest of the public and the commerce of the
people subject to the following conditions:
(E) Any order of the Commission entered pursuant to this paragraph
shall provide that if, for the period of its effectiveness, the cost, as hereinafter
defined, of handling, routing, and moving the traffic of another carrier over the
other carrier's lines of road shall exceed the direct revenues therefor, then upon
request, payment shall be made to the directed carrier, in the manner hereinafter
provided and within 90 days after expiration of such order, of a sum equal to the
amount by which such costs has exceeded said revenues. The term "cost" shall
mean those expenditures made or incurred in or attributable to the operations as
directed, including the rental or lease of necessary equipment, plus an appropriate
allocation of common expenses, overheads, and a reasonable profit. Such cost
shall be then currently recorded by the carrier or carriers in such manner and on
such forms as by general order may be prescribed by the Commission and shall be
submitted to and subject to audit by the Commission. The Commission shall
certify promptly to the Secretary of the Treasury the amount of payment to be
made to said carrier or carriers under the provisions of this paragraph. Payments
1976-1977]
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January 17, 1975.5 As subsequently revised, the orders directed the Lehigh
Valley Railroad Company (LVRR) and the Reading Company (Reading) to
operate over L & NE's lines for 240 days beginning January 24, 1975, and
further required LVRR, Reading, and L & NE to negotiate an agreement
concerning the directed operation.6 During the negotiations L & NE
contended that it was entitled to receive rent for the use of its facilities
during the period of directed service, maintaining that rent would be a
reimbursable cost to the directed carrier under section 1(16)(b)(E) of the
ICA.7 Intervening in the negotiations to resolve this issue,8 the ICC
determined that L & NE had not demonstrated a sufficient basis to support
its rent demand.9 Upon notice of this ICC decision, the negotiations
dissolved.'
Shortly thereafter, L & NE petitioned the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit to set aside the ICC's determination of the rent
issue, naming the ICC and the United States as respondents. 1 In its
required to be made to a carrier under the provisions of this paragraph shall be
made by the Secretary of the Treasury from funds hereby authorized to be
appropriated in such amounts as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out
the provisions hereof.
Id.
The railroad which is ordered by the ICC to provide service over the lines of
an nonoperating carrier is referred to as "the directed carrier," the railroad whose
lines are being operated by a directed carrier is designated as "the other carrier."
Lehigh & N.E. Ry. v. ICC, 540 F.2d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1976).
5. Service Order No. 1207, 40 Fed. Reg. 4,309 (1975); Service Order No. 1208, id.
at 4,311. Representatives of L & NE met with the ICC in the latter part of December
1974, after L & NE had received the projections of severe operating losses for the first
half of 1975. 540 F.2d at 76. At this meeting L & NE indicated its intention to embargo
all traffic to, from, and over its lines in the beginning of 1975. Id.
6. Corrected Revised Service Order No. 1207, 40 Fed. Reg. 13,506-07 (1975);
Corrected Revised Service Order No. 1208, id. at 13,508-09 (1975). The agreement was
to embody terms "including, but not limited to use of and rental for equipment, use of
and compensation for, existing inventories of fuel, materials, and supplies, and rental
for use of rights-of-way and other rail facilities." Corrected Revised Service Order No.
1207, id. at 13,506-07; Corrected Revised Service Order 1208, id. at 13,508-09. Final
approval by the ICC was required in order to validate the agreement reached by the
carriers. Corrected Revised Service Order No. 1207, id. at 13,506-07; Corrected Revised
Service Order No. 1208, id. at 13,508-09. The ICC alleged that L & NE requested that a
directed service be ordered over its lines; but L & NE denied this allegation. 540 F.2d
at 76 & n.15. Thereafter, the ICC conducted meetings with L&NE and L&NE's
shippers in an effort to formulate an alternative to directed service. Id. at 76. When no
solution was forthcoming, the ICC issued Service Orders 1207 and 1208. Id.
7. 540 F.2d at 76-77. Section 1(16)(b)(E) defines those expenses of a directed
carrier that can be classified as a "cost" of a directed service. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(16)(b)(E) (Supp. V 1975). For the text of this section, see note 4 supra.
8. Corrected Revised Service Orders 1207 and 1208 both provided that in the case
of disagreement between the directed carrier and the other carrier on the terms of the
agreement, "the directed service shall continue pending a Commission determination
to establish such terms as it may find to be just and reasonable. .. " 40 Fed. Reg.
13,506-07 (1975); id, at 13,508-09.
9. 540 F.2d at 77. The total operating losses incurred by LVRR and Reading in
conducting the directed service over L & NE's lines amounted to $325,891. Id. For a
discussion of the ICC's reasons for excluding rent to the other carrier as a
reimbursable cost of an unprofitable directed service, see note 33 and accompanying
text infra.
10. 540 F.2d at 77.
11. Id. at 72. It should be noted that L & NE instituted the present action to clear
the way to file suit in the Court of Claims against the United States for compensation
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petition, L & NE alleged, inter alia,1 2 that the scope of the ICC's order
exceeded the statutory authority vested in it by section 1(16)(b) of the ICA' 3
and that directed service without payment of rent constituted a taking
without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment.' 4 The Third
Circuit'5 denied L & NE's request to review and vacate the ICC order,
holding that the decision to deny rent to L & NE was within the statutory
authority granted to the ICC, and that directed service did not constitute a
taking for which just compensation was required. Lehigh & New England
Railway Co. v. ICC, 540 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1976).
The taking clause of the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution' 6 was designed to compensate citizens for any injury resulting
for the use of its facilities during the period of directed service. Id. at 75 n.12. This suit
was originated to prevent a charge by the Court of Claims that L & NE was
collaterally attacking the ICC regulation upon which the denial of rent to L & NE was
based, 49 C.F.R. § 1126 (1976). 540 F.2d at 75 n.12.
12. L & NE contended that even if the ICC possesses the constitutional and
statutory authority to determine which costs incurred by a directed carrier would be
reimbursable, the distinction between profitable and unprofitable periods of directed
service as the criterion for determining when rent would be classified as a
reimbursable cost was arbitrary and capricious. 540 F.2d at 77.
L & NE further claimed that by deciding that the payment of rent would be
reimbursable only when the directed operation was profitable, the ICC had usurped
the judicial function of determining what constitutes just compensation. Id. at 77.
Sinc,. the court's holding that directed service did not effect a taking eliminated the
necessity of establishing the type and nature of compensation due the other carrier,
the court concluded that resolution of the usurpation issue was not required. Id. at 82
n.102.
13. Id. at 77. L& NE alleged that section 1(16)(b) of the ICA does not empower
the ICC to determine which costs of a directed service would be reimbursable. Id.
Rcather, L & NE contended that the proper interpretation of section 1(16)(b) authorized
•,he ICC only to prescribe a form for recording the costs incurred by directed carriers
during a period of directed service. Id. Respondent ICC asserted that its authority
under section 1(16)(b) to determine which costs of a directed carrier would be
reimbursable was rooted in the preamble to the Rail Act, 45 U.S.C. § 701(a)(6) (Supp. V
1975), and in the ICC's inherent power to regulate the flow of federal funds to the rail
industry. 540 F.2d at 77.
14. 540 F.2d at 77. The ICC disputed L & NE's assertion that directed service
constituted a taking in contravention of the fifth amendment, claiming that directed
service merely fulfilled the other carrier's duty to continue to provide service. Id.
Moreover, the ICC alleged that the other carrier, L & NE in this case, would receive
substantial benefits as a result of a directed operation and that such benefits would be
just compensation. Id. at 77-78. The ICC also raised two barriers to the institution of
the action by L & NE. First, the ICC asserted that L & NE was equitably estopped
from attacking the order because L&NE had actively sought and received
substantial benefits from the directed operation. Id. at 77. Since there was a dispute
over whether L & NE had requested the ICC to conduct a directed service over its
lines, and a lack of evidence indicating that L & NE was aware, prior to the start of
the directed operation, that it would not receive compensation for the use of its
facilities, the court concluded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was not
applicable. Id. at 78. Second, the ICC maintained that L & NE lacked standing to
challenge the allowance of rent during a profitable directed service because that
situation was hypothetical, as the directed operations in the instant case were
unprofitable. Id. The court rejected this argument, stating the L & NE was "clearly
aggrieved" by the application of this distinction and, therefore, had standing to
challenge it. Id. at 85 n.45.
15. Judge Hunter wrote the opinion, joined by Judges Adams and Garth.
16. The applicable portion of the fifth amendment provides: "[Nlor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
1976-1977]
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from governmental interference with their private property.17 The application
of the fifth amendment's compensation requirement traditionally has been
dependent upon the determination that the challenged government activity
is a taking rather than a legitimate exercise of the government's police
power, for which no compensation is due. 8 In making this determination,
the courts have been reluctant to articulate any standard. Rather, they have
' resolved the issue by an appraisal of the individual circumstances of each
case.19 However, one factor which the courts have considered determinative
of the existence of a taking has been the government's use, or physical"
invasion of private property.
20
The instant controversy over payment of rent to L & NE for the use of
its facilities during the period of directed service stems from an amendment
to section 1(16) of the ICA by section 601(e) of the. Regional Rail.
Reorganization Act of 1973 (Rail Act). 2' Prior to the amendment the ICC's
17. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of 'Just Cdmpensation':Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1165 (1967).
18. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149
(1971); see Mugeler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623.(1887). In Mugeler, the Supreme Court
rejected a brewery owner's challenge thplt a state regulation prohibiting the sale and
manufacture of alcoholic beverages was a taking which required compensation. Id. at
668-69. Justice Harlan defined the nature of the police power as "legislation [which]
does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes,
nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use
by anyone, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests." Id. at
669.
19. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.. 590 (1962) (regulation
prohibiting excavations below the water table level which deprived petitioner of his
mining business held to be a valid exercise of police power); United States v. Caltex,
Inc., 344 U.S. .149 (1952) (destruction of respondents' terminal facilities during
wartime was a legitimate exercise of police power); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922) (regulation prohibiting mining which caused surface damage was
a taking of mining company's subsurface rights where it had conveyed title to the
surface on the condition that it would not be liable for damages resulting from its
mining activities); Air Gloves, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1970)
.(seizure of corporation's property in an enemy country during time of war did not
constitute a taking).
Commentators have enumerated certain factors influential in answering the
question of whether the government activity amounts to a taking. See Michelman,
supra note 17, at 1184, wherein the author lists the following factors:
(1) whether or not the public or its agents have physically used or occupied
something belonging to, the claimant; (2) the size of the harm sustained by the
claimant or the degree to which his effected property has been devalued; (3)
whether the claimant's loss is outweighed by the public's concomitant gain; (4)
whether the claimant has sustained any loss apart from restriction of his liberty
to conduct some activity considered harmful to other people.
Id.
20. See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947) (continuing physical
invasion of owner's property by flooding caused by dam constructed by Government
held to be a compensable taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373
(1945) (lessee entitled to compensation for the Government's assumption of possession
of warehouse during the lease term); Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565 (1965)
(Government activity on Naval gunnery range, located adjacent to plaintiffs land,
deprived plaintiff of use of property, amounting to a taking); Twin Falls Canal Co. v.
American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2, 45 F.2d 649, (S.D. Idaho 1930) (entry on and use
of reservoir and dam warranted compensation); Michelman, supra note 17, at 1184,
1228.
21. Pub. L. No. 93-236, Title VI, § 601(e), 87 Stat. 1021 (1973) (amending 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(16) (1970)) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1(16)(b) (Supp. V 1975)). The Regional Rail
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authority to respond to a cessation of service by a rail carrier was limited to
rerouting that railroad's traffic over other carriers' lines.2 2 Determining that
the most effective way to strengthen the ICC's ability to prevent a
disruption of essential rail service was to empower the ICC to direct a carrier
(the directed carrier) to operate over the lines of an incapacitated carrier
(the other carrier) for an interim period, 23 Congress granted the ICC such
authority by amending section 16 of the ICA.2 4 This amendment was
designed as a temporary measure enabling the ICC to take immediate action
to avert a termination of service,2,5 and thus preserve rail transportation for
the public by precluding the possibility that a cessation of service by one
carrier would adversely affect other carriers' abilities to continue service.
2"
While directed service under section 1(16)(b) would preserve rail
transportation and the railroad industry, it could also impose formidable
burdens upon the directed carrier.2 7 In an effort to eliminate any financial
hardship to the directed carrier, Congress provided in section 1(16)(b)(E) for
the reimbursement of the directed carrier for expenses incurred during the
Reorganization Act of 1973 (Rail Act) was a comprehensive congressional response to
the railroad crisis in the Northeast and Midwest regions of the United States. S. REP.
No. 601, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 6-8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 601]. The
long-range solution provided in the Rail Act envisioned "a reorganization of the
railroads, stripped of excess facilities, into a single, viable system operated by a
private, for-profit corporation." Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
108-09 (1974). However, short term remedies, such as the amendment to section 1(16)
of the ICA, were included in order to avoid a disruption of essential service during the
development of this unified rail network. S. REP. No. 601, supra at 9.
22. This power was originally contained in section 1(16) of the ICA, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(16) (1970) (amended 1973). The amendment by the Rail Act denominated this
provision section 1(16)(a) and added section 1(16)(b). See Pub. L. No. 93-236, Title VI,
§ 601(e), 87 Stat. 1021 (1973) (amending 49 U.S.C. § 1(16) (1970)) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(16)(b) (Supp. V. 1975)). In arguing for the amendment, the ICC maintained that as
originally enacted, section 1(16) was not sufficiently expansive to prevent a disruption
of rail service: "Particularly in cases where there is no parallel service offered by
another rail carrier, the sudden termination of such operations would be a serious
blow to many commercial interests and could have serious implications for the health
and well-being of the region served by the railroad." Hearings on S. 2494 Before the
Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 43, at 3 (1971).
23. See S. REP. No. 601, supra note 21, at 10.
24. See 49 U.S.C. § 1(16)(b) (Supp. V. 1975). For the text of this section, see note 4
supra.
25. S. REP. No. 601, supra note 21, at 10. The purpose of the amendment was to
provide "an interim remedy intended to assist the railroads in maintaining existing
essential services while a more long-range plan for reorganization and revitalization
is implemented." Id.
26. S. REP. No. 302, supra note 3, at 7. The ICC described two ways in which
section 1(16)(b) would alleviate the potential adverse effects on other rail lines
resulting from a termination of service by one carrier: "First, the Commission would
be able to prevent a cessation of essential service by directing adjacent or other
connecting carriers to conduct operations over a defunct carrier's lines. Secondly, by
maintaining such service, the Commission can prevent a chain reaction which
otherwise could thrust marginal connecting carriers into bankruptcy." Id.
27. For example, section 1(16)(b)(D) requires a directed carrier to assume all the
employment obligations of those employees of the other carrier who are retained
during the directed service. 49 U.S.C. § 1(16)(b)(D) (Supp. V 1975).
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directed operations.2 Section 1(16)(b)(E) requires the ICC to formulate a
method for recording the costs and revenues of a directed service, to
prescribe the forms to be used by a directed carrier seeking reimbursement,
to audit those forms submitted by the directed carrier for reimbursement,
and to certify to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States the
amount of permissible reimbursements payable to the directed carrier. 29
Pursuant to section 1(16)(b)(E), the ICC instituted a rulemaking
proceeding to prepare a report30 and to promulgate cost form regulations
3'
setting forth the forms and guidelines necessary for a directed carrier's
claim for reimbursement. The report announced that the ICC's policy would
be to limit the reimbursements made to a directed carrier to those expenses
"absolutely necessary" to performing the directed service. 32 Specifically, the
ICC declared that rent paid by the directed carrier to the other carrier for the
use of the latter's facilities during an unprofitable period of directed service
would not be regarded as a reimbursable cost.33 L & NE challenged the
ICC's statutory and constitutional right to enforce this policy.
34
28. Id. § 1(16)(b)(E).
29. Id. For the text of this section, see note 4 supra.
30. ICC, IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC LAw 93-236, SECTION 601(e), REGIONAL
RAIL REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1973 - SUBMISSION OF COST DATA To JUSTIFY
REIMBURSEMENT, 348 I.C.C. 251 & 320 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ICC REPORT].
31. 49 C.F.R. § 1126 (1976). Section 1126.1 explained the relationship of the ICC
REPORT to the regulations:
The report and order of the Commission . . . should be used by directed carriers
for guidance in the preparation of the cost form. This report and its appendix set
forth the Commission's policy as to just what costs and revenues incurred in or
attributable to the conduct of directed operations, are allowable for purposes of
inclusion in the cost form. Only such allowable costs and revenues will be
considered by the Commission in its computation of payments due to the directed
carrier under the provisions of section 1(16)(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Id. § 1126.1.
32. ICC REPORT, supra note 30, at 251, 260. The ICC REPORT stated:
The emphasis in the legislative discussions of section 1(16)(b) on the temporary
nature and profit potential of directed operations indicates to the Commission
that guidelines and policies accompanying the general cost form should
emphasize limited, short-term expenditures and should make clear to the directed
carrier that only expenditures absolutely necessary to the performance of the
service will be considered in determining the amount of final payment to the
directed carrier.
Id.
33. Id. at 251, 265. Two railroads, Central Railroad Company of New Jersey and
LVRR, challenged the ICC's position on the rent issue during the proceeding in which
the cost reimbursement report and regulations were formulated. Id. at 255-56.
However, the ICC contended:
[In ordering directed service, the Commission both fulfills the carrier's obligation
to continue to provide service and preserve the value that the operated properties
might have for continued use in their dedicated purpose.
Accordingly, it is our view that in the usual situation, where costs exceed
revenues, no compensation or rent for the use of the defaulting carrier's lines and
facilities is required.
Id. at 265. Since a directed carrier would be unwilling to pay rent to the other carrier if
this expense was not reimbursable, the practical consequence of the ICC's refusal to
reimburse a directed carrier for rent paid to the other carrier during an unprofitable
directed service was to deprive the other carrier of compensation for the use of its lines
and facilities. 540 F.2d at 75.
34. 540 F.2d at 77; see notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
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Within this historical context, the court in the instant case examined the
petitioner's contentions. Upon analyzing the ICC's express power to audit
under section 1(16)(b)(E) of the ICA 5 and the statement of purposes in the
preamble of the Rail Act,; G the Third Circuit concluded that the ICC
possessed the implied authority under section 1(16(b) to decide in a
reasonable manner which expenses of a directed service would be
reimbursable.37 Having so determined, the court then considered whether, in
excluding rent as a permissible cost of an unprofitable directed service, the
ICC had properly exercised this authority within the meaning of the ICA
and the United States Constitution.:' In focusing upon the statutory issue,
39
the court accepted the ICC's contention that Congress had not intended to
35. See 540 F.2d at 79, construing 49 U.S.C. § 1(16)(b)(E) (Supp. V 1975). The court
concluded that the grant of the express power to audit in section 1(16)(b)(E) imposed
upon the ICC a duty "to determine that the amounts expended by a directed carrier
were the type of expenditures for which Congress intended the carrier to receive
reimbursement." 540 F.2d at 79. In so concluding, the court rejected L & NE's
interpretation that the authority to audit was limited merely to verifying that the
expenses and revenues were actually expended or received by the directed carrier. Id.
at 77.
36. See 540 F.2d at 79, construing 45 U.S.C. § 701(a) (Supp. V 1975). Noting that
one of the purposes of the Rail Act was to provide the "necessary Federal financial
assistance at the lowest possible cost to the general taxpayer," the court maintained
that this express congressional aim would be frustrated if a directed carrier were
permitted to receive reimbursement for every expenditure made in connection with a
directed service, regardless of its reasonableness. 540 F.2d at 79, quoting 45 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(6) (Supp. V 1975). The court explained that by relying upon the preamble it
was not, as L & NE contended, conferring powers upon the ICC which were not
contained in section 1(16)(b). 540 F.2d at 79. Rather, the court pointed out that the
preamble was being used as a guide to delineate the scope of authority which
Congress vested in the ICC by the operative language of section 1(16)(b)(E). Id. The
court noted that the Supreme Court had utilized the preamble to the ICA in a similar
manner. Id. at 79-80, citing American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry.,
387 U.S. 397, 409-10 (1967), and United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 323 U.S. 612,
618-19 (1945).
37. 540 F.2d at 78-79. The express power to audit and the purpose of the Rail Act
to minimize the federal financial commitment led the court to conclude that
"Congress intended that the directed carrier be reimbursed for all reasonable expenses
necessary to providing directed service." Id. at 80. After noting the broad subject
matter and responsibility entrusted to the ICC by the ICA and the Rail Act, the court
adopted a policy of generous construction of the ICC's statutory authority. Id. Thus,
the court's determination of congressional intent coupled with its generous
construction of the ICC's statutory authority formed the foundation of the court's
holding that the authority to determine which costs of a directed service were
reimbursable was implied in section 1(16)(b) of the ICA. See id. at 78-80.
38. See id. at 80-85.
39. See id. at 80. Noting that courts, when reviewing an administrative
construction of a statute, have tended to defer to the interpretation of the agency
charged with the implementation of the statute, the instant court quoted at length the
Supreme Court's position:
'When faced with problems of statutory construction, this court shows great
deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged
with its administration. . . . To sustain the Commission's application of this
statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one,
or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the
first instance in judicial proceedings. . . . Particularly is this respect due when
the administrative practice at stake involves a contemporaneous construction of a
statute by the men charged, with the responsibility of setting its machinery in
1976-19771
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furnish a monetary incentive to a rail carrier to abandon service prior to the
approval of the ICC by providing for the payment of rent during a directed
service.' 0 Concluding that the ICC's interpretation of section 1(16)(b) with
regard to the rent issue was reasonable in light of Congress' intent in
enacting that section, the court held that the ICC had properly exercised its
statutory authority.
4 1
The Third Circuit then considered whether the ICC's determination
comported with the United States Constitution - specifically, whether
directed service constituted a taking, and whether the ICC's denial of rent
deprived the other carrier of just compensation as required by the fifth
amendment.42 The court compared directed service with the ICC's power to
order a carrier that has not obtained a certificate of abandonment to
continue to provide service.4 3 In particular, the court reviewed the New
Haven Inclusion Cases,4 4 in which the United States Supreme Court held
that there had been no taking even though the carrier in question had been
motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet
untried and new.'
Id., quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 6 (1965) (citations omitted).
40. 540 F.2d at 80-81. In the ICC REPORT the rationale supporting exclusion of
rent as a reimbursable cost of an unprofitable directed service was explained:
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, all common carriers by railroad must
fulfill their common carrier obligation to continue service to the public ...
unless and until a certificate of abandonment is authorized by the Commission.
... Under the requirements of section 1(16)(b), in order for the Commission to
issue a directed service order, the operated carrier, having ceased operations
without obtaining a certificate of abandonment from the Commission, must be in
dereliction of its statutory duty to continue to provide such service. It is highly
unlikely that Congress in its consideration of section 1(16)(b) desired to provide a
monetary incentive for the unlawful abandonment of rail service. Rewarding a
railroad for avoiding such a legal obligation would be contrary to public policy.
ICC REPORT, supra note 30, at 251, 265 (citation omitted).
In support of the ICC's position on the rent issue, the court emphasized that
section 1(16)(b) provided for monetary compensation, not to the other carrier, but to
the directed carrier for the costs incurred under a directed service. 540 F.2d at 80; see
49 U.S.C. § 1(16)(b)(E) (Supp. V 1975). For the text of this section, see note 4 supra.
41. 540 F.2d at 81.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 82. The ICC's power to order continued service pending a certification of
abandonment is found in section 1(18) of the ICA, which provides in pertinent part:
[N]o carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon all or any portion of
a line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have
been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public
convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment.
49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1970). In drawing the comparison, the court cited cases in which the
ICC had ordered a carrier to continue to provide service. 540 F.2d at 82 nn. 34 & 36,
citing New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 461, 491-92 (1970) (ICC's
requirement that the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad continue to operate
at a substantial loss for six years pending reorganization was not a taking
necessitating compensation), Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 680-81 (1935) (restricting creditors from liquidating
collateral of debtor railroad comported with the purpose of section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act), and In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 919 (Regional
Rail Reorganization Act Special Court 1974) (reorganization plan provided in the Rail
Act was fair and equitable and railroads could be compelled to implement such a
plan).
44. 399 U.S. 392 (1970).
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required to continue to operate for six years while incurring substantial
operating losses pending reorganization.15 By way of contrast, the court
noted that the maximum duration of directed service was 240 days, 46 that L
& NE was spared any further operating losses because it was relieved of its
obligation to continue service, and that substantial benefits flowed to L &
NE as a result of the operation. 47 Furthermore, the court determined that the
only hardship imposed upon L & NE was the postponement of its right to
pursue abandonment.48 The Third Circuit agreed with Supreme Court
authority holding that the exercise of the rights and remedies of the
railroads could be qualified by the need. to protect the public interest in
uninterrupted rail service49 and that a temporary impairment of these rights
and remedies, even if accompanied by losses for the owner, did not consti-
tute a compensable taking.50 Thus, the court concluded that L & NE was not
entitled to compensation for the postponement of its right to abandon
operations.5' Although L & NE contended that these authorities were
inapposite since they involved "erosion takings" while directed service
constituted a "conveyance taking,"5 2 the Third Circuit declined to draw this
45. Id. at 490-93.
46. 540 F.2d at 84. This duration is prescribed in section 1(16)(b)(A) of the ICA. 49
U.S.C. § 1(16)(b)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
47. 540 F.2d at 84. The benefits that the ICC claimed L & NE had received from
the directed service over its lines included:
(1) L & NE was relieved of further operating losses during this period;
(2) its rail properties were prevented from further deterioration;
(3) its properties were upgraded to safe operating standards;
(4) directed service led directly to agreements between L & NE and LVRR and
Reading to continue service over L & NE's lines; and
(5) directed service facilitated inclusion of L & NE's properties in the Final
System Plan.
Id. at 78 n.20.
48. Id. at 84. Subsequent to instituting the instant suit, L & NE filed a certificate
to abandon operations as required by section 1(18) of the ICA, 49 U.S.C. § 1(18)(1970).
540 F.2d at 77. This action was taken nine months after L & NE had determined that
it could no longer operate its lines. Id.
49. 540 F.2d at 83 n.37, citing Penn Central Merger and Norfolk & Western
Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 510-11 (1968) (ICC's plan to merge railroads into the
Penn Central system was valid, in light of public interest, despite ICC's refusal to
protect bondholders' rights), Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456,
481 (1924) (ICC's regulation of rates requiring carriers to hold earnings in excess of a
fair return as trustee for Government was valid because the purpose was to create an
efficient railroad system), and The New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 194-95
(1923) (unequal rate division designed to preserve public interest by relieving financial
ills of railroads in New England area held valid).
50. 540 F.2d at 83, citing New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 490-93 (1970),
RFC v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 535-36 (1946) (reorganization plan for rail
carrier which provided that hollers of general mortgage bonds would receive stock
with face amount equal to 10% of their claims was a valid exercise of the federal
bankruptcy power), Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. &
Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 680 (1935), and In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp.
895, 919 (Regional Rail Reorganization Act Special Court 1974) (reorganization plan
provided in Rail Act was fair and equitable and railroads could be compelled to
implement such a plan).
51. 540 F.2d at 84.
52. Id. The court classified as "erosion takings" those situations in which
railroads were ordered to continue deficit operations, thereby eroding their assets. Id.
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distinction: * and held that directed service did not effect a taking within the
meaning of the fifth amendment.
5 4
Finally, upon finding' that the ICC's distinction between profitable and
unprofitable periods of directed service - the criterion used in determining
whether rent to the other carrier would be classified as reimbursable 55 -
was not arbitrary or capricious, the court denied L & NE's petition to review
and vacate the ICC cost regulations in question.
56
The instant court's conclusion that the ICC possesses the implied
statutory authority to determine which expenses of a directed service are
reimbursable 5  was not without precedent.58  Furthermore, the reasons
The term "conveyance takings" was used by the court to describe government actions
resulting in a physical seizure of a carrier's lines. Id.
53. Id. The court's refusal to distinguish these two types of governmental activity
- "erosion" and "conveyance" takings - was based upon its reluctance to
differentiate between ordering an incapacitated carrier to continue operations and
directing another carrier to provide service over the lines of a defunct carrier. Id. The
court found it anomalous to conclude that the differences in the relief offered by these
two methods of preserving rail transportation justified holding that the latter
constitutes a taking while, as had been previously determined, the former does not.
Id.; see notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
54. 540 F.2d at 84. In holding that directed service did not effect a taking, the
court emphasized that it was not addressing the question of whether a taking would
occur where a carrier was forced to incur large losses without compensation for an
indefinite time while no solution was forthcoming. Id. at 83 n.38. The court also did
not reach the issue of whether the benefits received by the other carrier from a
directed operation would constitute just compensation in the absence of the payment
of rent for the use of its facilities. Id. at 82 n.32.
55. The ICC's distinction between unprofitable and profitable periods of directed
service as the test for the appropriateness of reimbursing the directed carrier for
rental payments made to the other carrier was based upon the conclusion that the
benefits received by the other carrier from directed service might be insufficient only
when such operation was profitable. ICC REPORT, supra note 30, at 251, 266. For a list
of the specific benefits L & NE received, see note 47 supra.
56. 540 F.2d at 85.
57. Id. at 78-79; see notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
58. Courts reviewing administrative actions have not required express statutory
authorization to uphold the legitimacy of the action. Rather, they have examined
whether the authority could be implied through an appraisal of the purpose and the
subject matter of the statute. See United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 323 U.S. 612,
616 (1945) (power of the ICC to order a railroad to allow a carrier by water to use the
railroad's cars when carrier by water could transport by the carload could be inferred
from Transportation Act of 1940); Chicago, R.I. & Pa. R.R. v. United States, 274 U.S.
29, 36 (1927) (although power of the ICC to establish joint rail and water rates was not
expressly provided in the ICA, it was derived from this statute); Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Summer Financial Corp., 451 F.2d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 1971) (empowering the
FDIC to sue and be sued and to regulate advertisement of interest rates carried with it
the implied ability to seek injunctive relief); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 441 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir. 1971) (Federal Power Commission's authority to
order a refund for termination of gas supply was implied under its power to certify
contracts for sale of gas under the Natural Gas Act); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 379 F.2d 153, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (under its statutory
authority to grant licenses to power companies, Federal Power Commission had the
implied power to authorize the effective date of any such license prior to the date of
issuance).
In holding that the ICC had the implied power under section 1(16)(b)(E) of the
ICA to exclude certain costs from the amount to be reimbursed to the directed carrier,
the court in the principal case relied upon the purpose of the Rail Act and the breadth
of the subject matter within the ICC's administration. See 540 F.2d at 79-80; notes 36
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underlying the need for directed service 59 and for reimbursement of costs to
a directed carrier 6 support the court's holding that Congress did not intend
the other carrier to receive rent for the use of its facilities.6 1 However, the
court's holding on the constitutional issue - that nonpayment of rent by a
directed carrier to the other carrier in periods of unprofitable directed service
& 37 supra. Thus, the instant court followed the same analysis employed by other
courts in determining whether authority for an administrative action could be
implied.
By not fully developing the supermanagement rationale to which it alluded,
the court in the principal case overlooked an additional justification for its
determination that the ICC had the statutory authority to determine which costs of a
directed service would be reimbursable. See 540 F.2d at 80, citing Florida E. Coast Ry.
v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 993, 997 (M.D. Fla. 1966), aff'd, 386 U.S. 544 (1967). The
delegation of the auditing function and the reimbursement function to the ICC and
the Treasury Department, respectively, raises the question as to why the Congress did
not delegate the entire accounting and reimbursement duty to the Secretary of the
Treasury. See 49 U.S.C. § 1(16)(b)(E) (Supp. V 1975). Had the court dealt more
extensively with this question, it could have looked for guidance to Akron, C. & Y.R.R.
v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Md. 1975), wherein the court stated:
[N]o great acquaintance with practical affairs is required to know that prescience,
either in fact or in the minds of Congress, does not exist. Its very absence,
moreover, is precisely why regulatory agencies such as the Commission are
created, for it is the fond hope of their authors that they bring to their work the
expert's familiarity with industry conditions which members of the delegating
legislatures can not be expected to possess.
Id. at 1235-36 (dicta) (emphasis added). Thus, the instant court could have concluded
that the delegation of the auditing function to the ICC and the more ministerial
reimbursement function to the Secretary of the Treasury evidenced Congress'
recognition that the ICC, as the supermanagement agent of the transportation
industry, possessed the expertise lacking in Congress or the Treasury Department to
limit the expenditures of a directed carrier to those absolutely necessary to the
performance of a directed service. Therefore, if the ICC's power to audit included the
authority to deny reimbursement for unreasonable costs, Congress could most
effectively insure that federal expenditures would be kept at a minimum - one of the
explicit purposes of the Rail Act. See 45 U.S.C. § 701(a)(6) (Supp. V 1975). Further-
more, Congress' failure to grant to the Secretary of the Treasury the power to deny
reimbursement for some of the expenses of a directed service, a power which would
also minimize federal expenditures, could have been construed as evidence of a
congressional choice aimed at limiting federal expenditures on the basis of the expert
decisions of the ICC, thereby insuring that sufficient assistance would be provided for
the continuation of rail services threatened with cessation - another explicit purpose
of the Rail Act. See id § 701(a)(3).
59. The amendment to section 1(16) of the ICA was drafted to prevent "any real
or threatened shutdown of necessary rail service." S. REP. No. 302, supra note 3, at 7.
See also [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3242, 3251, 3292 (additional statements
supporting the proposition that the purpose of section 1(16)(b) was to prevent a
disruption of essential rail service). The primary purpose of section 1(16)(b) was to
protect the public interest in uninterrupted rail service, not to fortify the financial
position of an incapacitated carrier. ICC REPORT, supra note 30, at 251, 259.
Therefore, it could be maintained that to argue that Congress intended the
incapacitated carrier to receive compensation for the use of its lines would be
inconsistent with the purpose of directed service.
60. Section 1(16)(b)(E) was included only to ease the financial burden which
directed service could foreseeably impose upon a directed carrier. S. REP. No. 302,
supra note 3, at 7; see text accompanying note 28 supra. It is difficult to argue that
this statutory provision for payment to the directed carrier should be viewed as
evidence of a congressional intent to reimburse the other carrier for the use of its lines.
61. 540 F.2d at 81; see notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra. The ICC's view
of the role which a directed carrier would be required to assume confirms the holding
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did not constitute a taking for which just compensation was required 2 - is
far more problematical. The court discussed two factors considered
determinative of the question of whether there had been a taking: 1) the
minimal harm, and even benefit- to, L & NE;63 and 2) the overriding public
interest in the continuation of rail service as compared to any loss which L
& NE had sustained. 64 However, by its refusal to distinguish between
."erosion" and "conveyance" takings, 65 the court did not fully consider the
effect. of the government's physical occupation of L &,NE's property on the
taking issue.'6
The federal government used and occupied L & NE's property during the
period of directed service through the presence of its agents - directed
carriers LVRR and Reading.6 7 Although a particular carrier's ability to
exercise its rights and remedies is restricted both by an ICC order requiring
a continuation of service until a certificate of abandonment is acquired,
68
and by an ICC order imposing a directed service over its lines, 6 9 the former
is not accompanied by the physical intrusion which is an integral aspect of
the latter. Basing a distinction between a compensable taking and a
legitimate regulation upon the physical occupation of the government may
indeed produce. anomalous results with regard to the ICC's authority. to
regulate the railroad industry. 70 However, it is submitted that the court
that the other carrier was not entitled to rent. The ICC stated: "Section 1(16)(b)
-envisions that a directed carrier will, to the extent that the Commission orders it to
perform a particular. operation, step into the shoes of the other carrier in relation to
that operation." ICC REPORT, supra note 30, at 251, 261 (emphasis added). Although
this statement was made in relation to the obligation of the directed carrier to assume
the duties of the other carrier during a period of directed service with respect o such
functions as collecting and disbursing revenues, handling all purchasing and billing,
and undertaking all operating functions, id., this view of the directed carrier's role can
reasonably be extended to the discussion of the payment of rent to the other carrier.
Thus, if the directed carrier's costs exceeded revenues, the other carrier should
not be entitled to rent for the use of its facilities because it would have incurred a loss
had it operated during this period. Conversely, if the directed service was profitable, it
follows that, the other carrier should be entitled to receive rent because it would have
sustained a profit had it operated during this period. This view of the role of the
directed carrier clarifies the reasons underlying the court's holding that Congress did
not intend to provide rent to the other carrier, and that, therefore, the ICC did not
abuse its statutory authority by denying reimbursement for rent.
62. 540 F.2d at 82; see notes 42-54 and accompanying text supra.
63. 540 F.2d at 84; see note 19 supra; see also notes 47 & 48 and accompanying
text supra.
64. 540 F.2d at 83; see note 19 supra; see also text accompanying notes 49-51
supra.
65. 540 F.2d at 84.
66. See 540 F.2d at 83. Physical occupation is one of the four factors generally
considered crucial in classifying an activity as a taking requiring compensation.
Michelman, supra note 17, at 1183-84. For a list of the other factors and a discussion
of the taking issue, see note 19 and accompanying text supra.
67. 540 F.2d at 82. For a discussion of the presence of a directed carrier on the
other carrier's property, see text accompanying note 23.
68. This ICC power is contained in section 1(18) of the ICA, 49 U.S.C. § 1(18)
(1970). For the pertinent text of this section, see note 43 supra.
69. This ICC power is contained in section 1(16)(b) of the ICA. For a discussion of
the court's comparison of these two powers of the ICC, see text accompanying notes
43-47 supra.
70. In explaining its decision not to distinguish between "erosion" and
"conveyance" takings, the court noted: "It might be anomalous indeed if the ICC
could order forced deficit operations by a railroad and not effect a taking, but could
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should not have rejected this distinction which has been determinative for
many courts in holding that a taking has been effected.71 In relying upon
the New Haven Inclusion Cases,72 the instant court embraced the "public
rights" theory articulated in New Haven,7' and in applying this theory, the
Third Circuit, in the name of public interest, extended the degree of intrusion
permitted before a taking occurs. This extension may well have been
unwarranted because the regulation at issue in the principal case resulted in
a physical intrusion by the government, whereas the regulation challenged
in New Haven did not.7 4 In New Haven, and in other cases where economic
regulations have been upheld in the face of a taking challenge, the
government or one of its agents ordered the private owners to do or refrain
from doing something to or with their property. 5 Conversely, directed
service, involves the government directing itself to use and occupy private
property. This difference in the nature of the regulation at issue, based upon
the element of physical occupation, could have supported a conclusion that
directed service constituted a taking for which compensation was required. 6
The court's holding on the taking issue became ambiguous when it
subsequently considered the reasonableness of distinguishing between
not order another carrier to discharge those same duties, .thereby in the usual case
saving that railroad operating costs, without such action constituting a taking." 540
F.2d at 84; see notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text supra.
71. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
72. See 540 F.2d at 83. For a discussion of this decision, see text accompanying
notes 44 & 45 supra.
73. 399 U.S. 392, 491-92 (1970); see Note, Takings and the Public Interest in
Railroad Reorganization, 82 YALE L.J. 1004 (1973), wherein the author explained:
Since New Haven was by traditional analysis a takings situation, the case's
"public rights" theory supplies a rationale - with very uncertain boundaries -
for transferring private property into the public domain. Whenever a public
interest is sufficiently compelling, it seems, the public may take a first claim on
the use of private property.
Id. at 1016.
74. See 399 U.S. at 403-07. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad was
forced to continue to operate for six years while incurring substantial losses. Id. In
contrast, in the instant case L & NE was ordered to permit LVRR and Reading to
operate its lines. 540 F.2d at 76.
75. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Baltimore & 0. R.R.
v. United States, 345 U.S. 146 (1953) (rate regulations on carloads of fresh vegetables
was a legitimate exercise of the ICC's authority); Friedlander v. Cimino, 385 F. Supp.
1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 520 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1975) (state
regulation that permit for non-physician-operated clinical laboratories required
proficiency tests was proper exercise of the state's police power).
76. For examples of the traditional judicial reliance upon physical occupation as
being determinative of the taking issue, see note 20 supra. For a discussion of
regulations and the fifth amendment taking clause, see generally Dunham, Griggs v.
Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law,
1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; Michelman, supra note 17; Sax, supra note 18; Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
It should be noted that the recognition of directed service as a taking of
private property would not have destroyed the legitimacy of section 1(16)(b) of the
ICA. Rather, it would have merely compelled the court to determine what would
constitute just compensation for the use of the other carrier's lines during the limited
period of directed service. See 540 F.2d at 82 n.32; see also note 54 supra. The result
could easily have been the same, i.e., the benefits received by the other carrier during
the operation could have been held to be constitutionally sufficient compensation
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profitable and unprofitable periods of directed service as the criterion for
allowing reimbursement for rent paid to the other carrier. By concurring
with the ICC's determination that the benefits normally conferred upon the
other carrier may be insufficient when the directed service was profitable,
77
the court seemed to merge its analysis of whether there had been a taking
with the subsidiary question of whether there had been just compensation.
In its holding with regard to the issue of reasonableness, 78 it is submitted
that the court implied that directed service is a taking, and th t whereas the
payment of rent is necessary to provide sufficient compensation during
profitable operations, the benefits resulting from directed service are
sufficient compensation when the operation is unprofitable. Although this
interpretation of the court's holding creates a good deal of confusion
concerning the court's determination of the taking question, it would appear
to be the only reasonable explanation of why rent was deemed to be
necessary during periods of profitable directed service.
The impact of the present decision will most likely center upon the
court's holding that directed service does not constitute a taking. The
departure from the traditional emphasis upon physical occupation as
determinative of a taking 79 and the expansion of the vague boundaries of
New Haven80 may sanction further noncompensable governmental intru-
sions into private property. Whether the application of this decision will be
restricted to the railroad industry remains to be seen. However, if it is
applied to other governmental uses of private property in order to preserve a
superior public interest, the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment
could be seriously eroded. Furthermore, if the holding was based upon an
implied determination that the ICC had provided just compensation for a
taking which did occur during the directed service,8' the court's confusing
language may mislead other courts into applying the present court's
decision to answer the threshold question of whether there has been a
taking, rather than applying this decision to the subsequent question of
whether there has been just compensation.8 2 This misapplication of the
present decision could lead other courts to hold that the government's
except when the directed carrier sustained a profit. In the case of a profitable directed
service, the payment of rent would have to accompany the benefits in order to
constitute just compensation. For a list of the benefits which would constitute
compensation to L & NE for the use of its facilities, see note 47 supra.
Monetary reimbursement is not the only type of compensation that will
satisfy the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment. The United States
Supreme Court has stated: "The clear implication of other decisions is that
consideration other than for cash - for example, any special benefits to a property
owner's remaining properties - may be counted in the determination of just
compensation." Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 151 (1974),
citing Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 584 (1897). Thus, the benefits received by the
other carrier during a directed service could be classified as the type of just
compensation contemplated by the fifth amendment.
77. 540 F.2d at 85; see notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
78. 540 F.2d at 85; see text accompanying note 56 supra.
79. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
80. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
81. See text accompanying notes 77 & 78 supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 77 & 78 supra.
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physical occupation of private property is not a taking without examining
whether the citizen has received any form of compensation. This result
would also tend to abridge private- property owners' rights under the fifth
amendment. Therefore, due to the confusion the court may have created by
merging its analysis of the taking and just compensation issues,83 its
holding that directed service did not constitute a taking for which
compensation was required s4 may well curtail the application of the fifth
amendment.
Patricia A. Godfrey
CONSUMER PROTECTION - TRUTH IN LENDING ACT - WHEN A SELLER
RECEIVES A COMMISSION FOR REFERRING A CUSTOMER TO A LENDER, HE,
AND NOT THE LENDER, HAS THE DUTY TO MAKE CREDIT SALE
DISCLOSURES UNDER SECTION 128.
Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co. (1976)
Janet Manning agreed to purchase an automobile from Springfield
Dodge, Inc. (Springfield), which assisted her in obtaining financing from the
Princeton Consumer Discount Company (Princeton).' Princeton made the
consumer loan disclosures as required by section 129 of the Truth in Lending
Act (Act),2 but neither Springfield nor Princeton made the additional credit
sale disclosures required by section 128. 3 Manning brought a class action 4
against Springfield and Princeton alleging that section 128 required both
the seller and the lender to make the additional disclosures. 5 The United
83. See text accompanying notes 77 & 78 supra.
84. 540 F.2d at 82; see note 54 and accompanying text supra.
1. Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 397 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Pa.
1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 173 (1976). Springfield
obtained the necessary information from the plaintiff, informed her that the
preparations had been taken care of, and drove her to Princeton's office in order to
complete the transaction. Id. Springfield received a commission from Princeton. Id.
2. Truth in Iending Act, § 129, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1970). Section 129 requires the
lender to disclose certain basic credit terms such as the amount of credit, all charges,
and the amount of the finance charge. Id.
3. See notes 8-12 and accompanying text infra.
4. Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 390 F. Supp. 320 (1975). For
purposes of injunctive relief, Mrs. Manning was certified as a representative of the
class of persons who had not received disclosures from Springfield as required by
section 128 of the Act. Id. at 324. Plaintiffs motion to have Springfield certified as a
class representative was denied. Id. Apparently, in failing to establish the number of
sellers engaging in the same conduct and to show an "industry-wide" practice, she did
not meet the "numerosity" and "typicality" requirements of rule 23, FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 533 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 173 (1976).
5. 533 F.2d at 104.
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the
lender was not required to make the additional disclosures. 6 On appeal, the
Third Circuit 7 affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Springfield,
as seller, was alone responsible for making the section 128 disclosures.
Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 533 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 173 (1976).
In reaching this result the Manning court initially decided that a "credit
sale" within the meaning of section 128 had in fact taken place., Section 103
of the Act defines a "credit sale" as one in which credit is arranged or
extended by the seller.9 Under Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board,10
a seller arranges for credit if he either accepts a fee, or participates in
preparing the contract documents and has knowledge of the credit terms.II
Since Springfield received a fee for referring the plaintiff to Princeton, the
court concluded that it was also a creditor.
12
Once having determined that both defendants were creditors, the court
addressed the principal question of whether both the seller and the lender
were responsible for section 128 disclosures in a credit sale transaction or
whether the seller alone was responsible for those disclosures. 13 While
section 121 of the Act refers generally to each creditor's responsibility to
6. Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 397 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
7. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Van Dusen and Weis.
Judge Weis wrote the opinion.
8. 533 F.2d at 104-05.
9. Truth in Lending Act, § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (1970).
10. The Federal Reserve Board was given the power to make regulations to carry
out the aims of the Act. Truth in Lending Act, § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970); see
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363-75 (1973). These
regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1976), known as Regulation Z, and the Board
interpretations thereof that are issued from time to time, have been given great weight
by the courts. See Frank v. Reserve Consumer Discount Co., 398 F. Supp. 703, 704-05
(W.D. Pa. 1975); Bloomer v. McKnight Rd. Dodge, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 403, 404 (W.D. Pa.
1975). Although interpretations issued by the Federal Reserve Board are treated as
"persuasive authority," they are not considered binding upon the courts. See Ljepava
v. M.L.S.C. Properties, Inc., 511 F.2d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 1975); Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc.,
495 F.2d 646, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1974).
11. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §226.2(h)(1), (2) (1976). The regulation states
specifically that a seller arranges for credit if he: "(1) Receives or will receive a fee,
compensation, or other consideration for such service, or (2) [hlas knowledge of the
credit terms and participates in the preparation of the contract documents required in
connection with the extension of credit." Id. For cases discussing the issue of when a
seller is also a creditor under the Truth in Lending Act, see Stefanski v. Mainway
Budget Plan, Inc., 465 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'g 326 F. Supp. 1,38 (S.D. Fla. 1971);
Childress v. Mobile Living Corp., 386 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. La. 1974); Meyers v.
Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1974); Starks v. Orleans
Motors, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. La. 1974), affl'd, 500 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1975). See
generally Moo, Closed End Credit Disclosure, 26 Bus. LAw. 809 (1971).
12. 533 F.2d at 105. The court read section 226.2(h)(1), (2) in the disjunctive,
interpreting the wording "and participates in the preparation of the contract
documents" as applying to only the wording "has knowledge of the credit terms," and
not applicable to "receives or will receive a fee." Id.
13. The pertinent language of section 128 merely states that "the creditor shall
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make disclosures to each borrower,14 the Act is unclear as to disclosure
responsibilities in a multiple creditor transaction. The Federal Reserve
Board promulgated section 226.6(d) of Regulation Z in an effort to clarify the
matter, which states in pertinent part that "disclosures required under
paragraphs (b) and (c) of § 226.8 shall be made by the seller if he arranges
credit. Otherwise, disclosures shall be made as required under
paragraphs (b) and (d) of § 226.8."' 5 By interpreting this last sentence of
section 226.6(d) as applying only to a situation. where the seller does not
extend or arrange credit,' 6 the court was able to conclude that where the
seller does extend or arrange credit it alone has the duty of making
disclosures. 7
In order to bolster its interpretation, the court argued that in practice it
would be foolish and of little value for the consumer to receive two sheets of
paper containing exactly the same information.' 8 Furthermore, since the
three items listed in section 128, and not found in section 129, are the cash
price, the amount of downpayment, and the unpaid balance of the cash
price,19 the court believed that they were more likely to be known by the
seller than by the lender.20
14. Truth in Lending Act, § 121, 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. V 1975). Section 121
states: "Each creditor shall disclose clearly and conspicuously, in accordance with the
regulations of the Board, to each person to whom consumer credit is extended, the
information required under this part or part D of this subchapter." Id.
15. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(d) (1976). The regulation states:
If there is more than one creditor in a transaction,. . . [each] shall be responsible
for making only those disclosures required by this part which are within his
knowledge and the purview of his relationship with the customer.
The disclosures required under paragraphs (b) and (c) of § 226.8 shall be made by
the seller if he extends or arranges for the extension of credit. Otherwise
disclosures shall be made as required under paragraphs (b) and (d) of § 226.8.
Id. Paragraphs (b) and (c) list items for disclosure required by section 128 of the Truth
in Lending Act. Id. § 226.8(b), (c). Paragraphs (b) and (d) list items required by section
129. Id. §§ 226.8(b), (d).
16. The court stressed that the word "otherwise" sets off the lender's disclosure
responsibilities from those of the seller, and that it is only where the seller does not
also qualify as a, creditor that the lender is required to make disclosures referred to in
the last sentence of section 226.6(d). 533 F.2d at 105. The court further stated that "the
specific direction of the third sentence prevails over the general language limiting the
scope of disclosure to items within the creditor's knowledge and the purview of his
relationship with the customer." Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at4,06. Plaintiff proposed a "fail-safe" theory, which would require both
the seller and lender to make section 128 disclosures in order to be doubly sure that
the buyer 'receives the required information. Id. The court rejected this argument,
stating that the sanctions imposed by the Act under section 130, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)
(Supp. V 1975), were sufficient to insure the seller's compliance with the disclosure
requirements of section 128. 533 F.2d at 106. For a discussion of section 130, see note
32 infra.
19. Truth in Lending Act, § 128, 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1970).
20. 533 F.2d at 105.
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In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit rejected the "conduit" theory
set forth by the plaintiff.21 The theory holds that where a lender and a seller
are closely tied, the lender may not escape responsibility for making
disclosures by using the seller as a "front man. ' 22 The court distinguished
Manning from the conduit cases23 on the ground that none of those cases
had considered section 226.6(d)'s requirement that the seller be responsible
for making the required, disclosures "if he extends or arranges for the
extension of credit."
24
Although the Third Circuit in Manning engaged in a careful analysis of
the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions, it is not at all certain
that the opinion clarifies the individual disclosure responsibilities in a
multiple creditor situation. On the one hand, the opinion may be read as
stating that the lender will not be responsible for the additional disclosures
in section 128,25 but thathe is nevertheless responsible for making section
129 disclosures. 26 On the other hand, Manning may be read as standing for
the proposition that where a seller arranges for the extension of credit, he
21. Id. at 106 n.4. The conduit theory is part of the judicial effort to limit the
immunity of a "holder in due course." For a discussion of the "holder in due course"
doctrine as it relates to Truth in Lending requirements, see Currie, The Holder in Due
Course in the Aftermath of the Truth in Lending Act, 52 CHI. - KENT L. REV. 95 (1975).
22. Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972). In
Garza, a finance company was the regular assignee of a health club's membership
installment contracts. The court held that an assignee of a consumer credit sales
contract who regularly extends or arranges for the extension of credit through an
assignor of the contracts may himself be a creditor. 347 F. Supp. at 964. As creditors
they would be responsible for disclosures. Accord, Kriger v. European Health Spa,
Inc., 363 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (bank which discounted notes held liable for
disclosures); Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 1255 (N.D. Ga. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1974) (automobile manufacturer who
prepared contracts for dealer who assigned completed contracts back to manufacturer
held responsible for disclosures). See also Joseph v. Norman's Health Clubs, Inc., 336
F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
23. 533 F.2d at 106 n.4.
24. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(d) (1976); see note 15 supra. The Manning court obviously
found section 226.6(d) controlling. 535 F.2d at 105-06. The district court in Manning
recognized that section 226.6(d) was difficult to understand and that at least one
district court had changed its interpretation of the regulation. 397 F. Supp. at 507,
comparing Boggan v. Euclid Nat'l Bank, No. C73-275, (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 1974),
vacated and remanded 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975), with Pitts v. Society Nat'l Bank,
Civil No. C74-556, (N.D. Ohio March 7, 1975).
The cases relied upon by the plaintiff could have been also distinguished by
the Manning court on the ground that they dealt with situations where a consumer
contract was assigned to a lender by a seller, behind whom the lender was
surreptitiously protected. See Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 1255
(N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1974); Garza v. Chicago
Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
25. Federal Reserve Board opinions have supported the view that the seller alone
is responsible for the added section 128 disclosures. See 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
30,399, 30,996 (1974); cf. id. 31,100.
26. Princeton did in fact make section 129 disclosures. 533 F.2d at 104. The Third
Circuit's interpretation of the district court holding was that the lender "was not
required to make any further disclosures." Id. (emphasis added). This implies that the
lender is still responsible for section 129 disclosures but not section 128 disclosures.
However, later in the opinion the court states that "[b]ecause the burden of full
disclosure was placed upon the seller, it is our view that if additional and duplicative
disclosure had been intended, the regulation would have set that forth with equal
[Vol. 22
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alone is responsible for all disclosures, and the lender is exempted from any
disclosure responsibility.
2 7
The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to ensure that creditors
provide consumers with sufficient information so that they may make an
intelligent choice of credit options.2" However, as the Manning court noted,
it would be superfluous to require of a lender in a credit sale transaction the
exact same disclosures that the seller is already required to make. 29 While
the opinion does not clearly delineate the individual disclosure responsibili-
ties in a multiple creditor credit sale transaction, it is submitted that in a
situation where the seller has "arranged" credit, Manning should be
interpreted as relieving the lender from his usual duty of making section 129
disclosures." In such a situation, the Third Circuit has apparently placed
upon the seller the sole responsibility for the disclosures required by the
Truth in Lending Act.
This conclusion is warranted by a logical construction of section 226.6(d)
of Regulation Z, since it would be redundant to include the "otherwise"
sentence if the immediately preceding sentence already imposes disclosure
responsibility upon the seller.31 Rather, the "otherwise" sentence reserves
disclosure responsibility to the lender in all situations where the seller is not
also a creditor, but where the seller is also a creditor the complete disclosure
responsibility shifts to it. The salutary effect of such a reading is that it
explicitness." Id. at 106. If the court is expressing an opinion here that a lender, under
the facts of this case, would not be responsible for any disclosures, then its opinion is
inconsistent with the earlier interpretation of the district court opinion. Furthermore,
such a view would be no more than dictum because in this case the lender had in fact
made some disclosures. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
27. See note 26 supra. The attorney for the plaintiff interpreted the Third Circuit's
ruling as exempting the lender from all disclosures in a credit sale transaction:
"Scanning over this general policy statement in section 226.6(d), the court reads the
third sentence's requirement that the seller must provide the sale disclosures as
eliminating any disclosure responsibilities by the lender in this circumstance."
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9, Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 97
S. Ct. 173 (1976).
28. Truth in Lending Act, § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975). Section 102
states:
The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the costs thereof by
consumers. It is the purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975). For a brief discussion of the purposes of the Truth in
Lending Act, see Comment, Truth in Lending and the Statute of Limitations, 21 VILL
L. REV. 904, 909-12 (1976).
29. 533 F.2d at 106; see note 18 and accompanying text supra.
30. This means that the lender is relieved of the duty of disclosing that
information which is "within his knowledge and the purview of his relationship with
the customer." See 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(d) (1976); note 11 supra.
31. See notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text supra.
1976-19771
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precludes any requirement of providing the consumer with duplicate
disclosure statements, which conceivably could differ in form and conse-
quently be confusing to a credit customer.
32
.. Charles J. Heinzer IV
FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION RULE 10b-5 - PLAINTIFF
MUST EXERCISE DUE DILIGENCE IN CONNECTION WITH A PURCHASE OF
SECURITIES AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF DUE
DILIGENCE IS ON DEFENDANT.
Straub v. Vaisman & Co. (1975)
Plaintiffs, a German securities account manager (Straub) and his
clients, made several purchases of securities through defendant Vaisman &
Company (VaisCo), a registered New Jersey securities broker-dealer
controlled by defendant Vaisman, its president and sole stockholder.1 In
December 1972, with the knowledge that Straub was interested in new
issues, VaisCo's employee recommended the purchase of 10,000 shares of
Mark I Offset, which it described as a new issue that would "break" in
January 1973.2 As a financial consultant to Mark I Offset, Vaisman knew
that it was not a new issue and that its bankruptcy was imminent.3 In
reliance upon the defendants' advice, Straub authorized the purchase of the
stock for himself and for his clients.' VaisCo then purchased the stock for
32. Such an interpretation may also prevent recoveries against both the seller
and the lender in a multiple creditor transaction. Section 130 of the Act provides for a
penalty and recovery of twice the finance charge, with a minimum recovery of $100
and a maximum recovery of $1,000. Truth in Lending Act, § 130(a)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975). A successful plaintiff may also recover actual damages.
Id. "§ 1640(a). It is possible that in a multiple creditor suit, where all the creditors are
found liable for Truth in Lending Act violations, each would be liable severally for the
statutory penalty. This would be even more significant in class actions where
recovery can amount to the "lesser of $100,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the
creditor." Id. § 1640(a)(2)(B).
1. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 594 (3d Cir. 1976). Straub was the
managing director of Success Portfolio Management Co., located in Stuttgart,
Germany. Id. The other plaintiffs were investment banking houses with accounts
managed by Straub. Id. Plaintiffs authorized the securities purchases in reliance upon
the advice of Erb, an employee of VaisCo held out by that company as director of
international operations. Id.
2. Id. Erb had originally recommended the purchase of 10,000 shares of a
different corporation, Loren Industries, but later changed his recommendation to
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the plaintiffs at a price higher than the current market price from a
company in which defendant Vaisman held a controlling interest.5
After Mark I Offset filed for bankruptcy within one month of the sale,
plaintiffs commenced an action in federal court for damages and rescission,
6
alleging violations of a number of federal securities provisions and SEC
rules, including rule 10b-5.7 The United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey found a specific intent to defraud on the part of defendants'
and awarded to the plaintiffs the relief requested under rule 10b-5 as well as
attorneys' fees.9 On appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, defendants claimed that the plaintiffs had not proved that
they exercised due diligence in ascertaining all relevant facts prior to the
transaction, and that the award of counsel fees was improper.10 The Third
Circuit' affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding 1) that in order to
make out a cause of action under rule 10b-5, a purchaser of securities must
exercise due diligence in determining facts surrounding the transaction, but
need not bear the burden of proof as to the exercise of his due diligence; and
2) that absent evidence of fraud during the course 6f the litigation, an award
of counsel fees is prohibited by section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.12 Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
5. Id. The company, Atlas Interfund, employed Vaisman as an officer and
securities advisor and held the Mark I Offset stock on his behalf. Id. at 594 n.2. The
district court found that Vaisman planned to sell this stock through Atlas Interfund
to improve VaisCo's capital position. Id.
6. Id. at 594. Straub had retained his 7,000 shares. Id. The other plaintiffs had
sold their holdings subsequent to the filing of Chapter XI proceedings by Mark I
Offset. Id. The stock was acquired at a price of $4 per share, and sold for 37/2€ per
share. Id.
7. Id. Plaintiffs alleged violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); sections 10(b), -15(c)(1), and 15(c)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 780(c)(1)-(2) (1970);
and SEC rules 10b-3, 10b-5, 15c1-1, 15cl-2, 15cl-4, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-3, .10b-5,
.15c1-1, -2, -4 (1976). The district court stated that since it had found that the
defendants had violated rule 10b-5, it was unnecessary to consider the plaintiffs'
alternate claims. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Civ. No. 513-73, slip op. at 15 (D.N.J. Nov.
15, 1974).
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facilitiy of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
8. 540 F.2d at 596.
9. Id. at 594-95.
10. Id. at 595-98.
11. The appeal was heard by Circuit Judges Van Dusen, Kalodner, and Weis.
Judge Weis delivered the opinion for the court; Judge Van Dusen dissented as to the
issue of the award of attorney's fees but concurred in the remainder of the decision.
12. Section 28(a) provides that "no person permitted to maintain a suit for
damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover . . . a total amount in
1976-1977]
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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" grants the SEC
broad powers "to forbid ... any devices in connection with security
transactions which it finds detrimental to the public interest or to the proper
protection of investors."'" Pursuant to this authority, the SEC promulgated
rule 10b-5,15 which makes it unlawful to employ deceptive and manipulative
practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 16 Despite the
expansive provisions of rule 10b-5, no express remedy was provided to
securities holders injured as a result of its violation. 17 However, in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,'" the Supreme
Court approved the implication of such a private remedy.' 9
With the development of rule 10b-5 as a basis of substantive private
liability, the courts looked to the common law in order to discern what
elements were necessary to state a claim for relief under the rule and what
defenses were available to defendants who had been sued for breaching its
excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1970). The Third Circuit found that because the award of counsel fees did not fall
within an exception to the rule which ordinarily prohibits such awards, it constituted
punitive damages forbidden by section 28(a). See Gould v. American-Hawaiian SS.
Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1974); Green v.
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
13. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
14. 78 CONG. REC. 2271 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Fletcher). See also 1 A. BROMBERG,
SECURITIEs LAW § 3.2(300)-3.2(400) (1975).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1976). For the text of rule 1Ob-5, see note 7 supra.
16. See note 7 supra.
17. In addition, it did not appear that any express remedies were contemplated by
Congress during the passage of section 10(b). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975). See also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6
(1934); 2 A. BROMBERG supra note 14, § 2.2; Wheeler, Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care
under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 561,
564-66 (1975); 61 HARV. L. REV. 858 (1948). Moreover, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) did not consider private civil remedies when it adopted rule 10b-5.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 730; see Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
3230 (1942); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1469 n.87 (2d ed. 1961); Conference on
Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967). However,
the 1934 Act expressly provides civil remedies in certain other sections. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p, 78r, 78t (1970).
18. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
19. Id. at 9. After the formulation of the implied 10b-5 private right of action in
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), it became the
"overwhelming consensus" of federal courts that such a cause of action did exist. Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1976).
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obligations. 20 One result of this common law analysis was the development
of the requirement of reliance as a substantive element of a 10b-5 cause of
action. 21 Hence, if it is shown that the plaintiff had knowledge of the facts
which he claimed the defendant did not disclose to him, the plaintiff will be
barred from recovery under rule 10b-5 for lack of reliance.2 2 An effect of the
reliance requirement is to bar recovery by a plaintiff who did not exercise
due diligence in ascertaining and interpreting material facts in connection
with a sale or purchase of securities in which he was involved. 23
20. Royal Air Properties v. Smith, 321 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962). The implied
defenses were necessitated by a desire to reduce to a manageable level the rapidly
increasing number of private 10b-5 actions. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14,
§2.5(6); Comment, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor"
Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 562-63 (1972).
For examples of such defenses and limitations, see Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (negligence not sufficient to satisfy requirement of
scienter on part of defendant); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 423 U.S. 820 (1976),
noted in 22 Vill. L. Rev. 205 (1976) (restrictive definition of materiality); Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 767 (1977) (privity required
between purchaser and seller); James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974) (no
cause of action where plaintiff has knowingly participated in defendant's violation).
But see Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y 1971)
(defense of plaintiffs knowing participation in the culpable conduct overcome by the
policy of enforcement of the antifraud provisions); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom,
422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1976) (test for justifiable reliance is subjective); Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)
(requirement that plaintiff be an actual purchaser or seller of securities), approved in
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
For a discussion of the origins of these defenses, see Bucklo, Scienter and Rule
10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 562 (1972); Comment, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the
"Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1972); Note, The
Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584
(1975); Comment, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: Failure to Solve the
Purchaser-Seller Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 965 (1976); Comment, Scienter and the
Flexible Duty Rule Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 125; Comment, The
Development of a Flexible Duty Standard of Liability Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 32
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99 (1975).
21. The courts have inferred the requirement of reliance for recovery for
violations of section 10(b) from their perceptions of the general policy of securities
legislation. See Comment, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor"
Reasonable?, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 562, 563 (1972). As one court observed: "Since civil
liability was judicially implied, the appropriate common law defenses should be
applicable." Royal Air Properties v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962); cf. List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (plaintiff
must establish causation).
22. The Straub court stated that a plaintiff with actual knowledge of material
facts undisclosed by defendant could not recover, since there would be a "lack of
materiality." 540 F.2d at 596. Such a plaintiff could not be said to have relied upon the
absence of the undisclosed facts, since he knew of their existence. The Supreme Court
has held, however, that in a case involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive
proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972).
23. Note, The Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975
DUKE L.J. 753, 754, A number of cases have discussed the issue of the plaintiffs use of
due care in ascertaining all material facts concerning a particular securities
transaction.
In Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), the court
held that the plaintiff must exercise due care in order to recover. Id. The plaintiff, a
brokerage firmalleged an intentional violation of 10b-5 by the defendants - another
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However, this was not the only aspect of the due diligence defense which
was available to a defendant under rule lOb-5. Contemporaneous with the
development of a reliance requirement under the rule, many courts fostered
the concept that private liability for a violation of the rule could be
brokerage firm, its agent, and one of its customers. Id. at 102. The Fifth Circuit, in
affirming the lower court's judgment on a jury verdict for the defendants, stated that
the "plaintiffs duty [of due care] is not altered merely because the misrepresentations
are alleged to be intentional rather than negligent." Id. at 105.
However, in Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), the
Seventh Circuit, denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, rejected
their contention that the plaintiffs' negligence should bar recovery even though the
complaint was based upon intentional misrepresentation. Id. at 357-58. The court
stated: "Nothing in the legislative history of the statute has been called to our
attention to show that Congress intended any such limitation .... Whatever the
relevance of plaintiffs' negligence might be to the issues at a trial on the merits, it
does not support the dismissal of the amended complaint which is based on fraud
rather than negligence." Id. at 358.
The requirement that the plaintiff exercise due care may also be illustrated by
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963), in which the plaintiff, who had been
a large stockholder, director, and officer of the defendant corporation, sued under rule
10b-5, claiming he had relied upon defendant's misrepresentations in selling his stock
in the corporation to the corporation at a price lower than the fair value thereof. Id. at
636. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for the defendant,
holding that the plaintiff could not recover because, as a corporate insider and
investor knowledgeable in securities dealings, he should have realized that the figures
given him contained substantial discrepancies as to which "mere inquiry" on his part
would have disclosed the facts. Id. at 641-42.
However, in Lehigh Valley Tr. Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th
Cir. 1969), wherein the plaintiff bank sued the defendant bank for an alleged violation
of rule 10b-5, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the 1934 Act "was
intended only to provide protection for innocent, uninformed investors," stating that
[nleither Congress nor the Securities and Exchange Commission had indicated
that the unsophisticated and the unwary are the only wards of Rule 10b-5 ...
Therefore, in view of the fact that gullibility is not the province of any one group,
the protections and remedies of the Securities Act are not accorded only to those
who fail a battery of information and intelligence tests, but are simply
conditioned upon the misrepresentation of material facts.
Id. at 992.
A number of courts have extended the scope of the reliance requirement by
denying recovery where the plaintiff was deemed to possess "constructive knowledge"
of information which he could have learned by the exercise of due diligence. See e.g.,
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 103-04 (5th Cir. 1970);
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 1970); Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
319 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1963); Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 295 F. Supp. 1249, 1254
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
Some courts have gone so far as to give the plaintiff the burden of proof as to
his own due diligence. In Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474
F.2d 514, 521 (10th Cir. 1973), plaintiff, a mutual fund, sued a corporation and its
underwriter, claiming a violation of rule 10b-5 in the corporation's delay in the
issuance of a special earnings statement showing unexpectedly low earnings. Id. at
515-16. Plaintiff relied upon defendant's inaction and made substantial purchases of
the corporation's stock. Id. at 515. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
judgment on a jury verdict for plaintiff, holding that plaintiff had not met its "burden
of proof to establish that it exercised due care in making its stock purchase." Id. at
521. However, the Financial Fund case was impliedly overruled in Holdsworth v.




Lamb: Federal Statutes and Regulation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
predicated upon negligence.2 4 The courts tempered the application of this
concept by drawing upon the common law concept of contributory
negligence 25 and extended due diligence defense to bar recovery by a
plaintiff who did not exercise due diligence in ascertaining and interpreting
material facts in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities at
issue in the litigation.2 6 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,27 however, the
Supreme Court ruled that negligent conduct could not be a proper basis for
the assertion of a cause of action under rule 10b-5; rather, the Court held
that absent an allegation of intent to deceive on the part of the defendant, a
private 10b-5 action for damages could not be maintained.
28
In view of the fact that the second aspect of the due diligence defense
had been developed by analogy to principles of the common law within
which negligence could form the basis of 10b-5 liability, 29 and because
contributory negligence is not a defense at common law to an intentional
tort,30 a question was raised as to whether the holding in Hochfelder
24. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). See'also Comment,
The Development of a Flexible Duty Standard of Liability Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 32
WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 99 (1975); Comment, Scienter and the Flexible Duty Rule Under
Rule IOb-5, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 125. See generally Comment, Negligent Misrepresen-
tations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824 (1965).
25. 540 F.2d at 597.
26. Id.
27. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
28. Id. at 194-214. In Hochfelder, investors sustained financial losses as a result
of a securities fraud perpetrated by the president of a brokerage house. Id. at 189. The
scheme, after having continued for 24 years, was finally exposed by the president's
own suicide note. Id. -The investors filed suit against the accounting firm which had
audited the brokerage house's books. Id. at 190. Seeking recovery under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5, the plaintiffs based their claim' solely upon the defendant's alleged
negligence in conducting audits of the. brokerage firm. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered summary* judgment -for the
defendant, holding that although such an action could be maintained for negligence,
there was no issue of material fact as to whether defendant had conducted its audit
according to generally accepted accounting standards. Id. at 191. The Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded, holding that there were issues of fact as to whether defendant
had been negligent in failing to investigate' certain unusual circumstances, and
whether 'such 'investigation would have led to discovery or prevention of the fraud. Id..
at 191-93. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that absent an allegation of intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the part of the defendant, a private action for
damages could not be maintaine.d. Id. at 193..
29. See note 24 supra.
30. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 108, at 716 (4th ed. 1971).
The Straub court stated: "Under the common law, once the right to recover for
intentional misrepresentation has been established, lack of care on the part of the
recipient in accepting the representation as true becomes irrelevant so long as the
misrepresentation is not patently false." 540 F.2d at 597, citing W. PROSSER, supra; see
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491' F.2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1974). Rochez Brothers, a
corporation, 'and Rhoades, an individual, each owned 50% of another corporation. Id.
at 405. Rochez Brothers sold its stock to Rhoades for $598,000. Rhoades later sold his
interest to another 'corporation for $4.25 million cash and 50,000 shares of the
purchaser's stock. Id. at 406. Rochez Brothers sued under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,
claiming nondisclosure of material information concerning Rhoades' negotiations
with potential purchasers prior to Rhoades' purchase of Rochez Brothers' interest. Id.
at 405. The district court found for plaintiffs. 353 F. Supp. 795 (W.D. Pa. 1973). The
-United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed as to Rhoades' liability
under rule 10b-5, but vacated and remanded on other grounds. 491 F.2d at 411, 413.
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implicitly left only the reliance aspect of the due diligence defense available
to lOb-5 litigants.:" Aside from the instant case, only one circuit has
considered this question. In Holdsworth v. Strong,32 the Tenth Circuit
reviewed the Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder and held that, because
a lOb-5 violation is now analogous to an intentional tort, "the exaction of a
due diligence standard from the plaintiff becomes irrational and unre-
lated. ' 3 Hence, the court eliminated the availability of the due diligence
defense insofar as it rested upon contributory negligence34 and required only
that a plaintiff demonstrate justifiable reliance upon the defendant's
nondisclosures.35
It was against this background that the Third Circuit, after disposing of
defendants' initial objections, 36 considered the viability of the due diligence
defense. The court initially focused upon the pre-Hochfelder law relating to
the defense and found that the defense was analogous to that of
contributory negligence and hence a "natural development" of the inclusion
The Rochez court stated that "before an insider may claim reliance on a material
misrepresentation, he must fulfill a duty of due care in seeking to ascertain for himself
the facts relevant to a transaction." Id. at 409.
31. 540 F.2d at 597-98.
32. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976).
33. Id. at 692. In Holdsworth, plaintiff and defendant were co-owners of a small
corporation. Id. at 689. Plaintiff sold his interest to defendant but subsequently sued
for rescission, claiming both that defendant had misrepresented the corporation's
financial situation and that plaintiff's status as a corporate insider negated the need
for him to use due diligence in the transaction. Id. The district court rendered
judgment for plaintiff, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 698. On appeal, the
defendant argued that the judgment should be reversed because: 1) plaintiffs did not
exercise due diligence in selling their stock; 2) plaintiffs' reliance on defendant's
statement was not justified; and 3) the misrepresentations were not material. Id. at
691. The Tenth Circuit, reviewing both the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (see note 28 supra), and the common law of
misrepresentation (see note 30 supra), stated that "[u]se of the tort analogy plainly
demonstrates the inappropriateness of due diligence in 10b-5 suits under the Ernst &
Ernst doctrine, for the due diligence standard as applied to 10b-5 suits is about the
same as the application of contributory negligence." 545 F.2d at 694. The court
declared that "where liability of the defendant requires proof of intentional
misconduct, the exaction of a due diligence standard from the plaintiff becomes
irrational and unrelated." Id. at 692. Thus, the court ruled that, to recover under rule
lOb-5, a plaintiff need prove only that he justifiably relied upon a material
misstatement made by the defendant. Id. at 695-98. Indicating that plaintiffs state of
mind is still relevant, albeit to a limited extent, the court stated that reliance upon a
palpably false statement is neither reasonable nor justifiable, id. at 694, and
concluded by holding that "[i]f contributory fault of plaintiff is to cancel out wanton
or intentional fraud, it ought to be gross conduct somewhat comparable to that of
defendant." Id. at 693. In light of the court's discussion of reliance, it would seem that
retaining this vestige of the due diligence requirement was unnecessary.
34. 545 F.2d at 695.
35. Id.
36. Although the defendants claimed that the district court had no jurisdiction to
hear a 1934 Act suit by foreign nationals residing outside of the United States, the
court of appeals had little'difficulty in finding that plaintiffs were permitted to invoke
the jurisdictional sections of the federal securities laws. 540 F.2d at 595. The question
of federal jurisdiction in cases of transactional securities fraud has recently received
extensive consideration. In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.
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of negligent conduct within the prohibitions of 10b-5.37 Thus, the court felt
that a reexamination of the due diligence defense was in order following the
Supreme Court's holding in Hochfelder.
38
1975), the Second Circuit held that the antifraud provisions of federal securities laws
and accompanying rules would apply to:
1. [Rlesident Americans whether or not any acts or culpable omissions of
material importance occurred in the United States;
2. Americans resident abroad only for acts or culpable omissions within the
United States which significantly contributed to the loss; and
3. [Floreigners outside the United States only if the proscribed conduct within
this country directly caused the loss.
Id. at 993.
The Third Circuit relied upon the more traditional formulation of section 17 of
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory,
whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct
outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its
territory.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17
(1965).
The court stated that the consideration may simply be one of policy:
"Moreover, on policy grounds, the interest of the United States in regulating the
conduct of its broker-dealers in this country and enhancing world confidence in its
securities market is ample justification for applying the securities laws." 540 F.2d 595,
citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (2d
Cir. 1972). The court also noted that Straub did not present a "predominantly foreign
transaction[:]" "The fraudulent scheme was conceived in the United States by
American citizens, involved stock in an American corporation traded on American
over-the-counter exchange, and an American securities broker from his office in New
Jersey was responsible for the wrongful omissions." 540 F.2d at 595; cf. IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction found where United States was used as
a base for manufacture of fraudulent security devices for export). See generally Note,
American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553
(1976).
After disposing of the jurisdictional issue, the court turned to defendant's
argument that VaisCo was not liable. The court affirmed the findings of liability on
the part of VaisCo as a "controlling person" under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970). 540 F.2d at 595-96. Section 20(a) provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
In Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), the Third Circuit
delimited the liability of a corporation under section 20(a), adopting a test requiring
that the plaintiff show culpable participation by the control person before liability is
imputed to him under section 20(a). Id. at 885, citing Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d
1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973). The Straub court found liability under this test on the basis
of VaisCo's "active participation in the scheme, its receipt of the benefits, and its
status as a broker-dealer." 540 F.2d at 596.
37. 540 F.2d at 597. The court found that analysis of the elements of common law
deceit and misrepresentation was relevant but not determinative in the interpretation
of rule 10b-5. Id., citing Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975),
and Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
38. 540 F.2d at 597.
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In undertaking this reexamination, the court viewed the common law as
"relevant"39 and observed that under the common law "once the right to
recover for intentional misrepresentation has been established, lack of care
on the part of the recipient in accepting the representation as true becomes
irrelevant so long as the misrepresentation is not patently false. ' '40
Moreover, the court noted that even where negligence is the basis of tort
liability, the developing doctrine of comparative negligence militates
against making the plaintiff's failure to exercise due care a complete bar to
recovery. 41 In view of these fundamental tort principles, the court ruled that
the analogy between the common law of deceit and rule 10b-5 required that
the due diligence defense be "narrowly circumscribed.
'42
The court, however, was not willing to use these tort concepts as a
rationale for eliminating the due diligence defense altogether; rather, it
stated that "tort concepts must be balanced against the policies underlying
the federal securities laws and the judicially credited causes of action.
'43
Finding that the availability of the due diligence defense would serve the
important policy of encouraging investor caution, 44 the court ruled that if a
plaintiff did not act with reasonable care under the circumstances at issue,
this would be a bar to recovery under rule 10b-5. 45 Nevertheless, the court
ruled that the burden of proof on the issue of the plaintiff's diligence was
39. Id.
40. Id. at 597.
41. Id.
42. Id.; see note 58 infra.
43. 540 F.2d at 597.
44. Id. at 598. The court referred to the "deterence of investor carelessness" and
the "encourag[ement of] investor caution." Id. at 597-98.
45. Id. at 598. The court stated that- factors such ac "fiduciary relationship,
opportunity to detect the fraud, sophistication of the plaintiff, the existence of
longstanding business or personal relationships, and access to the relevant
information" may be considered in determining whether plaintiff's actions were
reasonable. Id.The court also pointed out that even though a showing of due care will depend
in part upon plaintiff's level of knowledge of investments in general, a so-called
"sophisticated investor" - one whose knowledge and experience are far greater than
average - will not be barred from recovery simply by reliance upon defendant's
statements absent readily obtainable knowledge that defendants are not to be trusted.
Id. As to the question of a test to determine whether a particular plaintiff has such
knowledge, it has been said that "[wihen the problem is framed in terms of the
plaintiff's obligation to exercise due care, the plaintiff's own expertise and knowledge
are ready criteria for measuring the particulars of that duty." Wheeler, supra note 17
at 600. See also Mann, Rule lOb-5: Evaluation of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace
the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206 (1970);
Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lob-5, 32 U. Chi. L. R~ev. 824
(1965). Encouraging investor care- in securities transactions may result in the
detection of fraud by the investor himself at the inception of the transaction. This
view is evidenced by pre-Hochfelder cases holding that a plaintiff must exercise due
care even if the defendant acted intentionally. See Clement A. Evans & Co. v.
McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100. For the facts and holding of McAlpine, see note 23 supra. One
commentator suggested, however, that the decision in McAlpine may have been
influenced by the substantive law of Georgia, the state in which the cause of action
arose. Wheeler. supra note 17, at 582 n. 65. Georgia law, of which the court apparently
was aware, 434 F.2d at 103, provides that the plaintiff's carelessness is a defense even
to deliberate misrepresentation. Wheeler, supra note 17 at 582 n. 65. citing United
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squarely on the defendant since the due diligence defense was affirmative in
nature.
46
In applying its holding to the facts of the instant case, the Straub court
held that plaintiffs conduct had been within the "permissible zone" of due
diligence in light of the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
47
Rejecting the defendant's argument that the fact that plaintiff was a
sophisticated investor made his bare reliance on defendant's statements per
se unreasonable, 48 the court declared that "a sophisticated investor is not
barred by reliance on the honesty of those with whom he deals in the
absence of knowledge that the trust is misplaced. '49 Finding that the
plaintiff's trust in the defendant's integrity was reasonable by virtue of the
confidential relationship between them, and that the defendant had abused
this confidence, 50 the court affirmed the lower court's finding of liability.51
The major issue which confronted the court in Straub was whether
Hochfelder's introduction of scienter into the 10b-5 cause of action dictated
the elimination of the due diligence defense.52 As the court itself pointed out,
the due diligence defense was developed in the federal courts through an
express analogy to contributory negligence.5 3 Therefore, the denial of
recovery against a defendant who negligently misrepresented certain facts
where the plaintiff has failed to exercise reasonable care for his own
protection was a position firmly supported in American jurisprudence.
54
However, the theory that lack of reasonable care can operate as a defense to
liability for the intentional infliction of harm does not find support at
States v. Northeast Constr. Co., 298 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D. Ga. 1969); A.M. Kidder & Co.
v. Clement A. Evans & Co., 111 Ga. App. 484, 142 S.E.2d 269 (1965).
Although the defendants' conduct could probably be characterized as
intentional in many of the instances in which the requirement has been found,
Wheeler, supra note 17, at 581-82, most of these cases have omitted discussion of the
effect of a finding of intentionally fraudulent acts on the part of defendant upon the
due diligence requirement. Id. at 579. One case which addressed this point is Carroll v.
First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970); see
note 23 supra.
However, an argument for elimination of the requirement, especially in light
of Hochfelder, is presented by Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976); see
note 33 supra.
46. 540 F.2d at 598.
47. Id. Finding that Vaisman knew that it was unlikely that Straub would
investigate Erb's recommendation, the court found Vaisman to have abused the
confidence that Straub had in Erb. Id. It noted that Straub did not have access to
Mark I Offset's plans to file for bankruptcy. Id. Further, the defendants were found to
have planned the transaction to take place during the year-end holiday season, which
allowed only limited opportunity for investigation. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id; see note 47 supra.
51. 540 F.2d at 598.
52. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
53. Id. at 597; see notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text supra.
54. W. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 107, at 699. However, a "substantial minority" of
American jurisdictions refuse to follow this rule, and many courts that purport to do
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common law.s5 Since, under Hockfelder, the private 10b-5 cause of action is
now of the nature of an intentional tort,56 it would seem that the analogy to
the common law which fostered the development of the due diligence defense
in the first instance would call for the elimination of that defense.
The Straub court recognized this logic and the conclusion inherent in it.
Nevertheless, the court's ruling left the due diligence defense still available
to a lOb-5 defendant.57 The only rationale offered by the court to support its
departure from the common law was its own notions of public policy. In
looking to the federal securities statutes and the judicial gloss which has
been place upon them, the court discerned a policy in favor of encouraging
"watchfulness in the marketplace. ' 58 However, the court failed to cite any
specific sources from which such a policy could be derived.5 9 It is submitted
that the court's failure on this point is a result of the fact that the federal
securities laws generally, and section 10 specifically, do not in fact express
any policy of encouraging investor watchfulness.6 0 Indeed, the thrust of the
law is to the contrary, for the securities laws were passed in order to protect
public investors from the unscrupulous practices against which Congress
felt they were unable to guard by themselves. 61 Hence, while the policy of
encouraging investor caution might be desirable, it is certainly not found in
the federal statutes or in their legislative history.
6 2
Even assuming that a court may legitimately find such a policy and
condition private recovery upon the exercise of behavior which conforms to
that policy, it is submitted that the Straub holding is still unjustifiable. The
securities laws express a strong policy in favor of protecting investors.
63
Indeed, this was why the courts allowed private recovery under rule 10b-5 in
the first place.64 Where the plaintiff and defendant are of equal fault in a
securities transaction conducted on the basis of inadequate information, the
policy of encouraging investor caution, coupled with the traditional common
55. Id. § 108, at 716; see note 30 supra.
56. See note 28 supra.
57. 540 F.2d at 598.
58. Id. at 597. The court found additional support for its conclusions through a
consideration of the policy of protecting the integrity of the marketplace. Id. The court
stated that "[ijntegrity is still the mainstay of commerce and makes it possible for an
almost limitless number of transactions to take place without resort to the courts." Id.
at 598. The 10b-5 private remedy was implied by the judiciary at least partly because
the SEC could not be expected to seek a public remedy for each of the large and
growing number of claimed violations of the rule. Rule 10b-5 was not intended to be
"an insurance policy for foolish investors." Note, supra note 20, at 606.
59. 540 F.2d at 598.
60. See note 12 supra.
61. Section 2 of the 1934 Act states:
[TIransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges
and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest Which
makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and
of practices and matters related thereto ... in order to insure the maintenance of
fair and honest markets in such transactions .
15 U.S.C. §78b (1970).
62. See Wheeler, note 17, supra at 600 & nn.13-17.
63. See note 61 supra.
64. See note 19 supra and authorities cited therein.
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law concepts of contributory negligence, may be of sufficient force to justify
denying a public investor the protection given to him by the securities acts.
However, where the defendant knowingly defrauds a plaintiff, it is not only
against the spirit of the securities laws, but also against the history of
American jurisprudence to allow the defense that the plaintiff should have
known that the defendant was cheating him. Here, the policy of encouraging
watchfulness should yield to the stronger policy of protecting investors from
fraudulent securities transactions.
Notwithstanding these flaws in the logic of the Straub opinion, the
court's decision can be read as having substantially constricted the nature
and availability of the due diligence defense so as to comply more nearly
with the common law of fraud and the spirit of the securities laws. This
conclusion is supported by the court's holding that an investor, even a
"sophisticated investor," is entitled to rely upon the honesty of those with
whom he deals in the absence of knowledge that the trust is misplaced.65
This holding is tantamount to saying that any investor exercises reasonable
care when he enters into a securities transaction unless he has knowledge of
the facts not disclosed to him or knowledge that the person representing
these facts is not to be trusted. Hence, although the Straub court couched its
due diligence test in terms of whether the plaintiff acted reasonably under
the circumstances, 66 it is apparent that the test employed was whether the
plaintiff had justifiably relied upon the representations made to him. Such
an analysis of the Straub holding would bring the court's decision in line
with the Tenth Circuit's position in Holdsworth.67 However, the Straub
decision is highly ambiguous on this point and the issue must await further
clarification.
Straub is significant in that it recognizes the due diligence defense as
viable, even after Hochfelder. Thus, the impact of Straub lies in its
maintenance, in somewhat modified form, of the existing elements of a
private action under rule lOb-5. Those who choose to litigate such matters in
the Third Circuit will be required to meet the vague and ambiguous
standards of proof as to due diligence set forth by that court. In light of the
Tenth Circuit's elimination of the due diligence element in Holdsworth,
Straub has created a significant split among the circuits concerning an issue
extremely important to litigants because of the questions of proof involved.
The issue is thus ripe for resolution by the Supreme Court.
Harold Rosen
65. 540 F.2d at 598.
66. 540 F.2d at 598.
67. See note 32 supra.
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ANTITRUST LAW - TYING ARRANGEMENTS - CLASS ACTIONS - WHERE
AN ACTION ALLEGING AN ILLEGAL TYING ARRANGEMENT Is BROUGHT
AGAINST A FRANCHISOR BY ITS FRANCHISEES, THE FRANCHISEES MUST
INDIVIDUALLY PROVE THAT THEY WERE COERCED INTO TAKING THE
TIED PRODUCT, THEREBY PRECLUDING A CLASS ACTION.
Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. (1976)
Plaintiffs, a group of franchisees, filed suit' against their franchisor,
Dunkin' Donuts, alleging that Dunkin' Donuts granted their franchises only
upon the condition that the franchisees also purchase other items,2 and that
this requirement constituted an illegal tying arrangement3 prohibited by
section 1 of the Sherman Act (section 1).4 The plaintiffs sought class action
status under subsections (2) and (3) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b).5
1. Two actions seeking damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief were
filed against Dunkin' Donuts in 1972 in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and were consolidated for trial. Ungar v. Dunkin'
Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1214 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
One of the cases, Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., stemmed from the
standard form contract in effect from 1967 until November 1, 1970, which made it a
prerequisite to the franchise arrangement that the franchisee enter into an agreement
to buy his equipment package from Dunkin' Donuts. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of
America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 80 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The other case, Radar v. Dunkin'
Donuts, Inc., arose out of the amended contract, effect November 1, 1970, which
provided that the franchisee had a 30-day option to purchase the equipment from a
source other than Dunkin' Donuts. Id. The purpose of the 30-day option was to
preclude any suit from being instituted on the ground that the contract required the
purchase of equipment from Dunkin' Donuts and was thus an illegal tying
arrangement. See 531 F.2d at 1215-16.
2. 531 F.2d at 1214. Dunkin' Donuts, the largest coffee and doughnut franchise
system in the country, entered into franchise agreements with each of its franchisees
whereby it selected the site, built a doughnut shop, offered the prospective franchisee
a lease on the land and building, and offered to sell him the equipment needed to
operate the shop. Id. The described procedure, which is typical of franchise operations,
is called a "turn-key" operation since the franchisee need only turn the key to be in
business. Id. The ability of the franchisor to provide the franchisee with such an
operation is indicative of its power over the franchisee. Id. at 1223.
3. A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only
on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least
agrees that he will not purchase that product-from any other supplier." Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (footnote omitted).
Specifically, the franchisees contended that four kinds of items were tied to
the Dunkin' Donuts trademark - the alleged tying product: real estate, equipment,
signs, and supplies. 531 F.2d at 1215. They asserted that threats of disenfranchise-
ment exerted substantial pressure on them to retain vendors selected by Dunkin'
Donuts. 68 F.R.D. at 81. On appeal, they stressed that the absence of express
contractual tying provisions could have no importance if illegal tying could be
established in other ways. 531 F.2d at 1216. The focus of their case was not on
individual instances of illegal conduct, but rather "a pervasive company policy, 'firm
and resolutely enforced'" by Dunkin' Donuts, to tie the specified items to the
trademark license. Id.
4. Section 1 provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970).
5. Rule 23 reads in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
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Determining that it was not necessary for each franchisee to prove that he
was individually coerced by the franchisor into purchasing the tied items,
the district court concluded that common questions of law and fact
predominated over individual ones and granted certification of the class.
6
After permitting an interlocutory appeal, 7 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit" reversed and remanded for individual trials, holding that the
district court's class certification with respect to the tying claim, insofar as
it was expressly premised upon its rejection of the individual coercion
doctrine, should not have been granted because proof of individual coercion
is essential to establishing a prima facie case of illegal tying absent an
express contractual tie-in. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531
F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
The role which coercion has played in previous tying arrangement cases
is unclear. Historically, the Supreme Court has not spoken expressly in
terms of an individual coercion doctrine; rather, it has focused upon the
degree of economic power required to find an illegal tie. In International Salt
Co. v. United States,9 the Supreme Court essentially held that ownership of
a patent conclusively showed market dominance, so that if, as a prerequisite
numerous that joinder of all members is impractical, (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23
Appellant denied the existence of any tie-ins and argued that even an
assumption of illegality would not permit certification of a class, because the absence
of any express contractual tying provisions precluded a finding of any common
issues. 531 F.2d at 1216. Appellants claimed that individual questions predominated.
Id. at 1216-17.
6. 68 F.R.D. at 141. According to the district court, "[t]he individual coercion
doctrine ... appears to require proof by the plaintiff of such events and
circumstances surrounding the relationship between the franchisor and each
franchisee as will demonstrate that the franchisee was coerced into agreeing to an
anticompetitive tie, usually of equipment or supplies." Id. at 78 (emphasis supplied by
the court). Had the district court accepted the individual coercion doctrine, individual
questions of fact and law would have predominated, and a class action would have
been precluded.
7. 531 F.2d at 1214. The circuit court accepted the interlocutory appeal because it
involved the question of the district court's rejection of the individual coercion
doctrine, which had been adopted by many other district courts. Id. The court thus
focused its discussion upon the propriety of that rejection. Id.
8. The case was heard by Judges Aldisert, Garth, and Hunter. Judge Aldisert
wrote the opinion.
9. 332 U.S. 392 (1947). The Government brought an action under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), and section 3 of the Clayton Act, id. § 14, to enjoin
the International Salt Company from enforcing provisions of the leases of its
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to leasing a patented machine, a lessee had to purchase other products from
the lessor, a violation of section 1 was proved. 10
Six years later, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, the
Court temporarily narrowed the scope of illegality of tying by requiring that
the seller enjoy a monopolistic position in the market for the tying product.1
2
Significantly, Times-Picayune arguably marked the genesis of the individ-
ual coercion doctrine. According to the Court, "[bly conditioning his sale of
one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller coerces abdication of
buyers' independent judgment as to the 'tied' product's merits and insulates
it from the competitive stresses of the open market."":1 The Court found
further that "[tlhe common core of the adjudicated unlawful tying arrange-
ment is the forced purchase of a second distinct commodity with the desired
purchase of a dominant 'tying' product . . . ."4 Subsequently, in United
States v. Loew's Inc.,' 5 a 1962 decision involving block-booking of films in
patented machines which required lessees to use only International Salt's products.
332 U.S. at 393. In affirming the lower court's granting of summary judgment for the
Government, the Supreme Court held:
The appellant's patents confer a limited monopoly of the invention they reward.
... But the patents confer no right to restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented salt.
By contracting to close this market for salt against competition, International has
engaged in a restraint of trade which its patents afford no immunity from the
antitrust laws.
Id. 'at 395-96 (citations omitted).
10. 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Various commentators have suggested that if the Court
consciously assumed that competing products were available, it was saying that
dominance would be presumed on a mere showing that the tying product had some
element of distinctiveness. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the
Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50, 53 (1958); see Comment, Antitrust Barriers to
Franchising, 61 GEO. L.J. 189, 194 (1972).
11. 345 U.S. 594 (1953). The Times-Picayune Publishing Company, which owned a
morning and an evening paper in New Orleans, required all advertisers to purchase
space in both papers as a unit. Id. at 596-97. The Government filed suit challenging
these "forced combination" contracts as unreasonable restraints of interstate trade in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. In reversing the district court's
enjoining of these unit contracts, the Supreme Court, finding no monopolistic position
in the market for the tying product, stated:
From the "tying" cases a perceptible pattern of illegality emerges: When the seller
enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the "tying" product, or if a
substantial volume of commerce in the "tied" product is restrained, a tying
arrangement violates the narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act
because from either factor the requisite potential lessening of competition is
inferred. And because for even a lawful monopolist it is "unreasonable, per se, to
foreclose competitors from any substantial market," a tying arrangement is
banned by § 1 of the Sherman Act whenever both conditions are met.
Id. at 609 (footnote omitted).
12. Id. at 608-09; see McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The
Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1085, 1096 (1970); Turner, supra note 10, at 54.
The narrowing was only temporary because subsequently, in Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court construed the "monopoly power"
language of Times-Picayune as requiring nothing "more than sufficient economic
power to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied product." Id.
at 11.
13. 345 U.S. at 605 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
15. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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sales to television stations,16 the Court refined the economic power test by
holding that even absent market dominance, the requisite economic power
was inferrable from the desirability or uniqueness of the tying product.
1 7
The Court also stated that this economic power would be presumed when the
tying product was patented or copyrighted." Moreover, the Court noted that
because "[t]elevision stations [were] forced to take unwanted films, [they
were thereby] denied access to films marketed by other distributors . *..."19
While the Supreme Court has never characterized the coercion doctrine
as such, numerous lower federal courts have expressly required proof of
coercion as an element of an illegal tying arrangement.2"1 For example, the
Second Circuit, in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v.
American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres,2' stated that "there can be no
illegal tie unless unlawful coercion by the seller influences the buyer's
choice."22 Shortly thereafter, however, the Ninth Circuit, in Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc.,2: equated a trademark with a patent or copyright -
16. In selling motion pictures to television stations, the defendant film
distributors were conditioning the sale of feature films upon the purchase of a
package containing one or more unwanted or inferior films. Id. at 40. The district
court found a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. Relying upon
International Salt and Times-Picayune, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding
"economic leverage, inherent in the copyright, sufficient to induce [the seller's]
customers to take the tied product along with the tying item." Id. at 45.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 49.
20. See, e.g., Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 331 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Thompson v. T.F.I. Cos., 64 F.R.D. 140 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Smith v. Denny's
Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1974); E.B.E., Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts of
America, Inc., [1975] 1 Trade Cas. 60,266 (E.D. Mich., July 24, 1974); Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1973); In re 7-Eleven Franchise Antitrust
Litigation, [1972] Trade Cas. 74,156 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Capital Temporaries, Inc. v.
Olsten Corp., 365 F. Supp. 888 (D. Conn. 1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974);
Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
21. 446 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972). In this case an
action was brought by American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. (ABC)
against The Kemper Insurance Companies (Kemper) alleging Kemper's failure to
adhere to a contract which bound Kemper to sponsor ABC's "Evening Report." 466
F.2d at 1132. Kemper raised the defense that the contract constituted an illegal tying
arrangement. Id. By the terms of the contract, Kemper was bound to sponsor the show
on 95 stations, including 28 on which Kemper allegedly did not wish to advertise. Id.
at 1134. The district court struck this defense and Kemper appealed. Id. at 1133-34.
Affirming the dismissal of the antitrust claim, the court of appeals held that insofar
as Kemper failed to "persevere long enough with its ideal lineup [of 67 stations] to feel
any economic pressure from ABC," a substantial quantity of business to competitors
was not foreclosed. Id. at 1137.
22. Id. The court neither defined the term "unlawful coercion" nor cited any
authority in support of its statement. Id.
23. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). A treble damage
class action was brought against Chicken Delight by certain franchisees who sought
damages for injuries allegedly resulting from an illegal tie-in imposed by Chicken
Delight's standard form franchise agreement. 448 F.2d at 46. Specifically, the
franchisees were required to purchase certain cooking equipment, food items, and
packaging directly from Chicken Delight as a condition of obtaining the trademark
license. Id. The district court found the arrangement to constitute a per se unlawful
tying arrangement. Id. Finding all the elements of an unlawful tying arrangement
present (see note 38 infra), the court of appeals affirmed. 448 F.2d at 52.
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thus inferring sufficient economic power to bring the case within the
Sherman Act 24 - and found an illegal tie without mentioning coercion.
25
In reaching the instant decision, the Third Circuit, faced with the
conflicting results of previous tying cases, focused upon the rationale
underlying the district court's rejection of the individual coercion doctrine.
26
The court disagreed with the district court's holding on two grounds. First,
the court differed with the district court's view that the Supreme Court had
not set forth a coercion requirement. Determining that the Supreme Court
had done so in several cases,27 the Third Circuit stated that "coercion is
implicit - both logically and linguistically - in the concept of leverage
upon which the illegality of tying is premised: the seller with market power
in one market uses that power as a 'lever' to force acceptance of his product
in another market."
28
Second, the court took issue with the district court's reliance upon two
Supreme Court tying cases, FTC v. Texaco Inc.,29 and Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp.30 In Texaco, Texaco agreed with Goodrich
to induce its dealers to purchase Goodrich tires, batteries, and accessories in
24. 448 F.2d at 50. The court concluded: "Accordingly we see no reason why the
presumption that exists in the case of the patent and copyright does not equally apply
to the trademark." Id. (footnote omitted); see text accompanying note 18 supra. One
commentator subsequently observed that "the uniqueness-distinctiveness test affects
franchising through the concept of the trademark since trademarked products... are
by definition distinctive." Comment, supra note 10, at 195.
25. 448 F.2d at 52.
26. Due to the nature of the issue and the exhaustive treatment given the subject
by Judge Becker in the district court decision, Judge Aldisert noted that the "question
subsumes review of the district court's conclusions as to the proof requisite to
establish an illegal tie-in," and directed his analysis primarily to the lower court
opinion rather than to the contentions made by the parties. 531 F.2d at 1215.
27. Examining Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953), and Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the court found no
ambiguity in the Supreme Court's language on this point. The Third Circuit quoted
the following passage from Northern Pacific:
[Tying arrangements] deny competitors free access to the market for the tied
product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better
product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in anothei market.
At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free choice between competing
products.
531 F.2d at 1218-19, quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1958). The court also relied upon similar language found in United States v. Loew's
Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (see text accompanying note 19 supra), and Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). The Court in
Fortner had concluded:
[Diespite the freedom of some or many buyers from the seller's power, other
buyers - whether few or many, whether scattered throughout the market or part
of some group within the market - can be forced to accept the higher price
because of their stronger preferences for the product, and the seller could therefore
choose instead to force them to accept a tying arrangement that would prevent
free competition for their patronage in the market for the tied product.
Accordingly, the proper focus of concern is whether the seller has the power to
raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with respect to
any appreciable number of buyers within the market.
394 U.S. 503-04 (emphasis added).
28. 53,1 F.2d at 1218.
29. 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
30. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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return for a commission paid by Goodrich to Texaco.:" The district court had
concluded that "Texaco holds that proof of use of economic power. . . does
not require evidence of coercion, but rather that evidence of persuasion or
influence will suffice where there is dominance in bargaining power of a
franchisor over a franchisee, or. . .where there is evidence of an inherently
coercive marketing system."' 2 The court of appeals, however, distinguished
Texaco from Dunkin' Donuts on the basis that Texaco was decided under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act),:"' which is much
broader in its coverage than section 1 of the Sherman Act,3 4 and that the
legal focus of Texaco was not upon the relationship between Texaco and its
dealers, but rather upon the Texaco-Goodrich agreement. '
5
The circuit court also found no support for the district court's view that
Perma Life had emasculated the individual coercion doctrine.'" The district
court had apparently reasoned that Perma Life allowed franchisees to bring
a civil damage action against the franchisor even without coercion.
According to the Third Circuit, however, the Supreme Court in Perma Lifc
had not even considered the individual coercion doctrine. In addition, the
circuit court perhaps implicitly argued that there was in fact coercion in
Perma Life insofar as the franchisees' participation in the Perma Lll',-
scheme was "not voluntary in any meaningful sense."'I-,
In contrast to the holding of the district court, the Third Circuit stressed
that proof that the conduct in question is a tie-in is one element of a per se
31. 393 U.S. at 224.
32. 68 F.R.D. at 108-109.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
34. Section 5 of the FTC Act proscribes conduct not proscribed by the antitrust
laws. 531 F.2d at 1220. According to the court: "'[Tihe Federal Trade Commission
does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the
elusive, but congressionally manqated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity,
considers public values beyond si#nply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in
the spirit of the antitrust laws." Id., quoting FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405
U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
The court was also concerned that since Texaco was an enforcement
proceeding, the principle of judi ial deference to administrative expertise had been
applied. 531 F.2d at 1220. The 2ourt quoted directly from Texaco in this regard:
"'[Tihe determinations of the Commission, an expert body charged with the practical
application of the statute, are er titled to great weight."' 531 F.2d at 1220, quoting
FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 226 (1968).
35. 531 F.2d at 1220-21. Opining that this final distinction was fundamental, the
court stated: "The issue was wyhether Texaco and Goodrich engaged in unfair
competitive practices vis-A-vis Gdodrich's competitors. That is a very different issue
from the issue whether a frarichisor is engaged in illegal tying vis-A-vis its
franchisees." Id. (footnote omitted). Noting that the essence of the illegality of a tie-in
is that it forecloses competition in the tied product market, the court distinguished
between an action concerning the franchisee-franchisor relationship and an action
concerning the relationship between a franchisor and competing suppliers of the
franchisee market. Id. at 1221 n.7a.
36. Id. at 1221.
37. Id., quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
131, 139-40 (1968). Under the Perma Life scheme, the franchisees were required to sell
other Midas products so that they could have the right to sell Midas mufflers. Id. at
137. Although the franchisor in Perma Life contended that its franchisees "had
voluntarily, if not eagerly, participated in the tying scheme" to their benefit, 68 F.R.D.
at 110, the court stated that their participation could not have been voluntary in any
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illegal tie-in,38 and that in the absence of a formal agreement, this can be
proved by showing coercion.3 9 Interpreting the district court's formulation4 °
as requiring only proof of salesmanship by a franchisor with dominant
economic power over a franchisee, the court reasoned that the practical
effect of such a test would be to substitute proof of economic power for proof
of the tie-in.
41
According to the circuit court, under the district court's theory a class of
franchisees could prove a per se illegal tie merely by establishing: 1) the
franchisor's economic dominance; 2) the franchisor's offer and sale of more
than one product to its franchisees; and 3) the existence of a policy to
persuade franchisees to buy its products. 42 The circuit court found this
position unsupportable because these factors are inherent in any franchise
arrangement. 43 For the same reason, the court also rejected the district
court's alternative test, which allowed "illegal use of economic power to be
inferred from proof of 'acceptance by large numbers of buyers of a
burdensome or uneconomic tie.' 44 The circuit court reasoned that "this test
would render prima facie illegal virtually every franchise system involving
meaningful sense and that, therefore, the doctrine of in pari delicto did not apply. Id.
The Third Circuit quoted the following passage from Perma Life:
[P]etitioner['s] ... participation was not voluntary in any meaningful sense. They
sought the franchises enthusiastically but they did not actively seek each and
every clause of the agreement. Rather, many of the clauses were quite clearly
detrimental to their interests, and they alleged that they had continually objected
to them. Petitioners apparently accepted many of these restraints solely because
their acquiescence was necessary to obtain an otherwise attractive business
opportunity .... Moreover .. , they cannot be blamed for seeking to minimize
the disadvantages of the agreement once they had been forced to accept its more
onerous terms as a condition of doing business.
531 F.2d at 1221 (emphasis supplied by the court), quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1968). The court also reasoned that if
participation in the scheme barred a franchisee from suing, no action could ever be
maintained against a franchisor by a franchisee. 531 F.2d at 1221.
38. 531 F.2d at 1223-24. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958),
the Supreme Court identified three elements of a per se illegal tie-in: 1) the existence
of a tie-in (see note 3 supra); 2) sufficient economic power in the seller with respect to
the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied
product; and 3) a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce must be affected.
356 U.S. at 5-6.
39. 531 F.2d at 1224.
40. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
41. 531 F.2d at 1224. The court concluded that "[plroof of economic power must,
perforce, focus on the seller; but proof of a tie-in must focus on the buyer, because a
voluntary purchase of two products is simply not a tie-in." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1224-25. On the franchisor's market dominance, the circuit court noted
that although an advantage to the franchisor, the degree of bargaining power over its
franchisees is one of the basic problems in the franchise system. This power has been
the source of such abuses as arbitrary franchise terminations and fraudulent
promotional schemes. It may also be possible that franchisees have used the existence
of this power to gain sympathy from courts where the franchisor is guilty of nothing
more than enforcing an obligation which the now-successful franchisee feels to be
burdensome. 531 F.2d at 1223.
44. Id. at 1225, quoting Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65,
115 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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'large numbers' of franchisees. '45 Rejecting the district court's basic
assumption "'that persuasion or influence may be the virtual equivalent of
coercion where there is an unequal relationship between the parties,' -46 the
Third Circuit reasoned that "[i]t is only when the buyer's freedom to chomse
a given product is restricted that the tying doctrine comes into play: so long
as the 'buyer is free to take either product by itself there is no tying
problem.' "47
Although, as the district court noted, there was substantial ground for
differing opinions as to the correctness of its holding, 48 the circuit court
opinion is nevertheless subject to some criticism. A strong argument could
be made that the circuit court did not accurately construe the Supreme
Court's language in Times-Picayune, Northern Pacific, and Loew's, the
cases upon which it relied for authority that a coercion doctrine exists. 49 For
example, a close reading of the passages in Times-Picayune,50 wherein the
Supreme Court used the words "coerces" and "forced," does not clearly
support the Third Circuit's finding that the coercion requirement is implicit
in previous Supreme Court cases. 51 Rather, the language seems to indicate
that the Court was condemning the conditioning of the sale of one product
upon the purchase of another, as opposed to requiring coercion of the buyer.
Moreover, when the Court spoke of a "forced purchase, '52 it arguably meant
that because of the "conditioning," the buyer must take the second product if
he wanted the first. It was not saying that the seller exerted any force upon,
or applied any pressure to, the buyer.5 3 What the Third Circuit should have
focused upon, then, was the word "conditioning," and the manner in which
it could be proved.
In rejecting the district court's "basic assumption" that persuasion may
supplant coercion where there is an unequal relationship between the
parties,5 4 the court quoted from Northern Pacific to the effect that there is no
tying problem "so long as 'the buyer is free to take either product by
45. 531 F.2d at 1225. Suggesting that the district court had used circular
reasoning, the court of appeals explained: "[11f the question is whether there is a 'tie',
proof that large numbers of buyers accepted a burdensome or uneconomic 'tie' is not
helpful. The 'proof assumes the answer rather than proving it." Id.
46. Id., quoting Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 115 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
47. 531 F.2d at 1226, quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 n.4
(1958). The court also noted that the district court's basic fear was rooted in the
difficulty of determining whether the franchisee was indeed coerced. 531 F.2d at 1225-
26. The court concluded, however, that an inquiry into state of mind must be made
insofar as it was "the unfortunate province of the courts to struggle with them." Id. at
1226.
48. 531 F.2d at 1214.
49. See id. at 1218-19.
50. See text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
51. See text accompanying notes 13, 14 & 19 supra.
52. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
53. The same holds true for the use of the word "forced" in the Northern Pacific
passage quoted by the court (see note 27 supra), as well as its use in Fortner (see note
27 supra) and Loew's (see text accompanying note 19 supra).
54. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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itself,"' 5 5 thus implying that coercion is necessary. This, however, appears to
be an incorrect interpretation of the passage because if the seller simply will
not sell both products separately, then the buyer is not "free." The point of
the lower court opinion was precisely that the franchisee-buyer is not free to
do so. Its disagreement with the individual coercion doctrine was that
freedom may be restricted by other than overtly coercive means - e.g., by
persuasion coupled with dominance in bargaining power or the inherent
coercion of Texaco5 6 - a position clearly consonant with the Northern
Pacific passage.
Also subject to scrutiny is the court's attempt to distinguish the two
cases heavily relied upon by the district court - Texaco5 7 and Perma Life."8
While there is some validity in the Third Circuit's distinction between a
section 1 Sherman Act violation and a section 5 FTC Act violation,5 9 the
lower court relied upon Texaco for "its teaching that dominance in
bargaining power may give rise to inherent coercion '60 - a lesson which
would be applicable under the standard of either act.6 1 Nor does the notion
that the legal focus of that case was not upon the relationship between
Texaco and its dealers undermine the value of that lesson. Texaco was not
inherently coercing Goodrich, nor vice versa; Texaco was inherently
coercing its dealers. That Texaco was analogous to an illegal tying case is
clear from the Texaco opinion itself.
6 2
55. 531 F.2d at 1226, quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 n.4
(1958).
56. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
57. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra.
58. See note 36 and accompanying text supra. While it distinguished Texaco and
Perma Life, the Third Circuit relied upon several federal decisions suggesting that
coercion was needed which had been distinguished by the district court. 531 F.2d 1219
n.7 & 1222 n.9. Because the circuit court did not address the lower court's analysis in
this respect, the precedential support for the doctrine enunciated by the court has been
undermined. For a list of these cases, see note 20 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. In Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381
U.S. 357 (1965), the Supreme Court stated that "[lit has long been recognized that
there are many unfair methods of competition that do not assume the proportions of
antitrust violations." Id. at 369.
60. 68 F.R.D. at 108; see Baker, Another Look at Franchise Tie-Ins After Texaco
and Fortner, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 767, 771 (1969); Kamenshine, Competition Versus
Fairness in Franchising, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 197, 204 (1971).
61. The fact that Texaco was an enforcement proceeding should not detract from
its precedential value. Although, theoretically, this fact could make a difference
insofar as the FTC Act is broader in its coverage than the Sherman Act, in Texaco the
distinction was not significant. The Supreme Court found it clear from the record that
Texaco held dominant economic power over its dealers and that this power was used
in a manner which tended to foreclose competition. 393 U.S. at 226, 228-29.
62. 393 U.S. 223 (1968); see Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some
New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 88, 93; McCarthy, supra note 12, at 1106. The Third
Circuit also emphasized that the plaintiffs in the instant case were not suppliers
competing with Dunkin' Donuts for the franchise market. 531 F.2d at 1221 n.7a.
However, the identity of the plaintiff should have no bearing on whether or not the
antitrust laws have been violated. The focus of Texaco was whether an illegal
arrangement existed between Goodrich and Texaco, but in order to prove this, it was
necessary to prove what amounted to a tying arrangement between Texaco and its
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In rejecting the district court's reliance upon Perma Life, the court did
not appear to meet the lower court's implicit argument that by allowing the
franchisees in Perma Life the right to recover the Supreme Court was
essentially deleting any coercion requirement from an illegal tying
arrangement.6 3 Although the circuit court quoted the passage from Perma
Life wherein the Supreme Court characterized the petitioners' participation
as "not voluntary in any meaningful sense,"64 it did not specifically equate
this passage with a finding of coercion since in its view there was no
consideration of the doctrine.
6 5
In addition, it is submitted that the Third Circuit may have misread the
district court's argument. The court interpreted the district court as
requiring only salesmanship coupled with dominant economic power over
the franchisee. 66 But there exists a significant difference between salesman-
ship and the type of persuasion found to constitute inherent coercion in
Texaco.67 In this context, the plaintiffs in Dunkin' Donuts alleged that the
pressure to retain the approved vendors was coupled with threats of dis-
enfranchisement. 68 Moreover, as the district court queried, "what difference
does it make whether the tie is articulated in the contract or can be proved at
trial as having been imposed sub silentio through a pervasive and resolutely
enforced company policy as is alleged here?" 69 Furthermore, the practical
effect of the district court's formulation would not be to substitute proof of
economic power for proof of a tie-in, since that court explicitly stated that
use of the economic power would be required.
70
The Third Circuit's holding that only a coerced tie could be illegal is
subject to criticism on additional grounds. First, if, as the court implied, lack
of "freedom of choice" is the cornerstone of an illegal tie-in, 71 a "voluntary,"
i.e., non-coercive tie-in could be illegal, because if the sale of one product is
conditioned upon the purchase of a second, then the buyer has no freedom of
choice in the matter. He must take the second product in order to obtain the
first.
7 2
63. See 68 F.R.D. at 110-11.
64. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
65. 531 F.2d at 1221. It may be that the Supreme Court considered not whether
the requirements of a tie-in were present, but only whether the plaintiffs should be
barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto. See 392 U.S. at 140. If such was the case,
Perma Life would not support the district court's finding that Perma Life emasculated
the individual coercion doctrine. But the circuit court did not articulate this as its
reason for rejecting the district court's reliance upon Perma Life.
66. 531 F.2d at 1224.
67. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
68. 68 F.R.D. at 81.
69. Id. at 99 (emphasis supplied). This issue of the existence of a pervasive
company policy would be a common question.
70. Id. at 97.
71. See text accompanying note 47 8upra.
72. That the buyer indeed wants the second product is, of course, irrelevant if the
inquiry focuses upon the seller's intent. The seller does not care if the buyer is taking
the tied product voluntarily. As far as he is concerned, the buyer is going to take it
whether he wants it or not, or else he does not get the tying product. In the criminal
law, it is necessary to look to the state of mind of the criminal. Although it is
sometimes necessary to inquire as to the state of mind of the victim, as in rape cases,
1976-19771
80
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss3/10
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Second, the policy basis underlying section 1 suggests that a voluntary
tie can be illegal. By requiring that the focus be upon the buyer, 73 the circuit
court has ignored harm to the competitors whom section 1 was designed to
protect. The policy basis of section 1 as applied to tying arrangements has
beert summarized as follows:
The Court has shown . . . concern . . . with the interest of competing
suppliers of a tied product in free access to the consuming market - a
strong desire that competition in the sale of each product should be "on
the rperits." This interest is adversely affected even though the seller's
power over the tying product is slight, so slight that the buyers cannot
accurately be said to be "coerced" into the tying arrangement. It takes
very little power to induce buyers to enter into an agreement of the type
found in Northern Pacific .... But the fact that the seller's power over
the tying product is slight, and the buyers are not "coerced," does not
significantly lessen the impact on competing sellers of the tied product.
74
If the emphasis is indeed on the free market and the non-foreclosure of
competition, 75 then, whether the tie is voluntary or not, the conclusion that
an illegal tie has been established would follow, because the seller's
competitors, who are within the scope of section 1's protection, are the ones
being harmed by the tying scheme. The court's failure to recognize the policy
basis of section 1 thus weakens its application in tying cases.
Even the assumption that coercion is a proper requirement of tying law
would not necessarily settle the issue presented in Dunkin' Donuts. The
court did not address the possibility that coercion could be established in
such a manner that common, rather than individual, questions would
predominate. 76 Perma Life, Times-Picayune, and Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp.77 each contain language indicating that coercion
can be found from a conditioning of the sale of the first product upon the
this should not be necessary where the harm is to others as well. For the discussion of
the policy basis underlying section 1 of the Sherman Act, see text accompanying
notes 74 & 75 infra.
That there may be no damages flowing from a voluntary tie should have no
bearing on whether there was in fact a tie-in. And the fact that some plaintiffs may
have damages, and some not, would not cause individual questions to predominate
insofar as separate trials could be held on the question of damages. Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1967), modified sub nom., Chicken
Delight, Inc. v. Harris, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969). But see Smith v. Denny's
Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 459, 460-61 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
73. 531 F.2d at 1224. See note 41 supra.
74. Turner, supra note 10, at 60-61; see Baker, supra note 60, at 777-78; Pearson,
Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. Rgv. 626, 631 (1965); Note,
Franchises, Requirements Contracts and Tie-Ins: One Test for a Tangled Two, 74
YALE L.J. 691, 693-94 (1965). For a general outline of the policy basis underlying the
Sherman Act, see Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
75. See 68 F.R.D. at 112-13.
76. In finding that coercion must be established on an individual basis the court
stated: "What is sufficient to coerce one buyer's choice may not be sufficient to coerce
another buyer's choice; an item that one buyer might accept voluntarily, another
might accept only if forced to do so." 531 F.2d at 1219.
77. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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purchase of a second. 78 Indeed, the court quoted from the Times-Picayune
opinion to that effect. 79 Whether there was a pervasive company policy of
!,conditioning" would seem to be a common question. 0
Another possibility is that coercion might be inferred from sufficient
economic power in the seller. Referring to International Salt, Times-
Picayune, Northern Pacific, Loew's, and Fortner, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in Capital Temporaries, Inc. v.. Olsten Corp.,8' stated
that "ithe question raised in the pertinent cases is not whether coercive
pressure is used but how can it be established." 82 After reviewing these
cases, the Second Circuit concluded that
the plaintiff must establish that he was the unwilling purchaser of a tied
product. If he was not coerced by the economic dominance of the seller,
he at least must show that he was compelled to accept the tied product
by virtue of the uniqueness or desirability of the tying product, which
other competitors could not or would not supply.83
If the question of uniqueness is to be decided by the court,84 as it was in
Capital Temporaries, it would appear to be a common question not requiring
individual trials.
The potential impact of the instant case is difficult to ascertain because
its analytical weaknesses may deter other courts from relying upon its
rationale. At the same time, however, the decision may have the effect of
solidifying the view taken by numerous courts that individual coercion is a
requirement of tying law.8 In those cases which do follow Dunkin' Donuts,
the dispute will focus upon whether the franchisee has been coerced by the
franchisor. Although the holding in Dunkin' Donuts is narrow - relating
78. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04
(1969); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968);
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (see text
accompanying note 13 supra); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964)
(Lumbard, J., dissenting in part).
79. See 531 F.2d at 1218.
80. See note 3 supra.
81. 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974). This case was cited by the circuit court in Dunkin'
Donuts as requiring coercion. 531 F.2d at 1219 n.7.
82. 506 F.2d at 662. According to the Second Circuit, the coercion in International
Salt resulted from the existence of the patented machinery; in Times-Picayune and
Northern Pacific, it resulted from the seller's monopolistic position in the market for
the tying product; in Loew's and Fortner, crucial economic power was derived from
desirability to consumers and uniqueness in attributes. Id.
83. Id. at 663. In Capital Temporaries, the Second Circuit did not go as far as did
the Ninth Circuit in Siegel (see notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra); but that is
of no consequence for purposes of analyzing the case at bar. The Second Circuit
specifically found that there was nothing in the record, and no claim made, that there
was something so unique in the techniques of the franchisor that it could not be
offered by others. 506 F.2d at 663.
84. If Siegel were followed, there would be no need to decide the question of
uniqueness. Relying upon Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), the court
in Capital Temporaries implicitly distinguished Siegel. See 506 F.2d at 663. Susser,
however, has been generally discredited by commentators because of its misreliance
upon the market dominance test of Times-Picayune and Northern Pacific. Note, supra
note 74, at 697; see Baker, supra note 60, at 777-78; McCarthy, supra note 12, at 1094.
85. For a list of the cases espousing this view, see note 20 supra.
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solely to tying cases in which the terms imposing the tie-in were not
delineated in a contract - it may eventually be construed to cover all
franchise agreements. Because the individual coercion requirement makes it
impossible for class actions to be brought, the decision may be respousible
for initiating a trend away from contractual tie-ins and toward pervasive
company policies, 86 thus making proof of coercion a necessity in all
franchise cases.
While the instant decision, in the circuit court's view, saved the
franchise system from. ruination, 87 it is submitted that in the process it
harms the franchisees by raising barriers to their entry into court and by
increasing the burden upon them once they get. in. Even if it were able to
afford to bring an individual action, 88 the franchisee would now have to
meet the more rigorous test of proving coercion instead of use of economic
power. Moreover, the instant decision will result in a multiplicity of suits
instead of one class action. In addition, future courts will have to define
coercion and decide whether inherent, as opposed to overt, coercion will be
sufficient. 89 Finally, the court must determine the state of mind of each
buyer. 90
The court's inadequate treatment of numerous aspects of the case has
served only to enhance the confusion already extant in the law of tying
arrangements. Even if future courts decide to follow the Dunkin' Donuts
rationale, they will be forced to resolve the numerous problems remaining in
its wake.
Thomas M. Russo
86. See note 3 supra; text accompanying note 80 supra.
87. 531 F.2d at 1223 n.10.
88. One commentator has stated that such persons are unable to do so. Solomon,
An Analysis of Tying Arrangements: The Offer You Can't Refuse, 26 MERCER L REV.
547, 553-55 (1975).
89. 531 F.2d at 1226; see note 47 supra.
90. 531 F.2d at 1221 n.7a.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT -
UNNECESSARY INTIMIDATION OF DEFENSE WITNESS BY PROSECUTOR IS
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.
United States v. Morrison (1976)
Appellant Boscia was convicted by a jury of both conspiracy to
distribute and the distribution of hashish.' During the trial, the Assistant
United States Attorney sent at least three messages to Bell, appellant's key
witness, 2 warning her that if she testified, she could be prosecuted on drug
charges,3 and that her testimony could be used as evidence against her.4 The
United States Attorney then subpoenaed the witness, and upon her
appearance in his office, issued a barrage of warnings concerning the
dangers of her testifying. 5 When eventually called to the witness stand, Bell
invoked the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination more than
thirty times, allegedly depriving appellant of much of the evidence he had
expected to offer to the jury.
6
Although terming the actions of the prosecutor improper, the trial judge
denied appellant's motion for mistrial.7 Post-trial motions for a judgment of
acquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial were also denied. 8 The United
1. United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
2. Id. at 225. The witness was allegedly prepared to testify under oath that it was
she, and not appellant Boscia, who had been involved in the conspiracy to sell
hashish. Id.
3. Id. Originally, the witness had been indicted with the appellant, but the
federal charges against her had been dropped prior to the commencement of his trial.
Id.
4. Id.
5. Id at 226. The prosecutor had compelled the witness' presence in his office
through the use of an invalid subpoena, on which the witness' name had been
inserted over one which had been scratched out. Id. Evidently, the sole purpose of the
subpoena was to intimidate the witness in order to prevent her from testifying. Id. at
225-26. The Third Circuit noted that, in fact, the witness felt increasingly intimidated
by the prosecutor's continued warnings. Id. at 226. The traditional rule has been that
whether a witness is advised of his privilege against self-incrimination lies in the
court's discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241, 246 (6th Cir.
1967) (witness before grand jury need not be advised).
6. 535 F.2d at 226. The defendant's right to place evidence before the jury was
clearly established in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), where the Supreme
Court stated:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the
defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may
decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the
prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the
right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.
Id. at 19. For a discussion of the impact of Washington and the compulsory process
clause of the sixth amendment, see Western, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73
MICH. L. REV. 71, 111-17 (1974-75).
7. 535 F.2d at 224-25.
8. Id. at 225. The district court denied the motions on the grounds that the
prosecutor had acted in good faith, and that his actions neither deprived appellant of
any right to which he was entitled nor caused him substantial prejudice. Id. at 227.
1976-1977]
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States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit9 reversed the district court's
denial of a new trial, holding that the actions of the prosecuting attorney
deprived appellant of his constitutional right to call witnesses on his own
behalf and elicit their freely given testimony. United States v. Morrison, 535
F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1976).
The Third Circuit found that the instant case was controlled by Webb v.
Texas,"' where the trial judge's intimidation of the defendant's sole
witness '" was held by the Supreme Court to have deprived petitioner of due
process of law by denying him the opportunity to present witnesses in his
own defense.' 2 The district court in Morrison had distinguished Webb in that
the witness did testify,' 3 the prosecutor may have acted in good faith,' 4 and
the warnings to the witness were issued by the prosecuting attorney rather
than the trial judge.' The Third Circuit, however, did not find these factual
distinctions to be relevant to the issue of whether the appellant had been
denied a fair trial.'
6
9. The case was heard by Judges Forman, Gibbons, and Rosenn. Judge Forman
authored the majority opinion; Judge Rosenn dissented.
10. 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
11. In Webb, the sole defense witness was subjected to a prolonged warning by
the trial judge of the dangers of perjury. 409 U.S. at 97. In addition, the judge implied
that he fully expected that the testimony would be perjured. Id. Finally, the judge
instructed the witness, who had a prior criminal record and was then serving a prison
sentence, that a conviction on a perjury charge would be added to his present
sentence, resulting in an impairment of his chances for parole. Id. The Supreme Court,
in reversing the conviction, held that the judge's threatening remarks effectively
drove the witness from the stand, thus depriving the defendant of due process of law
under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 98.
12. Id. at 97-98; see note 6 supra.
13. 535 F.2d at 227. The Third Circuit ruled that although Bell did testify on
certain matters, the pressure imposed upon her by the prosecutor inhibited the
voluntariness of her testimony and thereby infringed upon the defendant's sixth
amendment right to have the benefit of her freely given testimony. Id. at 228.
14. Id. The preoccupation with the good faith of the prosecutor as a guide for
reversal or affirmance on appellate review is evident historically. See Singer, Forensic
Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors - and How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REV. 227, 269-72
(1968). Some courts have taken the position that the intention of the prosecutor should
be irrelevant in appellate review since the issue is fairness to the defendant, not
discipline of the prosecutor. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir.
1950); United States v. Nettl, 121 F.2d 927, 930 (3d Cir. 1941); United States v.
Sprengel, 103 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1939). See generally Note, The Nature and
Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 946 (1954).
On the other hand, good faith of the prosecutor has been a consideration in
whole or part for affirmance. See, e.g., Gladden v. Frazier, 388 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1968);
Keeble v. United States, 347 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1965); Nicholson v. United States, 221
F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1955); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946). At least one commentator has argued that the
prosecutor's intent should be a relevant consideration in a close case. See Alschuler,
Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. REV. 629, 645-47
(1972).
15. 535 F.2d at 228. While the prosecutor in the instant case was "somewhat lower
in the hierarchy" than the trial judge in Webb, the Morrison court noted that both
figures represent symbols of the state's authority to prosecute wrongdoers. Id.
16. Id. at 227. The decision reached in Morrison is supported by several other
recent cases. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Smith,
the prosecutor had warned a witness that if he testified, he could and would be
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Apparently, at least one factor in the Morrison court's decision was that
the actions of the prosecutor were wholly unnecessary to effectuate any
legitimate purpose.1 7 Despite a finding of prosecutorial misconduct, the
Third Circuit could have affirmed the appellant's conviction under the
harmless error rule.' 8 The court noted, however, that in Webb, a majority of
the Supreme Court had required reversal despite the presence of what
Justice Blackmun termed "overwhelming evidence of guilt."' 9 The Third
prosecuted as an! accessory to murder. Id. at 977-78. The court found such action
prejudicial and violative of the defendant's constitutional right to have witnesses
testify free from intimidation. Id. at 979. See also Bray v. Peyton, 429 F.2d 500 (4th
Cir. 1970) (arrest of defense witness during trial denied accused due process); People v.
Pena, 383 Mich. 402, 175 N.W.2d 767 (1970) (prosecuting attorney's letters to
important defense witnesses, calling their attentior to statute making perjury a felony
punishable by life imprisonment, were prejudicial, requiring a new trial). But see
Commonwealth v. DiGiacomo, 463 Pa. 449, 345 A.2d 605 (1975) (defendant's sixth
amendment right to present witnesses not infringed when prosecutor advised
eyewitness of his fifth amendment right to refuse to testify).
17. 535 F.2d at 227. The Third Circuit noted that the issue of instructing Bell of
her rights arose at the outset of the trial, and the trial judge stated that the court
would instruct her on her rights at the proper time. Id. In addition, the instruction was
in fact given by the trial judge to the witness before she took the stand. Id. at 228;
accord, United States v. Smith, 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court in Smith
emphasized: "If the prosecutor thought the witness should be advised of his rights then
he should have suggested that the court explain them .... The matter would then
have been presented . . .without any threats or implications of retaliation." Id. at
979.
It is also relevant that the Webb standard has been summarized as forbidding
practices unnecessary to effectuate a legitimate governmental objective if a material
witness is thereby deterred from testifying. See Western, supra note 6, at 140-41. Since
the Third Circuit in Morrison had already determined that the prosecutor's actions
were completely unnecessary, the Webb standard would apparently be invoked by the
additional finding that a defense witness was "deterred" by those actions.
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). Rule 52(a) provides: "Harmless Error. Any error,
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded." Id.
Normally, when evidence of a defendant's guilt is overwhelming, or if the
reviewing court determines that the misconduct did not affect the verdict, affirmance
under this rule can be justified. See United States v. Jenkins, 436 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (prosecutor's characterization of defendant as a teenage hoodlum deemed
harmless error); Taylor v. United States, 413 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (prosecutor's
statement that defendant stabbed, shot, and kicked the victim "like a dog" not
reversible error). But see United States v. Phillips, 476 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(prosecutor's comparison between the defendant and Sirhan Sirhan, James Earl Ray,
and Jack Ruby required reversal). See also Note, The Nature and Consequences of
Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946,
959-60, 970-71 (1954); Note, Prosecutorial Misconduct - Recent Second Circuit Cases,
2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 401-04 (1974).
In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), the Supreme Court had
stated that the standard for harmless errors was whether it was clear "beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained." Id. at 24. Although the district court in Morrison found that corroboration
of appellant's story by the witness would not have affected the final verdict, the Third
Circuit emphasized that the Government's interference with appellant's rights was
too serious to be excused. 535 F.2d at 227.
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Circuit viewed the action of the Supreme Court as precluding a finding of
harmless error when, by the actions of the Government, a defense witness is
prevented from testifying freely.
20
In failing to find harmless error under the circumstances present in
Morrison,2 while extending Webb to cover cases of prosecutorial miscon-
duct, 22 it is submitted that Morrison has eliminated some of the distinctions
which have heretofore been drawn between judicial and prosecutorial
misconduct for purposes of appellate review. 23 The Third Circuit's overriding
concern was to protect the defendant's constitutional right to present
witnesses who are free from intimidation.24 After Morrison, it is probable
that prosecutorial intimidation will not be tolerated if, in fact, it can be
shown that the testimony of defense witnesses might have been adversely
affected.
20. 535 F.2d at 228, citing Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 99 (1972), and United
States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973) (prosecutor's admonishments to defense
witness constituted prejudicial error even though guilt was overwhelming).
The Third Circuit has found prosecutorial misconduct improper, but not
prejudicial, in a number of cases. See, e.g., United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832 (1974) (prosecutor's improper remarks during opening
argument, trial, and closing argument were not prejudicial); United States v. LeFevre,
483 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1973) (prosecutor's improper remarks as to guilt and credibility of
accused did not constitute reversible error); United States v. Benson, 487 F.2d 978 (3d
Cir. 1973) (improper summation not so gross as to constitute prejudicial error).
In other cases, the Third Circuit has held that prosecutorial misconduct
required reversal. See, e.g., United States v. Newmann, 490 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1974)
(prosecutor's improper closing remarks were prejudicial and one factor leading to
reversal); United States v. Small, 443 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1971) (prosecutor's
representation in closing argument on evidence not in the record was extremely
prejudicial).
21. 535 F.2d at 228.
22. Id.
23. Appellate courts have exhibited a greater willingness to find prejudicial error
in cases of judicial misconduct since juries are thought to be more attentive to the
views and prejudices of the trial judge than to those of the prosecutor and since the
former are less subject to corrective measures at the trial level. Alschuler, supra note
14, at 684-90. It has been noted that the selective application of the harmless error
doctrine presents the most striking difference between cases involving judicial, as
distinguished from prosecutorial, misconduct. Id. at 689-90.
24. 535 F.2d at 228. Judge Rosenn, in his dissenting opinion, acknowledged this
right, but stated that a defendant does not have cause to complain when his witness
freely exercises the privilege to plead the fifth amendment. Id. at 229 (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting). Judge Rosenn distinguished Webb from the instant case on the basis
that, unlike the witness who was driven from the stand in Webb, the witness in
Morrison appeared in court for the defense, testified for the defense, and, in refusing
to respond to certain questions, was exercising her fifth amendment privilege
precisely as she was instructed was her right by the trial judge. Id. at 230.
Initially, the majority opinion did not address the conflict between the
witness' fifth amendment privilege and the defendant's sixth amendment right to
present witnesses in his defense. The fact that the witness' decision whether or not to
testify could not be made "freely" due to the prosecutor's misconduct was apparently
sufficient infringement upon.the appellant's due process rights to require the granting
of a new trial. See id. at 228. The issue of whether the witness would have taken the
fifth amendment regardless of the warnings issued by the prosecutor was evidently
irrelevant. Id. at 228-31.
In the final portion of the majority opinion, which dealt with the question of
whether a fair trial of appellant was presently possible, the majority confronted the
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In conclusion, it is submitted that still more guidelines need to be
established. Webb dealt with extreme judicial misconduct, while -Morrison
was concerned with outrageous and unnecessary prosecutorial miscornduct.
Future cases will undoubtedly arise in which the conduct of a prosecutor
may be improper, yet not so extreme as to mandate reversal on the basis of
Morrison. In these instances, criminal defendants will continue to raise
difficult questions by asserting prosecutorial misconduct as a basis for
appellate review.
Ira J. Rappeport
CRIMINAL LAW - FIFTH AMENDMENT - FEDERAL WAGERING TAX -
COLLATERAL RELIEF AVAILABLE TO VACATE CONVICTION BASED UPON
GUILTY PLEA TO VIOLATION OF STATUTE REQUIRING INCRIMINATORY
ACT.
United States v. Sams (1975)
In 1963, Victor Carlucci was sentenced to pay a fine of $10,0001 after
entering a guilty plea to an indictment charging him with willful failure to
pay the special federal occupational tax on wagering.2 The allegations
which supported the indictment were based on his failure to register as a
gambler 3 and his failure to pay the occupational tax for being a gambler
conflict between the 'rights of the defendant and his witness, resolving it on the basis
of use immunity. Id. at 228-29. Judge Forman stated that there are circumstances in
which due process may require a prosecutor to request use immunity for a defense
witness. Id. at 229. The prosecutorial misconduct in the instant case created such a
circumstance; the witness refused to testify on certain matters because of her fear of
self-incrimination, thereby depriving the defendant of favorable 'evidence. Id.
For an excellent discussion of the conflict between fifth and sixth amendment
rights, see Western, supra note 6, at 166-170, 177.
1. United States v. Sams, 521 F.2d 421, 423 (3d Cir. 1975).
2. Id. at 423. Carlucci was indicted under section 7201 of the Internal Revenue
Code (attempt to evade or defeat tax), section 7203 (willful failure to file return, supply
information, or pay tax), section 7262 (violation of occupational tax laws relating to
wagering - failure to pay special tax), and section 371 of title 18, United States Code
(conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States). Id. at 423 n.1. He pleaded
guilty to and was convicted under section 7203. Id.
3. Id. Section 4412 of the Internal Revenue Code requires that: a gambler register
certain information about himself and his business with the Internal Revenue
Service. See I.R.C. § 4412. The name and address of the registrant are required as well
as the names and addresses of those who work for the registrant and for whom he
works in the business of wagering. Id.
4. 521 F.2d at 423 n.1. Section 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code requires that a
gambler pay an occupational tax of $50 per year. I.R.C. § 4411. 1
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and the excise tax on wagers placed with him.5 Almost twelve years later,
Carlucci filed an application for a writ of coram nobis6 in federal district
court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in which he asked that his
conviction be set aside and the fine be refunded7 on the grounds that since
the Supreme Court had decided, subsequent to his conviction, that the
statutes which he was charged with violating required the giving of
incriminating information and that the fifth amendment was a complete
defense to a charge of, noncompliance, had Carlucci raised the fifth
amendment defense, he could not have been convicted.8
The district court ruled that as Carlucci's guilty plea constituted a
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, 9 and as there had been no
congressional waiver of sovereign immunity, 0 the court lacked the authority
to vacate his conviction and order, the return of the fine." On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2 reversed, holding that
Carlucci's guilty plea did not prevent him from asserting his fifth
amendment defense on collateral review since the very institution of the
prosecution against him violated his privilege against self-incrimination.
United States v. Sams, 521 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1975).
The Supreme Court had dealt with the tension between an individual's
fifth amendment rights and Congress' power to tax and to regulate certain
unlawful activities through taxation legislation a decade before Carlucci's
5. 521 F.2d at 423 n.1. Section 4401 of the Internal Revenue Code requires that
those involved in gambling aid wagering activities pay a two percent excise tax on
all wagers. I.R.C. § 4401.
6. The All Writs Act provides that the "Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) (1970).
A writ of coram nobis is a writ of error directed to a court for an alleged error
of fact not appearing on the record. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 406, 175-86 (4th ed.
1968). It is presumed that the error would not have been committed had the fact been
known to the court at the time. Id.
The use of a writ of coram nobis to test the validity of a conviction was upheld
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); see Lawson v.
United States, 397 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ga. 1975), in which a federal district court
allowed a defendant to proceed by a writ of coram nobis in a situation almost
identical to that found in the instant case.
7. 521 F.2d at 423.
8. Id. at. 423-24. Carlucci' also founded his action upon section 1346(a)(2) of the
Tucker Act which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court
of Claims, of:
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding
$10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress,
or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970).
9. 521 F.2d at 424.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The case was heard by Judges Van Dusen, Adams, and Garth. Judge Adams
wrote the court's opinion.
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conviction in United States v. Kahriger.13 There the Court held that the
federal wagering tax statute did not contravene an individual's fifth
amendment rights. 14 However, in 1968, the Court overruled Kahriger in
Marchetti v. United States1 5 and Grosso v. United States,16 both of which
involved defendants who had been convicted of failing to register and pay
the special taxes on wagering.1 7 In separate opinions, the Court held that
the assertions of the privilege against self-incrimination constituted a
complete defense to prosecution. 18
The Supreme Court applied the Marchetti and Grosso rationale one year
later in Leary v. United States,'9 which involved a defendant who had been
convicted of failing to pay the federally required tiansfer tax on marijua-
na.20 The Court in Leary interpreted the defendant's assertion of his fifth
amendment privilege not as a claim that he had the right to remain silent at
trial, but rather as a claim that he had a right not to be held criminally
liable for his failure to comply with a statute which required an
incriminatory act.
2'
13. 345 U.S. 22 (1953), overruled in part, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,
54 (1968); see notes 15, 17 & 18 and accompanying text infra.
14. 345 U.S. at 32-33. In his dissenting opinion in Kahriger, Justice Black stated:
"[W]e have a Bill of Rights that condemns coerced confessions, however refined or
legalistic may be the technique of extortion. I would hold that this Act violates the
Fifth 'Amendment." Id. at 37.
The approach taken by the majority in Kahriger was followed in Lewis v.
United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955), overruled in part, Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39, 54 (1968). Justice Black again expressed dismay that an individual could be
sent to jail for refusal to publicly register information descriptive of his criminal
conduct. Id. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black's reasoning was finally
adopted by the Court in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); see notes 15, 17
& 18 and accompanying text infra.
15. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). The Marchetti Court held that a proper and timely
assertion of one's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was a complete
defense to charges of violating the provisions of federal wagering tax statutes
governing registration and payment of occupational tax. Id. at 60-61.
16. 390 U.S. 62 (1968). Grosso originated out of the Third Circuit which had
affirmed the district court's conviction of the defendant for violation of the Gambling
Tax Act of 1954 and for conspiracy to defraud the United States and held that the
defendant could not raise a fifth amendment defense to the charge of failure to pay
taxes on gambling. United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 1966). The
Supreme Court heard the Grosso case with Marchetti, and held that the defendant
could not be prosecuted for failure to register as a wagerer, and to pay the special taxes
on wagering. 390 U.S. at 64-72.
17. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 40-41; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 63; see notes 3-5 supra.
18. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 50-54; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 71-72. The Court concluded
in Marchetti that "nothing in the Court's opinions in Kahriger and Lewis now
suffices to preclude petitioner's assertion of the constitutional privilege as a defense to
the indictments under which he was convicted. To this extent Kahriger and Lewis are
overruled." Id. at 54.
19. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
20. Id. at 11. The defendant in Leary had also been convicted of knowingly
smuggling marijuana into the United States and thereafter transporting and
concealing it. Id. at 10. The Leary Court reversed and remanded on these two counts.
Id. at 53-54.
Internal Revenue Code sections 4741 through 4746, 4751 through 4757, 4761,
4762, and 4771 through 4776, all of which dealt with the tax aspects regarding the
transfer of marijuana, were repealed in 1970 as a result of the fifth amendment defects
made apparent by Leary. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1292 (1970).
21. 395 U.S. at 28.
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The holdings of Marchetti and Grosso were given retroactive effect by
the Supreme Court in United States v. United States Coin & Currency.
22
Similarly, the Leary case was given retroactive application by the Third
Circuit in Bannister v. United States.23 As in Leary, Bannister involved a
defendant who had pleaded guilty to concealing and transporting marijuana
without paying the transfer tax.24 The court held that the defendant should
be able to assert his right against self-incrimination in a collateral attack on
his conviction because, had this right been recognized at the time he was
prosecuted, he could never have been convicted.
25
Soon after its decision in Leary, the Supreme Court held in the 1970
trilogy of Brady v. United States,26 McMann v. Richardson,27, and Parker v.
North Carolina28 that collateral attack by a defendant was not available
where the conviction was based upon a guilty plea voluntarily and
intelligently made.29 In all of these cases the Court focused upon the degree
to which the alleged unconstitutional governmental techniques had coerced
22. 401 U.S. 715 (1971). This was a proceeding by the United States involving the
forfeiture of money to the government. Id. at 716. The money was allegedly used by
one who failed to register and pay the occupational tax on wagering. Id. at 715.
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, stated: "Marchetti and Grosso dealt with the
kind of conduct that cannot constitutionally be punished in the first instance....
[W]e have held that the conduct being penalized is constitutionally immune from
punishment. No circumstances call more for the invocation of a rule of complete
retroactivity." Id. at 723-24.
The usual standards for applying a decision retroactively had been
established by the Supreme Court in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). There the
Court articulated three factors governing the propriety of retroactive application: "(a)
the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration
of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Id. at 297. In response to
the majority's reliance upon these factors, Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion
in United States Coin & Currency, stated that the usual standards were irrelevant in
that the Court's decision "established beyond peradventure that the government has
no legitimate interest in punishing such conduct at all." 401 U.S. at 727.
For a succinct review of the Supreme Court cases dealing with the question of
retroactivity, see United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S.. 715, 728-
38 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
23. 446 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1971).
24. Id. at 1250, 1256-57.
25. Id. at 1257-63.
26. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Brady, the Court refused to label the defendant's guilty
plea as involuntary even though the defendant argued that it was given in response to
a statute, later declared unconstitutional, which gave a jury, but not a judge, the
option of invoking the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping. Id. at 745-48. The
defendant contended that he pleaded guilty to avoid a jury trial. Id. at 744.
27. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). In McMann, the defendant argued that his original guilty
plea followed an allegedly coerced confession. Id. at 762. The Court looked not to the
confession, but to whether the guilty plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently.
Id. at 771-74.
28. 397 U.S. 790 (1970). The challenge in Parker was a synthesis of the arguments
put forth by the defendants in Brady and McMann. Parker argued that he pleaded
guilty because the statute proscribing first degree burglary gave a jury, but not a
judge, the right to invoke the death penalty. Id. at 794. He also argued that his guilty
plea followed a coerced confession. Id.
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the guilty pleas30 and determined that the pleas had been voluntary and
knowing in nature and that they had not been coerced by these alleged
techniques.3 1 Three years later the Court reiterated this emphasis in Tollett
v. Henderson.3
2
In 1974, the Court slightly modified the position it had taken in the
trilogy cases in Blackledge v. Perry.33 There the Court held that even though
a guilty plea had been entered, the conviction could be collaterally attacked
if the integrity of that conviction was in question 34 - that is, if the nature of
the underlying constitutional infirmity was so egregious that the state had
no right to prosecute in the first place.
35
It was against this historical framework that the Third Circuit was
faced with the task of determining the effect of Carlucci's guilty plea on the
availability of collateral relief.36 More particularly, the court was confronted
with the question of whether Carlucci's guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary in light of the fact that at the time of his conviction, Marchetti
and Grosso had not yet been decided, and thus Carlucci could not have
known that his fifth amendment right to remain silent would have provided
him with a complete defense to the charges against him.
37
30. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749-55; McMann, 397 U.S.at 769-71; and Parker, 397 U.S.
at 794-96. The allegedly coercive techniques were: 1) that the sentencing statutes for
certain felonies which gave a jury, but not a judge, the right to impose a death penalty
forced defendants to forego a jury trial rather than risk a death sentence, and 2) that
unlawfully extracted confessions from defendants are used to induce guilty pleas.
Brady, 397 U.S. at 743; McMann, 397 U.S. at 762; Parker, 397 U.S. at 794.
31. Brady, 397 U.S. at 758; McMann, 397 U.S. at 768-69; Parker, 397 U.S. at 794-
96.
32. 411 U.S. 258 (1973). In Tollett the right to be indicted by a constitutionally
selected grand jury - one selected in a nondiscriminatory manner - had been
recognized prior to defendant's indictment. Id. at 261. Tollett's attorney, however, was
not aware and did not advise his client that the state systematically excluded blacks
from the grand jury. Id. at 266. The Court decided that Tollett could attack his guilty
plea only on the basis of its voluntariness and the competency of his counsel and
could not attack it as an unknowing waiver. Id. at 266-68.
33. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). The defendant, convicted of a misdemeanor, was
threatened with having to defend a felony charge if he exercised his constitutional
right and requested a new trial. Id. at 23. He pleaded guilty to the felony charge and
subsequently sought federal habeas corpus on the ground that the felony indictment
deprived him of due process because it punished him for exercising his statutory right
to a trial de novo. Id. at 25.
34. Id. at 30-31.
35. Id. at 31.
36. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit had decided this issue in any
case factually similar to the instant case. An almost identical set of facts was
involved, however, in a case decided a month before Sams, Lawson v. United States,
397 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ga. 1975). Despite the factual similarity to Sams, the Lawson
court did not discuss the problem of the guilty plea. The Government had conceded
that the fifth amendment would have provided a complete defense for the defendant
and that the availability of such a defense was retroactive. Id. at 371. For these
reasons, the court held that Lawson's conviction could not stand. Id. at 371-72.
37. 521 F.2d at 424. Carlucci argued that a right not yet recognized could not have
been known to him when he pleaded guilty and, therefore, could not have been
waived. Id. In 1938, the Supreme Court defined '.'waiver" as "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); cf. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (defendant's
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The Third Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had greatly limited
the availability of collateral relief following guilty pleas to those situations
in which the defendant could "show that he did not make the plea
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily or upon a demonstration that the
plea was not uttered with the assistance of counsel competent with respect to
the law as it existed at the time of the conviction." 38 However, rather-than
applying the test of voluntariness to the guilty plea, the Third Circuit
interpreted its prior holding in Bannister to require an examination of the
quality of the right being asserted in the collateral attack.3 9 According to the
court, such an examination necessitated a determination of whether the
newly expressed right affected "'the integrity of the conviction'" or instead
constituted an "'essentially procedural change in the law.' "40 In this regard,
the Third Circuit agreed that the constitutional objection raised by Carlucci
- that the fifth amendment should have barred his prosecution -
undermined the integrity of his conviction, 41 and noted that the right
asserted was identical to that asserted in Bannister - "freedom from
criminal punishment for not incriminating one's self by paying a special tax
on an activity closely circumscribed by criminal penalties."
42
In response to the Government's argument that the Bannister rationale
had been undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in Tollett v.
Henderson,43 where the Court held that to determine whether there has been
a waiver of a constitutional right, the focus should not be on "the existence
... of an antecedent constitutional infirmity," 44 the Third Circuit distin-
guished the instant case from Tollett as well as from Brady,
45 McMann,46
and Parker47 on the basis that those cases were grounded on objections to
procedural rather that substantive constitutional infirmities which may or
may not have rendered the guilty pleas involuntary,4 whereas the assertion
in the instant case was that the very conduct with which Carlucci was
38. 521. F.2d at 424.
39. Id. at 425, citing Smith v. Yeager, 459 F.2d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1972).
40. 521 F.2d at 425, quoting Smith v. Yeager, 459 F.2d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1972).
41. 521 F.2d at 425.
42. Id.
43. 411 U.S. 258 (1973); see note 32 supra.
44. 411 U.S. at 266.
45. See notes 26 & 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
46. See notes 27 & 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
47. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
48. 521 F.2d at 425-26; see note 30 supra. Justice Harlan distinguished these
procedural and substantive issues by defining procedural due process rules as
those applications of the Constitution that forbid the Government from utilizing
certain techniques or processes in enforcing concededly valid societal proscrip-
tions on individual behavior. New "substantive due process" rules, that is, those
that place, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority
to proscribe, must [in Justice Harlan's view] be placed on a different footing. ...
[He concluded that] the obvious interest in freeing individuals from punishment
for conduct that is constitutionally protected seemled] to him sufficiently
substantial to justify applying current notions of substantive due process to
petitions for habeas corpus.
Bannister v. United States; 446 F.2d 1250, 1262-63 (3d Cir. 1971), quoting Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-93 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 22
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charged was constitutionally privileged. 49 To further distinguish those four
cases, the court looked to the type of conduct proscribed by the statutes in
question and noted that the defendants in Brady, McMann, Parker, and
Tollett were charged with crimes in which the Government had an "interest
in continuing to punish the offender"5 0 - kidnapping,5 ' burglary,5 2 and
nurder.5 3 In Carlucci's case, however, the court stated that the Government
no longer had a legitimate interest in the conduct charged against him
"since the Supreme Court has held that the conduct in question is not
constitutionally punishable."5 4 Moreover, the court noted that there was no
way to determine whether the defendant in Tollett would have exercised his
constitutional right even if he had been aware of it,55 while in Sams there
was little question that had Carlucci known of his fifth amendment right
under Marchetti, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have instead
exercised his fifth amendment privilege, for to do so would have been a
complete defense to the charges against him.5 6 Accordingly, on the basis of
the continuing vitality of Bannister and in light of the various distinguish-
ing features between that case and Toilet, the Third Circuit found that
Carlucci's guilty plea was subject to collateral attack.
5 7
The Third Circuit's decision that collateral attack is available enables a
defendant in that circuit who prior to the Sams case pleaded guilty to a
violation of federal wagering tax statutes to have his conviction vacated
without proving that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waive his fifth amendment defense when he pleaded guilty, and without
49. 521 F.2d at 426.
50. Id.
51. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 743 (1970).
52. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 792 (1970).
53. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 259 (1973).
54. 521 F.2d at 426; see notes 15-18 supra.
55. 521 F.2d at 426. The Tollett Court noted that a defendant might have chosen
to plead guilty even if he had been aware of the fact that the system by which his
indicting grand jury was chosen was racially discriminatory. 411 U.S. at 268.
56. 521 F.2d at 426. The Sams Court examined another case, Haynes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), in which the Supreme Court did not hesitate to reverse a
conviction based on a guilty plea that was in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights. Id. at 100-01. Haynes was charged with possession of an
unregistered firearm. Id. at 86. He argued that compliance with the firearms
registration statute would have required him to incriminate himself because the
firearm in question was an illegal weapon. Id. at 95-96. The Supreme Court concluded
that the fifth amendment was a complete defense to a charge of failure to register
such a firearm. Id. at 95-100.
The Third Circuit likened Carlucci's assertion to that of the defendant in
Blackledge v. Perry, in which the Supreme Court stated that the defendant was "'not
complaining of antecedent constitutional violations'" but rather was asserting "'the
right not to be haled into court,'" and it was on that basis that federal habeas corpus
was available to the defendant. 521 F.2d at 428, quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21, 30-31 (1974), quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973).
57. 521 F.2d at 428. The court denied relief, however, to Carlucci's claim for a
refund of the fine, citing the expiration of the six-year statute of limitations. Id. at 430.
Regardless of whether the right of action accrued at the time the fine was paid or at
the time Carlucci became aware that he had been injured - when the Marchetti and
Grosso decisions came down - more than six years had passed since either event. Id.
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showing that the advice from his counsel was incompetent in light of the
then-existing law.58
The defense of self-incrimination, raised by means of the proper writ,
will enable the court to expunge the record without the necessity of a
hearing.5 9 Moreover, as a result of Sams, a defendant's prior conviction for
failure to register or pay the federal wagering tax, if expunged, may not be
used for impeachment purposes if the defendant is on trial for a similar
charge, nor may it be used to increase his sentence.
8 0
58. The instant decision prevents Congress from requiring the performance of
incriminatory acts under the guise of its taxing authority. Justice Brennan,
concurring in Grosso, discussed the potential of the fifth amendment privilege to
dilute Congress' regulatory authority:
Of course the privilege does not guarantee anonymity. The question in these
cases, however, is not whether all governmental programs which require citizens
to expose their identity are invalid, but whether this statutory system, designed
primarily for and utilized to pierce the anonymity of citizens engaged in criminal
activity, is invalid. The privilege does guarantee anonymity from inquiries so
designed, when the risks are not wholly fanciful. And the risks here are obvious
and real. A list of persons who comply with § 4401 every month is invaluable to
prosecuting authorities. It must frequently provide the clinching link in the chain
of conviction.
We must take this statute as it is written and as it has been applied. Both the
statute and the practice under it clearly further a congressional purpose to gather
evidence from citizens in order to secure their conviction of crime. There
undoubtedly will be other statutes and practices as to which this determination
will be more difficult to make. These cases, however, present a statutory system
manifesting a patent violation of the privilege. That system must be dealt with
uncompromisingly to protect against encroachment of the privilege and to
encourage legislative care and concern for its continuing vitality.
390 U.S. at 75-76 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. In a discussion of the procedure required to apply the fifth amendment
defense retroactively to vacate convictions, Judge Biggs stated in Bannister that "as
the Fifth Amendment is a complete defense to prosecution under Section 4744(a)(2),
there will be no need for protracted evidentiary hearings upon applications for post-
conviction relief." 446 F.2d at 1259. Thus, once a petitioner has raised the fifth
amendment defense to attack a conviction entered prior to United States Coin &
Currency, there seems to be no need for a hearing; the conviction would simply be
vacated. The United States District Court for New Jersey explained its disposition of
a defendant's petition to vacate his conviction:
Therefore, there will be no need for an evidentiary hearing or retrial of this
defendant or any other. Mere assertion of the privilege eradicates any authority
the Government might have to prosecute. Additionally, the very nature of the
crime is a failure to provide required information. The Marchetti and Grosso
decisions indicate that this failure is now constitutionally protected.
United States v. Russo, 358 F. Supp. 436, 441 (D.N.J. 1973).
60. Some courts have expanded the Sams doctrine to expunge similar convictions
when those guilty pleas were obtained as a result of plea bargaining. See, e.g., United
States v. Liquori, 430 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 948 (1971)
(defendant's conviction for failure to pay transfer tax on marijuana vacated by court
even though obtained by guilty plea made as a result of plea bargaining). But see
United States v. Weber, 429 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated, 402 U.S. 939 (1971)
(conviction of defendant for failure to pay stamp tax on marijuana affirmed by court
on grounds that guilty plea made as a result of plea bargain benefited defendant and
was a complete waiver of. fifth amendment defense).
Although the court in Bannister was not faced with this question, Judge
Gibbons commented on the problem, noting that "[iln view of those substantial
benefits it is entirely reasonable that the government bear the risk that a statute to
which it accepts a plea may later be held to be unconstitutional as applied to the
defendant's conduct. Weighing the competing considerations we conclude that the
[Vol. 22
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The Sams decision is subject to criticism, however, in light of the court's
failure to consider the question of whether or not the fifth amendment
defense could be waived. In Bannister, Judge Gibbons noted that "neither in
Leary nor in Marchetti, [nor] Grosso . . . 'did the Supreme Court say
squarely that statutes requiring conduct which for an individual would be
self-incriminating were unconstitutional per se."'61 Therefore, it appears that
the possibility of criminal prosecution for noncompliance with the federal
wagering tax statutes exists for those who voluntarily choose to waive their
fifth amendment privilege. Neither the Supreme Court in its decisions on
this subject nor the Third Circuit considered the implications of a
defendant's waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination in such a
prosecution. Whether compliance by itself would be a waiver, and whether a
defendant would be able to assert his fifth amendment defense if the
information given in response to the wagering tax statutes were used
against him in another prosecution, were questions left unanswered by the
Sams court.
It is difficult to predict which statutes will prove as constitutionally frail
as the wagering tax law involved in Sams. There may be situations where,
although the required disclosure of basic information is incriminatory, the
government's need to regulate is held to have a higher priority.
6 2
In any factual situation where a constitutional deprivation is estab-
lished and the right to redress is applied retroactively, the courts will still
have to decide how to handle defendants' attacks upon convictions based on
guilty pleas. The Third Circuit's decision in Sams aids in the identification
of statutes which require incriminatory acts and as such may be vulnerable
to attack, and also serves to establish a standard for' vacating convictions
under such statutes.
Moreover, as a result of Sams, prosecutors may no longer use these
statutes as an incentive for plea bargaining without running the risk of
having the conviction vacated in the future. In addition, defendants who
were prosecuted as second offenders, where the first offense was a conviction
under one of these statutes, may now have recourse in the courts to question
government should bear this risk." 446 F.2d at 1265. In Sams, the Third Circuit did
not discuss the issue, leaving open the question of whether or not a plea bargain
would have affected the outcome of the case.
61. 446 F.2d at 1264. Justice Harlan spoke directly to the point while commenting
on Marchetti and Grosso in United States Coin, & Currency:
It was only the method Congress had adopted in collecting the tax that raised the
Fifth Amendment question .... Since it was only this method of tax collection
which was subject to constitutional objection, we indicated that the Government
remained free to collect taxes due under the statute so long as it did not attempt to
punish the taxpayer for his failure to file the required documents.
401 U.S. at 717-18.
In no case has the Court directly confronted the question of whether or not
voluntary compliance with the statute constitutes a waiver of the fifth amendment
defense if the information submitted is used as evidence in another prosecution.
62. In such cases the government may immunize the information from any use
other than the regulatory one. Use immunity has been offered as a possible
compromise between the government's right to regulate and the individual's right to
remain silent. See Comment, Reporting Illegal Gains As Taxable Income: A
Compromise Solution to a Prosecutorial Windfall, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 111 (1974).
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their status as second offenders and the penalties predicated upon such
status. Ultimately, the judicial decisions prior to and including Sams which
dealt with tax statutes requiring incriminatory acts may have the effect of
ensuring that new statutes promulgated by Congress and implemented by
the Internal Revenue Service will be drafted for the strict purpose of
exercising the government's taxing authority and not for the purpose of
detecting and punishing criminal activities.
6 3
Madeline H. Lamb
63. For a discussion of the purposes and policies behind the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination in the area of use of tax returns in non-tax related
criminal prosecutions, see Note, The Use of Tax Returns in Non-Tax Prosecutions, 41
BROOKLYN L. REV. 580 (1974).
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